

# CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES

EDITED BY  
RAFAŁ ZAJĘCKI

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


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THE EDITOR  
RAFAŁ ZAJĘCKI

REVIEWERS  
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EDITORIAL CORRECTION:  
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DIANA ŁUKOMIAK

TYPESETTING & COVER DESIGN:  
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# INTRODUCTION

The second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century presents mankind with many challenges. It is related to the emergence of both new and still unresolved (old) threats and problems to the functioning of states, both internally and externally. These phenomena reflect the activities of entities aimed at pursuing and satisfying their own interests on the international arena. The current stability of state structures has been tested by, among others, international conflicts, civil wars, economic crises, mass migrations of people, instability of democracy, outbreaks of new infectious diseases, or environmental issues.

Ryszard Zięba (2016) made a distinction between challenges and threats to state security. The first category refers to a phenomenon assessed as dangerous or unfavorable. It may also be a mental state or consciousness caused by the perception of phenomena recognized as dangerous. Generally speaking, threats may be understood as lack of security. By analogy, security is understood as lack of any kinds of threats. Threats are actions of a foreseen and unforeseen nature, affecting the quality of life of citizens and disrupting the desired level of functioning of a state. In his opinion, for security entities, including states, ensuring security is an existential need which is not only met by taking actions aimed at eliminating threats (negative actions). In this aspect, they also take actions to shape security, using positive methods, even if they do not experience threats at a given moment. Positive methods are related to challenges for entities, i.e. new situations in which inalienable needs arise that require formulating answers and taking appropriate actions. Therefore, such unanswered and unresolved challenges may only turn into threats to the security of individuals, societies, nations, as well as states. Challenges are a kind of anticipation of the emergence of threats, but they are not yet a threat. Ryszard Zięba (2016, pp. 9-12) points out that by putting challenges

and threats together, one may obtain some kind of continuum lines on which a certain need gradually arises, and then it transforms into the need for entities to take actions to ensure their security.

The multifaceted nature and complexity of the challenges and threats determining the security of states and international organizations allowed for identifying three dimensions of analysis. The first dimension of the analysis covers socio-economic challenges which are related to activities for the prevention, resolution and mitigation of the effects of economic and social crises (increasing areas of poverty, exclusion, or enslavement), monitoring of the processes of mass population migration, and resolution of conflicts on a social and economic basis. The second dimension of the analysis is based on political challenges which are primarily related to the crisis of democracy in the world, incomplete process of systemic transition and consolidation of authoritarian regimes, as well as emergence of a populist state governance. The last dimension of the analysis comprises the issues of the global (worldwide) range and the essence of threats which affect the overall international security and result from the globalization process. At this point, one may distinguish the challenge for the entire international community, which is posed by the threat of terrorism, military threats, epidemics of a global scale, i.e. COVID-19, and the growing discrepancy among rich and very poor states. Marek Malinowski noted that:

”The main challenge of the modern world is the growing conflict of interest among the economically developed, technologically rich and “white”, except for Japan, North and the much less economically developed, technologically much poorer and “colorful” South including the states of Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania with the PRC at the fore, aspiring to the role of a world superpower on an equal footing with the hegemonic today United States” (Malinowski, 2011, p. 6).

Apart from economic diversification, it is also worth mentioning the essence of globalization processes which, on the one hand, have a positive effect on establishing international cooperation; but on the other, undoubtedly pose a great threat by the spread of weapons of mass destruction, expansion of Muslim fundamentalism, implications of the economic crisis in the structure of international organizations on the crisis in national economies and the crisis of political leadership.

The purpose of this monograph was to start a debate on the current state of research in relation to the phenomena, processes and trends referred to as contemporary challenges for the functioning of states and international

organizations (in selected aspects). An attempt was made to verify and aggregate theoretical and empirical research on problems and threats to entities on the international arena.

This monograph is a collection of chapters made by researchers representing various academic centers from Poland, Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia, who indicate the multifaceted aspect of challenges in the modern world in terms of social, economic, political, and global threats.

The authors of the monograph are of the opinion that it is impossible to properly understand the specificity of challenges for the modern world, and therefore this monograph, without a critical look at the socio-economic and political systems, both in the national, regional and international dimensions. In view of the above, the authors' task was to embed the aspects of challenges for the functioning of states in the external and internal dimensions, based on the aforementioned dimensions of analysis.

In this monograph, Luc Ampleman makes a scoping review on cross-border transport geopolitics, while Beata Rogowska presents in her chapter a new research area, namely the economics of terrorism which, as she claims, is important not only for science, but also in practical terms, especially with regard to national and international dimensions of security. Roman S. Czarny, in his first chapter, attempts to present some opportunities and challenges posed by governing the Arctic and a brief outline of the American policy towards this region until the year 2018; whereas, in his second chapter, he deals with the role of Alaska in terms of American and international security, both in the past and at present. Moving southeast, Razhden Chikhorria discusses potential geopolitical consequences for the South Caucasus region, resulting from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Sylwia Hlebowicz, in turn, touches in her chapter a very important issue of multiculturalism and multiethnicity in modern societies and the notion of hybrid identity in today's globalized world. Staying East, Maryana Prokop and Ketevan Maisuradze decide to shed a light on the specifics of Ukrainian populism by analyzing the Servant of the People political party's campaign in 2019. Going northwest, Iryna Kaviaka concentrates on Germany and moves back to its unification in 1990 to show the geopolitical role of united Germany in modern Europe. Looking at North, Rafał Zajęcki tries to analyze the impact of Denmark, Sweden, and Finland on Poland's integration with the European Union and their contemporary relations on the EU's forum, by making a comparison of how these relations looked like before, during and after Poland entered the European Union. When it comes to the European

Union as it is, Lapin Oleh undertakes the issue of Brexit and Eurorealism in Scotland and Ireland, whereas Magdalena Tomala along with Tinatin Zhorzholiani describe the efficiency of health care systems of its member states. The whole monograph is ended with the chapter authored by Angelika Pienias, where she undertakes the issue of employment protection measures as a manifestation of Polish and British governments' intervention in times of today's pandemic crisis.

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LUC AMPLEMAN<sup>1</sup>

## CROSS-BORDER TRANSPORT GEOPOLITICS: A SCOPING REVIEW

**Abstract:** The present chapter proposes to re-scope the casual state-centric perspective in cross-border geopolitics and international transport by considering a holistic stance which is inclusive of all political stakeholders, including subnational actors in the field of cross-border transport. Through a series of illustrations related to recent cross-border transport conflicts and cooperation initiatives, the author identifies four types of concerns affecting the political transportability of people and freight across borders. This typology of cross-border transport conflicts includes i) those triggered downstream by political issues other than transport; ii) political tensions directly linked to the existence or absence of cross-border infrastructure and transport services; iii) the mobilisation of actors towards better conditions of cross-border transportability and finally iv) the interruption of cross-border transport by discontented stakeholders as a means of protest or for negotiation purposes. By looking at these oft-overlooked dimensions, the present contribution undertakes to provide an insightful look at transport diplomacy to decode tensions related to the transportability of people and freight across borders.

**Keywords:** cross-border, geopolitics, sub-national actors, transport

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<sup>1</sup> Luc Ampleman, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland. <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0035-8569>.

## Introduction.

### **Toward a more holistic vision of cross-border transport geopolitics**

How are borders, transport, and geopolitics intertwined? At first glance, the answer to this question seems obvious. Still, an in-depth look at the issue forces its examiners to admit that the answer to such a question depends on how we define each of these terms, and more significantly, the concept of geopolitics.

Traditionally, geopolitics has been looked at as:

- a ground of strategic practice by political actors;
- a field of political representation and narratives about geographical cooperation and conflicts for the broad public, but primarily as
- a subdiscipline at the intersection of politics and geography which often mingles with its subdiscipline sister, political geography (Ampleman, 2017, pp. 67–68; Dodds, 2007, pp. 45–47; Foucher, 1991, pp. 33–35).

The claim that the dominant conception of geopolitics is intrinsically linked to the context of international relations (IR) is unlikely to arouse much controversy (Chapman, 2011, pp. 1–5; Cohen, 2015, p. 15; Dussouy, 2006; Kelly, 2016, p. 3;21; Klieman, 2015, p. 2; Stogiannos, 2019, p. 5; Subra, 2016, p. 5). Geopolitologists have usually maintained the importance of the state-centric approach when it comes to discussing matters related to cross-border conflict or cooperation (Brenner et al., 2003; Foucher, 1991, 2016; Kelly, 2016, pp. 114–120; Klieman, 2015, p. 3). After all, don't borders fall under the examining scope of IR and relations between nation-states?

Within the limited perspective of this conventional approach, the relationship between borders, transport, and geopolitics, the theoretical shortcuts seem evident. In an orthodox approach of geopolitics, national states exercise - or try to exercise - political control over their borders or what they consider to be their borders. In doing so, through a range of policy instruments, political institutions regulate the incoming and outgoing physical mobility of people and freight between borders, namely the so-called 'cross-border transport'. Thus, political arrangements or the absence of political arrangements between sovereign states contribute to determining the level of political transportability or transborder crossing fluidity between/across two or several borders (Anderson & Rodrigue, n.d.; J.-P. Rodrigue et al., 2013, pp. 158–162).

While this first account of cross-border transport geopolitics seems satisfying, this conception of the relationship between the elements of the fun-

damental triad leaves several unanswered questions in the background. One reason for that stems from the fact that any country-state cannot be considered as a monolithic actor (Subra, 2016, pp. 20–23). Within the state itself, several ministries, agencies and even individuals usually disagree on the political arrangements, instruments and priorities that should be implemented to ensure the smooth running of the national governance over cross-border transport. In addition to the pluralistic nature and sometimes contradictory voices within the state apparatus, one must also consider the fact that transnational and sub-national actors, and among them all-size businesses, may also have their own agenda and perception of what should be done to improve, limit, or control transport between and across borders (Anderson & Villa, 2015, p. 2). In this respect, a legitimate analysis of the cross-border transport geopolitics framework can only be examined from an inclusive perspective which considers several transport stakeholders involved, one which tries to clarify the level of political control of the mobility of these actors and understand why cross-border mobility of people and freight remains a concern for these actors. More specifically, such a perspective would allow us to address a series of fundamental questions, among them: i) how do non-states / sub-national actors influence cross-border transport geopolitics and diplomacy? and ii) what mobilizes political actors to act on the mobility of people and goods?

As we will see through a series of worldwide case illustrations in the following sections, the concerns of local actors about cross-border transport appear usually well documented and have found some echoes in several case studies. Previous works have notably contributed to documenting the strategies of buyers, suppliers, and transporters, albeit limited to logistics (Higginson, 2013). Nevertheless, little theoretical effort has been made to establish a coherent and systemic portrait of the geopolitical voices and influence of subnational actors on cross-border transport geopolitics. The present paper aims to examine the complexity of cross-border transport and diplomacy by exploring some underlying geopolitical dimensions that are too often disregarded.

Thus, the first section of this paper revisits a common understanding of cross-border geopolitics as generally exposed by geopolitologists working in the field of IR. Within this paradigm, national states and transnational institutions occupy the central picture of the geopolitical analyses, while cross-border transport is usually approached as a key matter for national sovereignty and economic self-interests. The next four sections propose to re-scope this state-centric perspective by considering a holistic stance which is

inclusive of all political stakeholders, including subnational actors in the field of cross-border transport. Each section examines a specific kind of issue which triggers transport conflicts or cooperation between cross-border stakeholders. Thus, section 2 looks at cross-border issues that are not at first glance directly related to the implementation of transport initiatives, but which ultimately have an impact on cross-border mobility services and infrastructure. Section 3 provides some illustrations of cross-border transport issues directly related to the presence (or not) of cross-border transport systems, that is to say, that transport services and infrastructure are considered by subnational stakeholders as a source of geopolitical conflicts. Section 4 reflects on transportability conditions as irritants or opportunities which can trigger cross-border actors mobility strategies. The short section 5 briefly discusses one issue that cannot be neglected, namely where the border is taken hostage by local stakeholders who attempt to disrupt cross-border movement as a means of protest. The conclusion exposes how the elements examined in the present paper may provide an insightful look at transport diplomacy as a means to mitigate tensions related to the transportability of people and freight across borders while evoking some aspects not covered in this paper but which deserve the attention of transport and cross-border geopolitologists.

### **A traditional way of looking at cross-border transport and geopolitics**

In the last few decades, as the question of the globalisation has become a significant component of many polities' agendas, several observers have undertaken to decode the impact of the numerous phenomena at play on the international level. This includes the acceleration of transborder trade, the increase of bilateral and multilateral agreements of both a political and economic nature, the increase of pan-national cooperation in areas as diverse as the environment, culture, health and security, and the integration of international standards and norms (Cohen, 2015, p. 146; Newman, 2006, p. 127). Concomitantly, transportation which is often regarded as both an effect and as an accelerator of the globalisation, has occupied a prominent place in the concerns of political and economic actors (Cohen, 2015, p. 51; Mamadouh, 2016, p. 238). As a consequence, the questions of how globalisation reshapes the relationship between political actors, and how it affects the political transportability of people and goods, have found a sound footing in the scholarship of transport geopolitics.

To say that sovereign states have been at the heart of analyses undertaken to decipher the relationship between borders, transport, and politics would be an understatement. Transport geographers usually recognise the instrumental role played by sovereign states in both domestic and international affairs. At the national level, transport policymakers engage in arbitrating the potential tensions between transport beneficiaries and providers. As suggested by Shaw et al. (2008, p. 65) states play this role for three reasons. First, to settle a fair distribution of mobility between beneficiaries of transport, secondly to protect the 'natural monopoly' of specific transport networks in a situation where competing infrastructures would be ruinous for all, and thirdly to ensure a certain social justice since "*the costs of transport's externalities are seldom borne by those who produce them*" (idem). This request from sovereign states tries to ensure the coherence of the development and maintenance of the transport system through adequate planning, programs and policies. At the international level, states also ensure the sovereignty of their borders through a series of control mechanisms which vary from one country to another.

Yet sovereign states are not the only actors involved in transport cross-borders. The role of pan-national institutions and global arrangements have also fed the scholarship extensively on cross-border transport in recent decades. The emergence of international institutional pillars in the wake of the end of World War II, such as the International Air Transport Association (1945); the International Civil Aviation Organization (1947); the International Road Transport Union (1948); the International Maritime Organization (1948), the International Transport Forum within the OECD and the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (1953), to name but a few, have all contributed to the establishment of standards in security, environmental and transportation practices. The advent of international trade agreements and new political and economic regionalism (Söderbaum, 2003) have found their more robust expression in the development of structured supranational unions such as the EU or ASEAN. In turn, this has played a crucial role in the crafting of more or less binding 'single transport policies' and common regulations about mobility. For the last few decades, transportation has increasingly been conceived as an international geo-economic arena.

In this context, Anderson and Rodrigue (n.d.) have accurately identified five key perspectives under which the geopolitics of international transpor-

tation can be approached.<sup>2</sup> One can summarise these components through a series of crucial questions. These perspectives concern the dimensions of

- **Conquest and conflicts**, namely how political actors and especially states have taken advantage of the transport technology advancement to take-over new world regions or to "control and conquer oceans, territories, and resources" This is also a matter of how the development of adequate transportation and logistics capacity was instrumental in the context of international conflict
- **Competition**, or what transport strategies are political actors and international carriers carrying out to improve their position on the global market
- **Jurisdiction**, or how international legal arrangements and the internal territorial law of sovereign states are impacting the movement of transport users and carriers in the land, maritime and air transport. This also refers to the matter of under which conditions foreign transporters can access and operate transport activities abroad
- **Cooperation**, or more precisely how states collaborate to facilitate trans-border transport, improve transportability conditions and impact and limit political tensions in the vicinity of borders. And, finally,
- **Security**, or how political actors protect transport routes and strategic locations from safeguarding their economic interests (especially with regards to energy supply and valuable goods) as well as the safety of their subjects.

Undoubtedly, the general attention paid by both decision-makers and transport analysts to global transportation issues helps to supply clearer insights about how and why political actors conflict, compete, and cooperate over borders; how it affects the transportability of people and goods; and what role does transportation play in the global arena. However, what does it look like from the perspective of sub-national, local protagonists or smaller organisations which do not seem to enjoy the same political influence as dominant states and multi- or transnational institutions? Can we consider these actors as devoid of any geopolitical influence?

Undoubtedly, these questions are primarily of interest when it comes to transborder geopolitics and cross-border transportation. One should consider

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<sup>2</sup> Strangely enough, the cited text of Anderson and Rodrigue remains undated. The long article can be found on the website of Jean-Paul Rodrigue from Hofstra University and appears to work as an extension of his seminal work on the Geography of Transport Systems (Rodrigue & Notteboom, 2013) .

the assumption that even global players may deal all the time with the concerns of subnational actors while engaging in the defence of national or international interests. The field of transport geopolitics cannot be limited to the major global players in the same way that geopolitics should not be confused with the field of IR. This is especially true in the area of the mobility of people and freight. Transport systems are an object of concern at every scale. Within the arena of global transport, individuals, businesses great and small, small communities, advocacy groups from the civil societies, and other sub-national institutions engage continually with more influential global actors to negotiate the implementation, maintenance or abandonment of transport initiatives. Thus, when it comes to cross-borders, how do landowners, citizens, and other transport users impact transport geopolitics?

The idea that geopolitics should be more inclusive of all actors concerned about space as a political issue is not new. The French approach to geopolitics has long argued for a broader approach to geopolitics which is not limited to IR and instead deals with all spatial conflicts at all level of governance or, like Rosière (2001, p. 36), defines geopolitics as the study of geographical space as a political issue. In this respect, the French scholarship has engaged in a series of critical works on regional geopolitics (Giblin, 2005), local geopolitics (Subra, 2016) and land-use geopolitics (Subra, 2018). This latter scholarship covers, in fact, what is often labelled in the Anglo-Saxon tradition as 'land-use conflict studies' (Goetz et al., 2005). In both cases, the object of the study covers the same fundamental questions related to the 'geopolitical' nature of the occupation and organisation of the ecumene by conflicting or cooperating actors whose influence is varied in scope, time and space. When focusing on the geopolitical influence of subnational actors on cross-border transport, a series of questions can be asked. Among them are the following: How do these subnational actors mobilise around cross-border transport initiatives? And how, in turn, do the concerns of these subnational actors mobilise national state actors? The next four sections analyse the main sources of cross-border transport conflict and cooperation.

### **Non-transport issues triggering cross-border mobility issues**

Firstly, subnational actors can be mobilised by general cross-border matters which are not directly related to transport, but which will sooner or later impact the cross-border transport systems and decision-makers. This situation occurs since transport can be conceived as a derived demand (Rodrigue et al.,

2013, pp. 2–3) and several aspects of daily life depend on the physical mobility of people and freights. More concretely, citizens, firms, local governments, as well as various organisations, engage in mundane activities including commuting for work; trade, shopping; travelling and tourism; exploitation of natural resources; health care and education, etc. As many of these activities are taking place or can potentially take place abroad, cross border transport initiatives may unite several subnational actors. The same can be said about migratory issues which, although distinct from transport issues, imply in themselves a form of physical mobility.

The cross-border tourism sector seems to offer an obvious case here where subnational stakeholders involved in this industry mobilise to request more efficient infrastructure (Chow & Tsui, 2019; Michniak et al., 2015; Mikhalova, 2015). At the very least, they seek better coordination instruments between cross-border partners, since public transport in the vicinities of border regions often falls under the responsibility of local communities which lack regional harmonisation (Kołodziejczyk, 2020). Other economic stakeholders have been vocal in defending the *positive* impact of transport infrastructure on the development and improvement of cross-border investments (Blyde & Molina, 2015). In some cases, it is the business communities which seek to improve trading conditions, decrease procurement costs and increase regional development by advocating the improvement of cross-border facilities, even between countries whose relations have been marked by long political tensions such as India and Pakistan (Chanda, 2015).

But far from being a lonely concern for holidaymakers, merchants, and stakeholders from both tourist and trade sectors, the improvement of cross-border transport technology has become a general concern for many transport users, especially for commuting cross-border workers, merchants and residents. This is discernible in the European Union, where cross-border commuting has been facilitated in recent decades through numerous transport policy arrangements with the hope of aiding the mobility of people and goods between EU country members (Cavallaro & Dianin, 2019; Morchid & O'Mahony, 2019; Schiebel et al., 2015). In East and South Asia, reduction in transport costs is sometimes positively perceived as among the factors facilitating cross-border migration by young workers from poorer economies moving to more prosperous countries who are in need of a fresh new labour force (Syzdykova et al., 2020). Meanwhile, informal cross-border trading (ICBT) between countries like South Africa and Zimbabwe has become a survival source of revenues, notably for young educated women using public transport

like buses to practice their new businesses and bringing economic benefits for the countries, stable incomes for their households and offering their communities access to goods otherwise unavailable locally (Bamu, 2015; Chikanda & Tawodzera, 2017).

Enhancing the cross-border transportability of people and freight to improve the well-being and economy of targeted sectors does not constitute a unique request from sub-national stakeholders, however. A contrario, communities of land-users from any sides of a border, may also express concerns to limit or exercise more coercive control over the cross-border mobility of people and freight for several reasons. For instance, local stakeholders in the vicinity of national borders may express their discomfort over domestic, cross-border movement. This may happen when, for example, a local population feels irritated by incoming cross-border shoppers and the inappropriate location of transport equipment (Zhang et al., 2018). A more explicit illustration and well mediatised problematic international issue affecting cross-border residents and transport decision-makers are provided by the strong migration movement experienced in recent years. The example of asylum seekers trying to illegally cross borders by hiding in road freight vehicles constitutes a delicate example of concern which has an undesirable impact, more specifically the transport industry and international freight companies (Lietuvnikė et al., 2018). Also, the emergence of sanitary and pandemic crises like Ebola (Schmidt-Sane et al., 2020) or Coronavirus (Robin-Olivier, 2020; UNCATD, 2020; UNESCAP, 2020) have prompted decision-makers to juggle to find the best political instrument to control cross-border movements without penalizing subnational actors for whom the supply of essential products or personal movement remain crucial. This leads to another geopolitical cross-border transport issue which is at the center of some subnational actors' concerns, namely when cross-border transport systems constitute an object of conflict in themselves.

### **Cross-border transport systems as a source of geopolitical conflicts for subnational actors**

Beyond their own *raison d'être*, whether it be the aim of improving trade, access to resources or the comfort of individuals, groups, and polities they serve, transport systems may sometimes appear as a threat per se for certain communities because their presence is perceived as putting the land-use of a specific community in jeopardy. In fact, any development of a new

transport infrastructure may be the object of opposition from several land-use stakeholders. The development of cross-border infrastructure makes such a situation even more complicated by involving more actors from different national systems of governance.

The development of cross-border pipelines offers a sensitive illustration of conflictual geopolitical narratives between stakeholders. For instance, the development of the North American Keystone XL Pipeline has continuously contributed to stirring up the passions of both opponents and supporters of the project from both sides of the Canada-US border since its inception in 2008 (Hoberg, 2016; Palliser, 2016; Sears, 2013). The fourth phase development of the crude oil pipeline (1,900 km) planned between Hardisty in Alberta (Canada), and Steele City, Nebraska (USA) was met with tremendous opposition by Nebraska farmers and the Native tribes in Montana, South Dakota and Nebraska, with the latter defending the sensitive Sandhills region and the Ogallala aquifer area. American tribes and Canadian First Nations joined forces in opposing TC Energy Corporation which office is based in Calgary (Fontaine, 2017; Parrish & Levin, 2018; Smith, 2017; Volcovici, 2017). The Keystone XL Pipeline project not only divided the energy sector and an essential part of the land-users, but also the political classes about the financial benefits and the environmental impact of such projects (Kalvapalle, 2017).

In this regard, recent decades have obviously seen the significant involvement of various environmental and citizen groups whose influence sometimes transcends borders. The tunnel project (57.5 km) connecting the French and Italian fast train lines between Lyon and Turin illustrates how the ecological movement in Italy and French protest groups confronted the French, Italian, and also European political authorities. They ultimately made the latter consider their concerns of the threat posed by the project to the Susa valley, as well as the fact that it was largely pointless economically (Marincioni & Appiotti, 2009; Sutton, 2016).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Political resistance from subnational actors about transborder infrastructure does not always emerge from new infrastructure initiatives but may arise from past experience after international transport networks appear to have not delivered their promises, at least for certain communities. Once again, the development of the High-speed rail (HSR) provides here a good example at least in North West Europe where the HSR initially conceived to enhance Inter-city mobility and connections between major metropolitan areas with the clear expectation that other intermediary regions will benefit from this development have often failed to fulfil their purposes. Taking the case of the European TEN-T network, (Vickerman, 2014) has argued that the latter “has not met the primary objectives of reducing regional disparities in accessibility or reducing the effect of national borders on regional integration”.

Far from only threatening the land-use, the cross-border systems may also appear to put at risk the well-being of a population when it comes to protecting vulnerable local communities. A study looking at the trans-Asian highway, built between 2004 and 2008 in the Luang Namtha Province in Northern Laos along the border between China and Thailand, has highlighted concerns about the risk posed by the propagation of HIV among minorities living along the new corridor, both during and after the construction of the infrastructure (Slesak et al., 2012).

There are, of course, several reasons why cross-border transport systems may divide subnational actors and become the object of political conflict. Rivalry around cross-border infrastructure may occur, for instance, between transportation sectors. The competition between the trucking and the rail industries between Texas and Mexico has notably engaged transporters from their respective sector to champion investment and political support for their own infrastructure (Stagl, 2016). Sometimes rivalry between regional governments within the same country has proven divisive for the national government. In Belgium, while the central government decided to stop financing the little-used and unprofitable Thalys cross-border rail service between Paris and the town of Ostend in the province of West Flanders, the Flemish government asked for reciprocity and demanded Brussels also abandon the subsidies for Thalys services to and from Paris which served the Walloon cities of Liege, Namur, Charleroi and Mons (Keating, 2015).<sup>4</sup>

One would perhaps deem it unfair to solely consider cross-border transport initiatives as confirmed or potential sources of geopolitical conflict. Such initiatives can also be deemed cooperation opportunities by political stakeholders, hailing the benefits of such other transborder projects for the local population. Besides cross-border transport infrastructure (CBTI), the simple improvement of transport infrastructure within one region can be seen as a benefit for cross-border development (Jacobs-Crisioni & Koomen, 2017). Conversely, the development of CBTI and cross-continental corridors can also be used geopolitical rhetoric arguments or, as Wang and Yau (2018, p.221) in their studies on the transport infrastructure projects in the con-

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<sup>4</sup> Of course, the rationality of transport initiatives, including cross-border travel, still deserves to be discussed. Is a high-speed train service between France and Belgium a reasonable option? However, beyond questions of return on investment in transport, transport initiatives and those linked to the provision of international and cross-border links make it possible to question the actors who benefit the most geopolitically (at the electoral or economic level, for example) from such initiatives, whether or not it concerns the maintenance or not of leaves such as those mentioned in the example of the Belgian Thalys.

text of the Eurasian Belt and Road initiative put it: *as a legitimate discourse [of state-actors] to expedite their national/municipal development.*

### **Transport conditions triggering cross-border actor strategies**

If the existence and maintenance (or, reciprocally, their inexistence and non-maintenance) of cross-border transport systems may act as a source of mobilisation for subnational actors, or even as a source of conflict between them, the latter may also influence the geopolitics of cross-border transport in another manner, i.e. through the way they deal with cross-border transport systems. As a matter of fact, transport stakeholders tend to adapt their behaviours and strategies to handle cross-border crossings, which may also shape cross-border transport geopolitics. How do subnational actors deal with the physical movement of people and goods, and how does it affect policymakers at the national and international level?

A first manner subnational actors cope with cross-border transport systems is through logistic strategies. Drawing on previous studies, Higginson (2013) has efficiently summarised how buyers, shippers, and carriers deal with crucial cross-border transport issues, i.e. border crossing costs, waiting times and delays as well as other miscellaneous issues impacting the two previous ones. Buyers importing goods may change their international suppliers for local ones; charge penalties for late deliveries or increase storage facilities on their own side of the borders. Conversely, shippers and carriers may decide to incorporate longer times (border crossing buffer time) in their delivery planning, change transport routes or even switch to another mode of transport. Transport and trade policymakers sensitive to the challenges faced by buyers, shippers, and carriers may want to adapt their programs and advocate some better practical harmonisation between transport stakeholders from both sides of the border.

Actors from the transport industry are not the only ones to adjust to cross-border transport issues. Individuals also know how to identify strategies to take advantage of cross-border movements which may also force policymakers to reconsider their policies. Leal et al. (2010), for instance, discussed how a difference in the taxation of certain products between two border countries have a certain impact on cross-border shopping, and especially for alcohol, when this difference may positively compensate for travelling costs. Following audacious cross-border field research between Russia and Finland, Anna Stammer-Groszman (2012) documented the tactics of shuttle traders

from northwest Russia to 'beat the system' and increase their revenues. She describes the situation where, in exchange for a free ride to the Finish side and back, each of the four travellers embarking with a local taxi driver would agree to bring one BMW winter tyre with them. This would allow the driver to avoid exceeding the limit in weight (35 kg per month in 2006) and value (65,000 roubles in the same year) of the fixed customs-free import of goods before re-selling the tyres on the local market. If asked at the border control why each of the four travellers had bought one tyre, the answer was simple: each of them was giving it to a friend to be used as a garden flower bed. In her paper, Stammer-Gossmann identified different strategies evidently already known by customs controllers to circumvent product import regulations. Among them are "weight distribution amongst passengers; under-invoicing; commodity disintegration; replacement of identical goods for the same purpose" (idem: 245). Cross-border smuggling and shuttle trade are well-documented phenomena, and while some activities represent a high risk for the states, authorities or actors in positions of regulation enforcement, they also have to consider the limits of cross-border measures affecting transportability (Bruns & Miggelbrink, 2012).

### **Disruption of cross-border mobility as an act of protest**

Finally, there is another subversive way in which subnational actors can behave vis-à-vis cross-border infrastructures, quite merely by limiting their access. In recent history, cross-border infrastructure has been blocked by different national authorities for political reasons. Such cross-border blockades have also sometimes been raised by exasperated members of the city because of specific conflictual tensions. Perhaps one of the most spectacular illustrations of such a conflict is the case which opposed Argentinian and Uruguayan border residents over the construction of a pulp mill on the Uruguay River. This river serves as a border between the two countries and provides an excellent example of local cross-border transport geopolitics (Estero, 2017; Kaakinen & Lehtinen, 2016; Merkouris, 2010). The tensions occurred after the Botnia S.A. company received the environmental authorisation to build a cellulose factory in the vicinity of the Uruguayan city of Fray Bentos to the benefit of the local population glad to welcome the such an economic opportunity in terms of local employment and regional investment. The project was not met with the same enthusiasm by the cross-border population of the Argentinian town of Gualeguaychú, who feared the environmental impact on their

community and thus mobilised anti-mill activists into protests and the recurrent blocking of the cross-border Libertador General San Martín Bridge between November 2006 and June 2010. All in all, the conflict had a significant impact on the diplomatic relations between the two countries and resulted in litigation in the International Court of Justice and the MERCOSUR tribunal. The bridge blockade was eventually lifted after an agreement between the two countries was reached in the summer of 2010 (Kaakinen & Lehtinen, 2016).

All the examples mentioned in the previous sections show how the geopolitics of cross-border transport is generally structured by a complex system of relations of actors which cannot be limited to the simple relationships between cross-border states apparatuses. Not unlike the representatives of state actors, subnational actors engage in transport diplomacy where the key issue is control over the cross-border transportability of people and goods and whose impact differs for all stakeholders concerned.

### **Conclusion.**

#### **One more step to decipher the diplomacy of cross-border transport**

The present paper undertook to propose a typology of transport conflicts related to mobility across borders. Although it may appear a natural reflex to look at cross-border policies and international mobility under the lens of interstate relations, the observations collected over the course of the previous sections have mainly sought to extend the conception of cross-border transport geopolitics by including sub-national actors.

Although the proposed illustrations are perhaps guilty of having a car-centric character, this was because the paper focused its attention on terrestrial transport, the present contribution undertook to identify four primary sources of cross-border conflicts and cooperation that can be related to or impact transport geopolitics. First, the political mobilisation of social actors, whether at the local, regional, national or international level, around transport initiatives may be first triggered downstream of other political stakes following issues which by definition involved mobility. These include tourist development, the trade and migration policies. Secondly, social actors may be mobilised favourably or unfavourably by the perspective or existence of cross-border infrastructure and the implementation of transport services. The fluidity or the fixedness of transport conditions between borders may constitute a third concern for subnational actors who wish to maintain

or improve the best transportability conditions between the inchoative and terminative positions on both sides of borders. Finally, cross-border mobility can also be restrained as a means of protest by discontented stakeholders putting pressure on national authorities and other political actors to dissolve tensions if they hope to restore the cross-border movement of people and goods.

While the present chapter has set out to illustrate as clearly as possible cross-border conflicts through a series of concrete cases taken from the four corners of the world, one may wonder how political actors manage their divergences and how it affects cross-border transportability. The efforts to facilitate (or to voluntarily obstruct) smoother relations between the parties concerned by cross-border transport depend on a series of parameters, which have been overlooked in this paper and which deserve more in-depth attention. One may call transport diplomacy both i) the commitment and initiatives were undertaken to reduce, maintain or increase the political distance (s) between the actors concerned by transport issues and ii) the study of these initiatives and actor's commitment. When it comes to cross-border transport geopolitics, three key questions merit some specific consideration.

The first consideration concerns the form of political control that actors involved in cross-border transport are able to exercise on the transportability of people and goods. It appears evident that the levels of influence that political actors can exercise over the cross-border transportability of people and goods varies and remains asymmetrical. Two effective forms of control over the transportability of people and goods deserve to be mentioned. The first concerns the political control over the mobility of political actors and the second, the capital of the influence of these actors on transport initiatives. The notion of political control of mobility can be defined as the underlying capacity to assign places and physical networks that can be accessed (or not) by oneself and by other political subjects (individuals, groups of individuals, institutions, etc.). The capital of influence on transport initiatives can be understood as the proficiency level of political actors in terms of being able to successfully negotiate the implementation, maintenance or abandonment of transport initiatives in a specific area or on specific routes. Interestingly, experience also shows that sub-national actors from one specific state may have a more significant influence on transport initiative abroad than resident sub-national actors. The case of pipeline development mentioned earlier once again constitutes a good illustration of such a form of cross-border and transborder control of mobility. The social acceptance of transport initiatives

by subnational actors may have a significant impact on national cross-border policies.

The second consideration is related to what mobilises these actors to take part in or feel concerned about cross-border transportability, namely the geopolitical values of stakeholders. When it comes to transport, subnational actors may be concerned with ideals linked to the transportability itself because they perceive the transport of people and goods (across borders or even locally) as a benefit. In doing so, they may advocate the following four axiological ideals:

- accessible transport in term of costs;
- more efficient and fluid mobility;
- better comfort and
- safer transport systems. At the same time, actors looking for mobility improvement are not the only ones affected by transport politics. Stakeholders concerned by the impact of transport on the ecumene or who believe that some transport initiatives may impact their land-use may have other axiological priorities, including
- the security of non-transport users;
- the well-being of residents too often disturbed by negative externalities of transport;
- the privileges stemming from access to the land itself, not to mention what can be called at the higher level, the land sovereignty, and finally
- the social cost of mobility, i.e. the impact of the movement of people and goods on the value of the land or other land or business owners (Ampleman, forthcoming).

The third consideration can finally be linked to the level of engagement of transport stakeholders on influencing cross-border transportability. That is to say that while subnational actors may want to protect their own interests and while they may be eager to exercise their influence, the question remains: how far and how long will they want to engage. This dimension primarily refers to the level of the intensity of conflicts or, on the contrary, to the amount of will and energy that stakeholders are ready to invest in order to dissolve tensions and increase cooperation.

By examining these three parameters further and conjugating them to the four types of cross-border geopolitical sources of tensions affecting transport previously introduced in this chapter, one can obtain a functional toolbox to help diagnose geopolitical frictions affecting the transportability of peo-

ple and goods across borders. The emergence of new sensitivities, especially those of an environmental nature, those linked to the more recent intensification of global mass-migration and the impact of the sanitary crisis on supply and international travel today, offer additional reasons to be interested in and investigate local cross-border geopolitics from the perspective of sub-national actors and its impact on internal and international relations.

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BEATA ROGOWSKA<sup>1</sup>

# TOWARDS A “NEW KIND OF SECURITY”. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM

**Abstract:** The research goal is to present a new research area, i.e. the economics of terrorism, which is important not only for science, but also in practical terms, especially with regard to increasing security in the national and international dimensions. Quantitative research conducted within the framework of the economics of terrorism allows for drawing attention to the causes, effects and key areas for terrorist phenomena in those aspects which have been so far marginalized. It is particularly important in the context of terrorist phenomena being intensified across Europe and the world, and which are posing a real threat on a global, state and individuals' levels.

**Keywords:** economics of terrorism, security, terrorism

## Introduction

Historically, the concept of security was primarily of a military nature (military power). The broadening of the field of interest of security sciences was to a large extent implied by the complexity of the modern world. In addition to purely military aspects, such areas as social, ecological, energy,

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<sup>1</sup> Beata Rogowska, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1173-1215>

economic, etc. appeared in response to the real threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Nowak, Nowak 2011, p. 17; Wojtaszczyk, Materska- Sosnowska 2009, p.11). Researchers extended the scope of research by pointing to the importance of economic analysis for the study of particular problems, like terrorism. Terrorism has always contained a financial or economic element (Bates, LaBrecque, 2019, p. 2). From the beginning, such questions have been posed as: who is financing terrorism? what is the economic cost of a single terrorist attack?

Security is a classic public good provided, first of all, by states. Thus, there is a significant correlation with public finances (public expenditures) (Gold, 2004, p. 4; Pham, Doucouliagos 2017, p. 2). The analysis of the relationship between economics and terrorism as well as economy and terrorism should be started by defining what economics and economy are.

Among many definitions of economics and economy (Kowalczyk, 2018, p. 10; Horodecka, 2011, p. 85; Chmielewski, 2011, p. 429; Glapiński, 2006, p.11; Noga, 2018, p. 8; Księżyk, 2012, p. 71), it is worth pointing out that the former one is the science of rational management, while the latter one is a complex system which, depending on the role and importance of market impulses and private property, may have a market or non-market character.

### **Terrorism**

There are many definitions of terrorism, but there is no one universally recognized in the literature on the subject Ephesus (it is assumed that the first terrorist in history was Herostrates of Ephesus) (Resztak, 2012, pp. 149, 152). On the basis of these definitions, such key elements may be identified as: violence, fear, crime, intimidation, extortion, etc. (Nowak, Nowak, 2011, p. 138; Marczak, 2012, p. 92). The main reason lies mainly in different interpretations resulting from different approaches (Sieczka, 2017, p. 91; Enders, Sandler, 2008, p. 5). Due to dynamic changes in this area, methods of conducting attacks, and terrorist targets, a complex typology of terrorist phenomena is currently emerging. A number of criteria are used. For instance, in terms of state participation, there are: national, international; entity: state, anti-state; legality: legal, illegal; area of influence: continental and Middle Eastern, etc. (Sandler, Enders, 2008, p. 11; Enders, Sandler, 2012, p. 8; Węgliński, 2010, p. 63; Resztak, 2012, p. 158).

### Essence of economy of terrorism

At the beginning, it was believed that terrorism was called as the "weapon of the poor" (Bates, La Brecque, 2019, p. 1). Thus, discussions on the relationship between economics and terrorism were focusing on such issues as poverty and social inequality. The correlation between poverty and terrorism is not a thesis which nowadays dominates in the literature on the subject. Since the research of Krueger and Malečková (2003), it has been pointed out that there is no strong relationship between poverty, education, and terrorism. Currently, it is emphasized that terrorism arises from "calculation", not from poverty (Krueger, Malečková 2003, p. 114). For example, members of the Hezbollah's armed wing or Palestinian suicide bombers come from privileged families and have elite education (Blomberg, Hess, 2004, pp. 1010). Many madrasas, i.e. religious schools in Pakistan, are being financed by wealthy entrepreneurs. Teaching in these schools focuses on making their students become infantry soldiers or elite agents of extremist movements in the future. It is worth pointing out that, from the perspective of some states, terrorist groups often act as providers of basic goods and services for the poor. In this way, they fill in missing gaps in the operations of states and markets (Gold, 2004, p. 10).

From the economic perspective, terrorism generates the costs of lost economic activity and its negative impact on industries and sectors of economy is visible, for example, tourism or increasing public spending on security.

Due to its complexity, the analysis of economic effects has received a number of classifications according to various criteria.

The economic effects may be divided into:

- macro- (decline in GDP) and microeconomic (reduced revenues from tourism) ones (Buława, Szmit, 2012, p. 79),
- global, sector, industry, and local ones,
- those for the states with a high level of economic development and those for developing ones.

In addition, the following costs are distinguished:

- direct costs including direct losses related to a terrorist attack (damaged goods, value of lost human lives, value of lost earnings) (Brück 2007, pp. 12-13),
- indirect or secondary costs relating to the subsequent losses associated with the terrorist attack, such as increased insurance premiums, increased

protection costs, costs associated with long-term changes in trade, higher earnings for potentially “vulnerable employees” (Sandler, Enders, 2008, pp. 1-11; Brück, 2007, p. 5; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, Younas, 2014, p. 25).

Terrorism may also lead to such negative phenomena as unemployment or homelessness. Therefore, it can affect different markets, including the labor one. It is indicated, however, that the impact of terrorist attacks (actually its strength) depends on the states’ level of wealth. States being at a higher level of economic development have better opportunities to react and limit the macroeconomic effects of terrorist attacks thanks to the instruments of their monetary and fiscal policies (Sandler, Enders, 2008, p. 5). Most of the literature on the economic consequences of terrorism focuses on the economy of “destination state”. Nevertheless, terrorism may also have unintended economic consequences for the economy of the state where the perpetrators of terrorist attacks live (Benmelech, Berrebi, Klor 2009, p. 2). The financial, commercial and logistic interdependence of modern economies makes the cost of terrorist activities become a special tax (Bates, LaBrecque, 2019, p. 12).

A turning point for the economic analysis of terrorism was September 11, 2001 (the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States). It was the first time that attention was paid to the costs and economic effects of terrorism on such a scale (Enders, Sandler 2008, p.1; Nowak, Nowak 2017, p. 139). The literature on the macroeconomic consequences of terrorism was not developed until 2003 and was limited in scope. Since the early 1990s, the research on the microeconomic consequences of terrorist attacks have been conducted. In particular, this research covered tourism, trade, and a financial sector.

The literature on the subject analyses the impact of terrorism on:

- foreign direct investment (FDI) (Sandler, Enders, 2008, pp. 15-19). As terrorist risks increase, investors are redirecting investments to “safer states”. In 1996, Greece and Spain suffered from terrorism in the form of significant losses in FDI (about 10% per year). The effect may be stronger in poorer states as they are less able to diversify risks (Schneider, Brück, Meierrieks, 2011, p. 42; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, Younas, 2014, p. 27; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, Younas, 2018, pp. 657-658),
- foreign trade - terrorism may disrupt trade by increasing its “uncertainty”. Supply chain disruptions may reduce the total volume of trade or cause

- it to be replaced by alternative trade routes and new trading partners, and thus limiting trade with states affected by terrorism (Pham, Doucouliagos, 2017, p. 4). In both destination and neighboring states, the fear of terrorist attacks may lower consumer demand, increase income uncertainty, and potentially delay or interrupt purchases of goods, such as imported ones. Psychological effects may also influence the structure of trade (Pham, Doucouliagos, 2017, pp. 5-6). Tightened immigration restrictions are another costs, making it difficult for skilled workers to cross borders (impact on labor markets) (Gold, 2004, pp. 4-11),
- financial markets - weakening of the international financial system (Johnston, Nedelescu, 2005, p. 3; Michalczuk-Ouerghi, Dłużewska, 2018, p. 59).

International travel and tourism contribute significantly to the economic growth and development of individual nation states. According to the annual forecast by Travel and Council, the total contribution of travel and tourism to the global economy increased by 3.6% in 2017 (Dragičević, Radić, Grbić, 2018, p. 66). The interdependence of many industries related to tourism, including airlines, hotels, restaurants, and shops may be attractive targets for terrorists whose priority is to weaken economies of given states (Bates, LaBrecque, p. 11). In the economic perspective, a limited willingness to invest in places threatened with the risk of terrorist attacks is visible. This, in turn, lowers the income of residents and the employment rate in states affected by terrorism. In addition to short-term costs like reducing the number of tourists, and long-term costs like reducing the level of foreign investment, terrorism has numerous indirect costs. These include increased expenditure on promotion aimed at encouraging tourists to enjoy their leisure time, as well as the costs of renovation of tourist facilities damaged during terrorist attacks. Additional costs are borne in order to increase protection measures against attacks (Marczak 2012, p. 92; Siczka 2017, p. 93). Additional individual insurance in the event of death or injury as a result of an attack, incurred indirectly by owners of tourist facilities and directly by tourists themselves, also belong to indirect costs (Marczak 2012, p. 99). This has a negative impact on the demand for travel (Kapera 2016, p. 13). In underdeveloped states, the aversion to tourists is particularly evident because of clear social and religious differences, among others. The most common types of terrorist attacks whose victims are tourists include bomb attacks, suicide attacks, and kidnapping for ransom (Marczak 2012, pp. 91-97).

Terrorist activities carried out in one state may also have implications for other states. The attacks in Tunisia in 2015 had enormous consequences for most European tour operators, as well (Michalczyk-Ouerghi, Dłużewska, 2018, pp. 91-97). Therefore, states of tourist reception, where tourism revenues account for a significant percentage of GDP, face huge financial losses when tourists change their leisure destinations. It is then said about the effect of substituting the place of destination (Marczak, 2012, pp. 91-97).

### **Neoclassical model**

In the field of research methodology, terrorists' activities are overlapping with the model of economic man - *homo oeconomicus* - neoclassical rational choice (Michalczyk-Ouerghi, 2018; Dłużewska, p. 73; Phillips, 2016) correlated nowadays with law and economics. The economic model of crime and law enforcement is based on a balance between the benefits of committing a crime and corresponding costs in terms of probability and severity of punishment for individuals (decision) and society (optimal law enforcement project) in order to achieve effective deterrence (Garoupa, Klick, Parisi, 2006, p. 148). It is pointed out that terrorists can be defined as rational actors making choices (motivations) between legal norms (punishment) and potential profits. The cost of terrorism consists of material resources, gathering of information, and the time needed to prepare attacks. In addition, the expected costs also reflect the risks associated with the actual performance of activities (e.g. likelihood of capture and imprisonment, and expected punishment). In economics, it is illustrated by indifference curves. It is worth pointing out that death for terrorists may be a potential profit for them - "a reward for heroic deed after death" (Frey, Luechinger 2003, p. 2). Terrorist preferences are very important in understanding the benefits of committing a crime (suicide death in the name of religion) as well as in establishing effective punishments. The agent-principal economic theory seems to be helpful in this respect. In the light of this theory, the lack of trust between the agent and the principal may become a limiting factor in *ex ante* crime and disclose *ex post* information and evidence. The legal mechanism of distrust between different parties (e.g. settlements or punishment mitigation) has an effect that makes different parties less likely to break the law (because each party is afraid that the other one will come to an agreement with the authorities and present incriminating evidence) (Garoupa, Klick, Parisi, 2006, p. 150).

Thus, following Frey (2004), they can be ascribed to the concept of economic rational man: *Restricted, Resourceful, Evaluating, Expecting, Maximising, Man* – RREEMM. In support of this thesis, terrorists substitute their targets and methods of attack. For example, when states introduce metal detectors at airports to prevent air attacks, a number of bombings in buildings is increasing. It has been suggested that a terrorist is not irrational. Terrorists will be rational in their actions - they will effectively react to changing stimuli (e.g. they will put a bomb in a bus if metro stations are equipped with monitoring cameras) (Garzarelli 2006, pp. 337-338).

In economic terms, terrorists' goals come down to:

- weakening economic growth in certain states,
- redistribution of power and property rights,
- rent seeking,
- using the media to achieve economic goals,
- destabilization of political and economic systems,
- burdening societies with economic costs in order to force implementation of specific demands (Frey, Luechinger 2003, p. 5).

### **Counteracting terrorism - economic perspective**

In this dimension, a question about the methods of counteracting terrorism, which are effective from the economic perspective, arises. One view of the Swiss economist B. S. Frey will be presented. In the light of this concept, it is difficult to impose sanctions on terrorists because they act "less visibly", do not officially represent specific economies as it is in the case of criminal organizations, are not institutionalized (network structures), and are not subject to international law. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon that needs to be reduced, and requires a wide range of tools and institutional structures, such as: security institutions (army and police), financial institutions (disruption of terrorists' financing channels), and the use of politics and diplomacy.

The fight against terrorism is thus resource-intensive and therefore has direct economic costs. The basic method used in the face of terrorist threats is, in political terms, the so-called "deterrence". Over time, attention has begun to be drawn to the fact that states' actions based on "deterrence" (threats of severe sanctions using the police and armed forces) are extremely costly. They often exceed the "true" cost of terrorist attacks (Frey, Luechinger 2003, p. 3; Gold, 2004, p. 11). Hence, some counter-proposals, initiated

by B. S. Frey, among others, began to emerge. One of the key assumptions was the concept of state decentralization, which is to reduce the susceptibility to terrorist attacks (Frey, Luechinger, 2002). To this end, he compared the attack in Switzerland in 2001 with the attack in Armenia in 1999, by pointing to the effectiveness of decentralised governments against centralized ones (Frey, Osterloh, 2016, p. 2; Frey, 2004; Frey, Luechinger, 2003b). First of all, decentralization should concern politics, power should be divided between different levels of government (center, local government, local structures), economy (market is based on price impulses), and civil society (non-governmental societies). An important element in the face of threats from the so-called network structure characteristic of terrorists is the creation of a poly-centric society consisting of many different groups and organizations (Frey, Osterloh, 2016, p. 2).

Decentralization as an element of the anti-terrorist strategy may take two forms:

- political power is shared between many different political actors (classical separation of powers, democracy and the rule of law) and, at different levels, government (federalism),
- market economy which is to be less susceptible to terrorist attacks than an over-regulated economy (Frey, 2003, p. 6).

It proposes a positive policy (carrot) which should discourage from entering into criminal activities (cost advantage over potential profits), i.e. encouraging fighters to leave terrorist camps, undertaking negotiations with terrorist groups (Garzarell, 2006, p. 338; Frey, Osterloh, 2016, p. 1). Contrary to the “stick” policy which deals with retaliation by means of coercion or even violence (such as economic sanctions against states helping terrorists, imprisonment, lack of negotiations, tortures, and war on terrorism).

It should be noted that terrorist groups are often in competition with each other, even if they share similar beliefs. For example, they can compete for the same group of potential new recruits (Frey, Luechinger, Stutzer 2007). According to B. S. Frey, the essence of such a conflict may be used as a tool for counteracting terrorism. Similarly, it shows, at the microeconomic level, the necessary impact on the education systems of “potential states involved in terrorism”, for example, through student exchange programs (cultural aspect) (B. S. Frey, M., Osterloh, 2016, p.1).

When one uses the assumptions of public choice theory, it may turn out that this solution will be unpopular. Why? This theory is based

on the assumption that political actors and public administration do not pursue the public interest, but maximise rent seeking. Therefore, some of the key public security institutions may be interested in maintaining the current concept of combating terrorism (Steelman 2005, p. 56), due to such issues as employment, remuneration, and promotion (special profit).

Can this concept be effective? It seems that only practice can verify this.

The analysis of terrorism from the economic perspective allows for paying attention to the mechanisms of terrorist activity, which have been so far marginalized. In the individual aspect, a significant new view is the model of *homo oeconomicus* (rational terrorist), while in the collective perspective – relationships with corporate and organized crime. In the economics of terrorism, the traditional “use of force” is viewed in terms of costs. Hence, it seems necessary to focus the anti-terrorist policy on activities aimed primarily at increasing the costs of terrorists in relation to their activities, as well as developing theoretical models necessary for the practical use of knowledge about the economic motives of terrorists.

## Conclusion

Contemporary activities for security must respond to even newer threats and phenomena. The economics of terrorism allows for looking at threats from a new perspective. At the same time, the economic analysis of the causes of terrorist phenomena, their conditions, costs of terrorist activities, and effects in the macro- and microeconomic aspects allows for more effective preparation for potential threats from the terrorists’ side (economic efficiency). Economics provides new methodological tools and strategic concepts (empirically verified) relevant to the recognition of new threats. In this way, it leads to a deeper understanding of them. This allows for developing new research programs with regard to science, while in practical terms – it helps to create real instruments to overcome terrorism, thanks to obtained data, models, and forecasts.

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## ALASKA IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

**Abstract:** The Arctic plays a very important role in the world today, be it for climatic reasons or the promise of unspeakable riches in the future or new maritime routes. And the whole world is interested in the Arctic as evidenced by the participation of major global players in everything related to that region. Therefore, there is a strong supposition that the Arctic countries will have a major role to play in the international arena in the upcoming years. The year 2017 marked the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the famous purchase of Alaska from Russia by the United States of America which made the latter an Arctic nation. The aim of this chapter is to present the role of Alaska in terms of American and international security, both historically and today. It also attempts to portray the contemporary geopolitical situation of the Arctic, answer the question why Alaska and the Arctic seem critical for the National Security of the United States and possibly the globe, as well as attempt to describe the changes in the American policy concerning the region. The work focuses on political rhetoric concerning the issues rather than on actual military capabilities.

**Keywords:** Alaska, American security, global security, the Arctic

*Alaska is the most central place in the world for aircraft, and that is true either of Europe, Asia or North America. I believe in the future, that he who holds Alaska will hold the world, and I think it is the most important strategic place in the world.*

Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, 1935  
(Fast Facts, 2018)

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<sup>1</sup> Roman S. Czarny, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland. <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1923-7660>.

## Introduction

The Arctic plays a very important role in the world today, be it for climatic reasons or the promise of unspeakable riches in the future or new maritime routes. And the whole world is interested in the Arctic as evidenced by the participation of major global players in everything related to that region. Therefore, there is a strong supposition that the Arctic countries will have a major role to play in the international arena in the upcoming years. The year 2017 marked the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the famous purchase of Alaska from Russia by the United States of America which made the latter an Arctic nation.

The aim of this chapter is to present the role of Alaska in terms of American and international security, both historically and today. It also attempts to portray the contemporary geopolitical situation of the Arctic, answer the question why Alaska and the Arctic seem critical for the National Security of the United States and possibly the globe, as well as attempt to describe the changes in the American policy concerning the region. The work focuses on political rhetoric concerning the issues rather than on actual military capabilities.

### **Alaska's military importance, historically speaking**

Armed conflict and military engagements were an important part of Alaska's history when the Native cultures first interacted with European cultures. "Exploring parties sent to the new world had military, as well as economic purposes, as it was believed that whoever controlled the seas would control the trade routes and thus the wealth of the world" (Ongtooguk, n.d.). The first "explorers" were Vitus Bering, an officer of the Russian Navy, and Captain Cook of the British Navy. "Much of the exploration on board these military ships was to complete navigational charts, including deep-water harbors that might be of military value. A highly sought-after resource was timber, as the ships of that era needed tall, fine grained, straight trees to use for masts. The forests of Southeast Alaska contained trees that were a strategic commodity. The Russians harvested this timber and its value to them influenced their decision to colonize in Southeast Alaska. Some of Alaska's earliest recorded written history is about military confrontation, particularly between Alaska Natives and the Russians" (Ongtooguk, n.d.).

When Alaska was transferred to the United States from Russia, the military was put in charge of administering the new territories and the first administrator was the army. However, the Americans soon found out that the land forces should be replaced with the navy as most of the settlements were along the coast. “The navy remained in charge of the Territory of Alaska until 1884 when the Organic Act allowed for the transfer of power to civilians. The civilian government at first relied heavily on the military to maintain law and order, but over time, as the civilian government became stronger, the military’s role in this area diminished. The military, however, continued to play a direct and prominent role in the early days of the development of the Territory of Alaska” (Ongtooguk, n.d.).

The relations between the American administrator and the Natives were far from peaceful – such were the times then and the superiority of the “whites” over the “savages” was hardly ever questioned. The Natives were punished at every instance of any resistance, and severely at that, without any observance to individual guilt but on the principle of group punishment. As writes Paul Ongtooguk (n.d.), “the USS Saginaw destroyed three Kake villages in reprisal for the murder of two Sitka traders by Kake hands in 1869. In 1882 a Tlingit shaman from Angoon was accidentally killed by a harpoon charge from a whaling vessel. The Tlingits demanded a payment of blankets (customary practice) and the Northwest Trading Company called in the U.S. Navy from Sitka. The USS Corwin shelled and destroyed the village of Angoon as well as a nearby summer camp. A part of the reason the United States was able to inflict military attacks was the introduction of steam powered vessels like the USS Saginaw that were better able to navigate more of the waters of southeast Alaska.”

The location of Alaska came to the forefront for the first time at the time of WWI which marked the first use of airplanes. Not only Alaska spruce proved to be indispensable for building aircraft (at that time made of wood), but the territory’s site allowed for moving the troops and supplies with much speed and to the surprise of the enemy. “Alaska had become the shortest possible route from the U.S. to Asia and flying from the U.S. to Europe from Alaska, over the pole, cut down the time enormously” (Ongtooguk, n.d.).

Although as early as the 1930s, some American strategists claimed that mainland Alaska was strategically insignificant and “not a major anxiety of the War Department,” as stated in a 1939 letter from Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall to President Franklin Roosevelt, the truth

is that some places are just more important than others and their importance often depends on time and events.

By 1940, the U.S. was slowly beginning to build up its military to protect ports and strategic locations in such points as Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and the Marshall Islands. As writes Michał Łuszczuk (2015, pp. 109-110), it was the Second World War that brought prominence to Alaska and its strategic location. The sea routes from the US, Iceland and Great Britain proved to be of vital importance for the Allied convoys sent to the ports of Murmansk and Archangelsk. Alaska proved its strategic value as over 7,000 aircraft were sent to Russia and were vital for keeping Russia in the war. WWII also marked the time of intense fighting in the Aleutians. The Japanese desperately tried to keep the U.S. out of a sustained war in the Pacific. In 1942, they invaded the islands of Attu and Kiska and bombed the naval installations at Dutch Harbor. The Japanese occupied the islands of Attu and Kiska for nearly a year, and that was the only occupied U.S. territory not only in WWII but possibly in the post-colonial history of that country. The Japanese thought that control of the Aleutians could prevent a U.S. attack across the Northern Pacific while the U.S. feared that the islands would be used as bases for launching aerial assaults against the West Coast. A battle to reclaim Attu, called the Forgotten Battle, started on May 11, 1943 and was completed on May 29. On 15 August 1943 an invasion American-Canadian force reclaimed Kiska.

Alaska played a very important role in the Cold War mainly because of its proximity to the territory of the Soviet Union. As a picture is worth a thousand words, the map below shows the island of Big Diomedes is in Russian territory, and not far away is the Little Diomedes, which is part of the United States. At their closest points, the two islands are about 3.8 km (2.4 mi) apart. If one could handle the cold water, one could possibly swim from the States to Russia, or the other way round, depending on the fancy!

As the shortest route for the Soviets to attack would have been over the North Pole, Alaska had become 'the 'eyes' for America in order to warn the rest of the country if an attack was coming. At the cost of millions of dollars, a radar system was constructed across the North. "Ultra-modern, state-of-the art radar systems (the Distant Early Warning, or DEW line) were now functioning in areas where only indigenous people had previously lived. Communications systems were needed to support the radar sites and a network of radio and telephone support stations developed. Microwave systems were constructed to connect the DEW line and other military installations and this telecommunication system connected Alaska in a way that would

not have been economically feasible for Alaska's sparse population without the military" (Ongtooguk, n.d.).

Obviously, with time and the invention of more sophisticated weaponry, perhaps regrettably, the missiles from mid-range have been developed to reach nearly any part of the world, so what stays put in Alaska is the warning systems – this time oriented more against a possible attack from North Korea. The U.S. Air Force continues to have a strong presence in Alaska (Kubiak, 2012, pp. 242–255). As stated by Byron W. King (2008), "Of course, the world has changed from a few years ago. But as the world changes, it is not moving backward. The Cold War has passed, but it is not over. The Cold War has evolved into a new, world-spanning strategic game that is just beginning."

### **Alaska's military importance today**

Unlike most countries, especially in Europe, the U.S. has a different division of the armed forces. Hence, referring to US military by the name of the 'Army' is a mistake and might misled the Reader as it is only one branch composing all the forces. Therefore, it seems necessary for those who are not necessarily "in the know" to explain these divisions. The passages below, unless marked differently, are based on the official site of US military called "Military.com" (Join the Military, n.d.).

The U.S. Armed Forces are made up of the five-armed service branches: Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Navy. There are three general categories of military people: active duty (full-time soldiers and sailors), reserve & guard forces (usually work a civilian job, but can be called to full-time military duty), and veterans and retirees (past members of the military).

"The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief, who is responsible for all final decisions. The Secretary of the Department of Defense (DoD) has control over the military and each branch - except the Coast Guard, which is under the Dept. of Homeland Security. With over 2 million civilian and military employees, the DoD is the world's largest 'company.'"

The Air Force (and its reserve) is the source of air and space power. The primary mission of the USAF is to fly planes, helicopters, and satellites.

The Air National Guard is a separate reserve component of the United States Air Force.

The Army (and its reserve) is the dominant land power. The Army generally moves in to an area, secures it, and instills order and values before it leaves. It also guards U.S. installations and properties throughout the world.

“Army National Guard [and its reserve] is an elite group of warriors who dedicate a portion of their time to serving their nation. Each state has its own Guard, as required by the Constitution; in fact, it is the only branch of the military whose existence is actually required by the Constitution.”

The Coast Guard’s mission (and its reserve) is primarily with domestic waterways. The Coast Guard does rescues, law enforcement, drug prevention, and clears waterways.

“Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve are known as the U.S. ‘rapid-reaction force.’ They are trained to fight by sea and land, and usually are the first ‘boots on the ground.’ Marines are known as the world’s fiercest warriors.”

The Navy (and its reserve) accomplishes its missions primarily by sea, but also by air and land. “The Navy secures and protects the oceans around the world to create peace and stability, making the seas safe for travel and trade.”

Today’s geopolitical environment makes the words of Brigadier General Billy Mitchell even truer today than when he spoke them in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives in 1935 (Garfield, 1982, p. 59). In the words of some, Alaska is or rather has been the vital center of U.S. resource security (King, 2008). General Hester stated that the Pacific arena is critical for the next 100 years and expanded on this theme, saying, “When you don’t know where the fight is going to be, then you need to balance all of the pieces... Alaska is the place” (King, 2008). In the opinion of the General, a combat aircraft can easily reach somewhere deep in the Pacific fastest from Alaska. This is also true for Europe, as the planes can go across the pole and land in Europe. The same applies to the Mideast. Therefore, by starting from Alaska, U.S. air power can reach those distant strategic points. Therefore, Alaska is important. Alaska is strategic to the U.S. and since Alaska is the back door to North America, it is strategic to Canada as well.

The above applies to air routes but one should not forget about the strategic importance of new maritime routes which will open up should the melting of the Arctic continue. They are going to be equally significant both in terms of the military and the economy. “The Arctic should be a major consideration in discussions of U.S. national security. Alaska is critical to national security of the United States for several reasons. It is where the U.S. has its ground-

based missile systems that can intercept potential missile launches from Asia. It has operating bases where aircraft can refuel. It is on the great circle route from the United States to Asia. If you look at the ability of U.S. forces in Alaska to deploy to the Pacific Rim, it becomes a very important forward operating base or stopover point” (Allen, 2017).

Alaska is claimed to be a key part of U.S. national security today, both geographically and geologically. After decades of hard work and tens of billions of dollars of capital investment, Alaska now holds immense and proven energy wealth. This treasure is contained in the form of known reserves and additional measured and inferred resources.

As assessed by Siemon T. Wezeman (2016), in January 2009, George W. Bush, towards the very end of his presidency, presented an Arctic Policy which replaced the previous policy from 1994. It listed security as the first of six policy priorities for the Arctic (The White House, 2009). In the very same year but a little later, the US Navy published an ‘Arctic roadmap’ as a guide for its policy, strategy and investments in the Arctic (Department of the Navy & Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 2009). In May 2013, the US Government issued a policy paper entitled ‘National Strategy for the Arctic Region,’ which was not much different from the previous text of 2009 text (The White House, 2013). It was followed in the same month by the US Coast Guard’s (USCG) Arctic Strategy (Sulmasy, Wood, 2014). The US National Security Strategy, issued in 2010 by the administration of President Barack Obama, and the US National Military Strategy, issued in 2011, defined the goals of US security and military policies but hardly concentrated on the Arctic although it was mentioned in the document (Mullen, 2011; The White House, 2010). The Arctic did not appear at all in a January 2012 document outlining security priorities for the 21st century (Panetta, Obama, US DoD, 2012). “Similarly, in the January 2015 ‘Implementation Report’ of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, military security is excluded from the list of the many major issues of concern. Instead, the report focuses on environmental protection, maritime research and providing support for civilian activities in the Arctic region (Polar Research and Policy Initiative, 2016).

Nevertheless, the state of Alaska is a key part of the United States defense system, with military bases located in Anchorage and Fairbanks, and it is the country's only connection to the Arctic, which ensures it has a seat at the table as melting glaciers allow the exploration of the region's significant resources. Alaska plays a vital role in the protection of the United States national secu-

rity interests in the Arctic region. According to the Department of Defense's (DoD) 2016 Arctic Strategy, the desired goals for the Arctic are as follows: a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges. The two main supporting objectives are:

- ensure security, support safety, promote defense cooperation; and
- prepare to respond to a wide range of challenges and contingencies,
- operating in conjunction with like-minded nations when possible and independently if necessary,
- in order to maintain stability in the region (Department of Defense, 2016).

The 2016 Arctic Strategy also updates the ways and means DoD intends to use to achieve its objectives as it implements the National Strategy for the Arctic Region. These include: enhancing the capability of the U.S. forces to defend the homeland and exercise sovereignty; strengthening deterrence at home and abroad; strengthening alliances and partnerships; preserving freedom of the seas in the Arctic; engaging public, private, and international partners to improve domain awareness in the Arctic; evolving DoD Arctic infrastructure and capabilities consistent with changing conditions and needs; providing support to civil authorities, as directed; partnering with other departments, agencies, and nations to support human and environmental security; and supporting international institutions that promote regional cooperation and the rule of law (Department of Defense, 2016).

### **What is to defend or secure in Alaska and the Arctic?**

The shortest answer could be – plenty. In this energy-starved world of today, securing new sources of energy is of vital importance, especially in view of the depleting resources in the Arabic countries. No country wishes to be dependent on one source only or left without energy as such a situation spells economic disaster and possibly a revolution staged by its own society. Hence, all states are desperate to secure new energy for the future. Desperation usually leads to unpredictable behavior or aggression and these breed conflicts.

The riches concern both land and offshore resources. "According to a US Geological Survey completed in 2000, Arctic shares of global proven and undiscovered reserves of oil and gas are around 14 and 23 per cent,

respectively, which already meant that that the Arctic was one of the main players in the global energy supply. The Arctic holds 5.3 and 21.7 percent of the total proven global reserves of oil and gas. Almost all of the Arctic proven gas reserves are found in Russia. Based on geological evidence and methods, the Arctic share was assessed at 20.5 per cent and 27.6 per cent of undiscovered oil and gas, respectively. North of the Arctic Circle, tremendously large deposits of crude oil are situated, estimated at 90 billion barrels, and deposits of some 47 billion cubic meters of natural gas, which is the equivalent of liquefied natural gas [LNG]" (Czarny, 2015, pp. 98–99).

Apart from "pure" energy sources, Alaska and the Arctic are rich in other natural resources, including gold and a variety of precious metals. The latter list comprises diamonds, platinum, lead, manganese, nickel, and lead. The Arctic can also boast of iron, uranium, copper, rare earth metals, and precious stones. One should also not forget about real "natural" resources like fish, including shoals of cod, halibut, salmon, mackerel, trout and shrimp, so desired all over the world. Only in Greenland, "in 1915 the catch of shrimp was 29 ton, in 1950 – 25,000 ton, and in 1998 the catch reached 50,000 ton annually" (Czarny, 2015, p. 104).

In addition, one must always keep in mind maritime transport. Global warming opens up new sea routes linking Europe with Asia, which is one more reason why so many countries show so much political interest in the region. There is a promise of opening up of new commercial sea lanes between the Euro-Atlantic region and Asia. From the Canadian and American side, there might be a new North-West Passage leading through the Bering Strait to the Orient, while along the northern side of Siberia a North-East Route could be established.

Should the ice keep melting at the rate it has been, it may actually open the sea route in the Arctic and it means that a competitive corridor for the Suez and Panama canals would be created, shortening the distance and time for transporting goods between Asia and Europe, which in the future may be a spectacular change in the global transport. The Northwest Passage through Canada's Arctic islands shortens by  $\frac{1}{4}$  the distance in comparison with the route through the Suez Canal, and by three times compared to the route through the Cape Horn, and is shorter by 4,000 km than the one through the Panama Canal. It is estimated that in the near future the route will become available for regular maritime navigation called the Northeast Passage called or the Northern Sea Route [NSR]. This one goes along the northern coastline of Russia, from the Kara Strait to the Bering

Strait, and reduces the sailing distance from Europe to Asia by over 33% [between Rotterdam and Yokohama from 11,894 nautical miles – via the current route, through the Suez Canal – to only 6,500 nautical miles]. The Northern Sea Route is some 3000 nautical miles long and navigating it all the way is only possible in summer due to meteorological conditions in the Arctic. For example, using the Northeast Passage along the Russian coast reduces a trip from Hamburg to Shanghai by almost 4,000 miles, cuts a week off delivery times, and saves approximately \$650,000 in fuel costs per ship. Unlike in the Gulf of Aden, there are no pirates operating in the Arctic.

“Undoubtedly, the two sea routes are going to shorten both the distance and time of sailing. 21 thousand kilometres separating today London from Tokyo will be cut to some 14 thousand due to the shortcut through the Arctic. And the time of voyage from Norway to China will be shorter by 15-20 days because of the Northeast Passage. It should be noted that until now sea shipping routes through the Arctic Ocean have had an international status. But the ‘professional’ Arctic politician, Artur Chilingarov [Vice President of the parliamentary club of the leading party United Russia, and the polar explorer who placed the Russian flag on the bottom of the ocean at the North Pole], presented a draft of a special bill which says that they should be recognized as ‘a historically developed Russian national transport route through the Arctic, where Russia ‘...should exercise control over the «ecological situation» in the region and decide through diplomatic channels about the right of foreign navy ships to sail there” (Czarny, 2015, p. 110).

### **Russia: the perennial threat?**

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union competed for every advantage, including study of the Arctic for its strategic value. The end of the “First” Cold War seemed to herald a new world order – that of only one dominant power on the globe. “In 1990 Charles Krauthammer proclaimed on the page of ‘Foreign Affairs’ the arrival of a ‘unipolar moment’ – a moment in history when there is just one superpower left in the international milieu” (Polus, n.d., p. 196).

Such is not the case in the Arctic. Generally speaking, an important shift from post-Soviet spatial contraction to new spatial expansion, not only in the Arctic is observed. This expansion is seen in the growing involvement of the Russian state in the Arctic, development of new oil and gas fields, and upgrades and extension of Arctic transport infrastructure (Stephen, 2018).

Russia's presence in the Arctic seems to be rather overwhelming and the other 7 Arctic States, or the other littoral 4, do not even come close in terms of preparedness to act in circumpolar regions or the military presence. Currently, there exist no politically significant conflicts about maritime or territorial boundaries in the Arctic anymore, which is a good sign. "The Barents Sea conflict between Russia and Norway could count as the last substantial conflict, but it was solved in 2010. Existing disputes between the Western states in the Arctic like in the Beaufort Sea or about Hans Island are unlikely to cause serious political tensions, and the overlapping claims regarding the limits of continental shelf extensions in the central Arctic Ocean basin between Russia, Denmark, and Canada lack the political and economic salience to be of major concern" (Stephen, 2018).

However, conflict potential exists in form of an Arctic security dilemma in case militarization continues beyond reasonable defensive measures, which then indeed could result in an arms race. As showed in 2007, when the Russians planted their flag beneath the North Pole (Parfitt, 2007) and some disturbing developments proving that Russia is militarizing the Arctic, this indeed may be the case. The North Sea Fleet is now the largest fleet in the Russian navy. Recently, it was announced that Russia was reopening airbases on archipelagos above the Arctic Circle that were closed at the end of the Cold War. Russia has made its position on the Arctic very clear. In 2011, after announcing the creation of two new Russian "Arctic Brigades" to be deployed in the Arctic, Vladimir Putin said: "As for our own geo-political interests (in the Arctic) ... we shall be protecting them firmly and consistently" (Coffey, 2012). It is no surprise then that whenever there is talk about American or world security, be it right or wrong, the name of the Russian Federation is frequently cited.

As claimed by Col. Michael J. Forsyth [he was the chief of staff of the Alaskan NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) Region and Alaskan Command at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska], U.S. Army, "The obvious source for possible conflict is the increasing human contact and the claims put forth by the various Arctic nations. One nation making such claims in the Arctic region has made a concerted effort to assert or expand its sovereignty in other areas of the globe recently; that nation is Russia. The Russian Federation already derives 20 percent of its gross domestic product from economic activity in the Arctic, and its claims would expand its reach to make further economic growth possible. Over the past five-plus years, Russia has systematically embarked on a program to establish new or

refurbish abandoned military bases in the Arctic. The reasons for this effort include providing protection to the emerging Northern Sea Route and securing its economic interests. As already noted, the Northern Sea Route has the potential to provide great benefit to Russia through direct trade or the facilitation of trade between Asia and Europe. Further, should Russia win its claims on the outer continental shelf, it will control vast areas and resources to its benefit. Thus, refurbishment and expansion of new bases is an effort to secure what Russians believe is theirs. However, this gives rise to the strong possibility of conflict if other nations do not accept Russian claims” (Forsyth, 2018).

Further on, in his article published by Army University Press referred to several times in this chapter, Col. Forsyth says that in order for the United States to effect protection of its interests, the country has to assert leadership using critical elements of national power, including the military. “We must rebuild long-ignored Arctic military capabilities to provide a credible deterrent to any nation that may want to expand its territory outside of recognized international norms to exploit the tremendous resources of the Arctic. As human activity continues to increase in the Arctic, it will become more and more important for the United States to demonstrate its strength in the region. Failure to do so could allow the friction of human interaction to grow into needless regional confrontation with global implications. This is preventable with a commitment to leadership and peace in the region that stems from sufficient investment and preparation” (Forsyth, 2018). It should be noted that history has so far never recorded a military person that would consider the budget allocated for military spending sufficient or – God forbid – too high, which, obviously, does not mean that Col. Forsyth is not right. However, it is extremely difficult to assess whether the “call to arms” is necessary, but on the other hand, the lack of parity between Russia and other players in the Arctic is more than apparent.

In the report on the Arctic strategy presented to the US Congress in June 2019 by the Department of Defense, there was an update of the strategic objectives for the Arctic region. The three major objectives were outlined such as building awareness, enhancing strategic operations and strengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic (Department of Defense 2019).

It truly seems that the United States of America has been somewhat lagging behind in terms of its involvement in the Arctic, be it only in military terms. Being much involved militarily in other parts of the world, perhaps the Arctic is of no immediate concern at the moment. It remains

to be seen whether the changes in the Administration will bring any major changes to the issue.

### **Conclusion**

It might seem that the Cold War could possibly find its continuation and turn into another “Cold” War over the Arctic and actually in it. The Arctic, and therefore Alaska as well, seems to be of immediate consequence globally and calls for imperative actions, be it for the sake of fighting global warming, solving territorial claims, prospective commercial shipping across the Arctic seas, natural resources exploitation, prevention of possible conflicts, ecological reasons or protecting the rights of indigenous peoples. It appears that for the first time in history the “white man” has a reasonable chance to do something right in these respects, particularly in the case of the natives. Only the future will tell whether the efforts of the Arctic States through their activities within the Arctic Council will overcome the desperate search for new sources of energy and state, corporate, human greed.

The U.S. position in the Arctic because of Alaska is of enormous strategic significance. The United States has vital interests in the Arctic region that are somewhat overlooked for a variety of reasons. However, with time, these interests will come to be seen as both critical and vital to the U.S. long-term economic interests as well as security. It seems that the “reluctant Arctic nation” will have to take action, ratify UNCLOS, and for the moment at least hope that the resolutions to territorial and resource claims remain peaceful. So far, the political rhetoric seems to have regrettably been all talk and no (or very little) action. Hence the conclusion that the Arctic plays only a very minor role in overall America defense policy and as claimed by Andrew Holland, Senior Fellow for Energy and Climate Policy at the American Security Project, a non-partisan national security think tank, the United States has simply not invested the resources needed to meet the challenges of an opening Arctic (Holland, 2014, p. 80).

It is very difficult to find the reasons for such an attitude and cite possible political or financial reasons. Not matching the polar military strength, capabilities, equipment and training of Russian troops in any measure, perhaps the United States seems to rely on NATO and the collective defense which is at the very heart of the Treaty. After all, out of the Arctic Eight, only Finland, Sweden (though bounded by Nordic solidarity) and – naturally – Russia remain outside of the Treaty.

Having said that, it should be noted that in recent times the U.S. has relied almost too heavily on technology alone (the example being the first war in Iraq – Storm Desert) assuming that “boots on the ground” are not necessary. As proven, this was rather a mistake. Therefore, American options are somewhat limited in terms of participation and reaction because there is hardly any American presence in the area, accompanied by lack of infrastructure.

It seems that almost nobody wishes to see a militarized Arctic and nobody seems to want this region to become a new area of a regional conflict which undoubtedly will escalate to a global one. But the lack of parity as far as presence in the Arctic is only too apparent. The American difficulty is further compounded by the U.S. non-ratification of UNCLOS, which was ratified by 167 nations, including Russia and China. This body was called to life in order to define the rights and responsibilities of nations in their movements throughout the world’s oceans. As proven, also territorial disputes are settled in this forum.

However, there is great hope in the activities of the Arctic Council as a body which provide peaceful resolutions to potential disputes and conflicts. As stated in the summary of *The Changing Arctic and Poland’s Presence in the Region: Key Factors and Prospects*, “The system based on legal (UN Convention on the Law of Sea and other international instruments) and political (notably Arctic Council) components, operates on various levels of international relations, from the global, through the subregional, to the bilateral” (Łuszczuk et al., 2015). So far, the Arctic Council has proved that peaceful solutions and international cooperation are indeed possible.

In order to avoid military confrontation, it seems that it is either the Arctic Council or UNCLOS. If these two for a do not work, it seems that NATO is the only solution to counteract the possible threats. The alliance should perhaps respond to the constantly growing Russian military presence in the North Atlantic and the Arctic regions. During his visit in Ottawa in 2018, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters during a joint press conference with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, “I think we should continue to strive for avoiding an arms race and higher tensions in the High North... Therefore part of the adaptation of NATO is that we are also increasing our naval capabilities, including the High North” (Sevunts, 2018).

Therefore, viewing the Arctic through a military lens, from the American point of view, and should some intervention prove to be imperative, it is NATO, if necessary, but should it be necessarily NATO alone?

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ROMAN S. CZARNY<sup>1</sup>

## THE UNITED STATES AND THE TOP OF THE WORLD: THE DIFFICULTY OF BEING A 'RELUCTANT' ARCTIC COUNTRY

**Abstract:** The Arctic plays a very important role in the world today, be it for climatic reasons or the promise of the future unspeakable riches or the new maritime routes. And the whole world is interested in the Arctic as evidenced by the participation of major global players in everything related to that region. Therefore, there is a strong supposition that the Arctic countries will have a major role to play in the international arena in the upcoming years. The United States became an Arctic country by virtue of purchasing Alaska from Russia in 1867. For security reasons, the Arctic used to be a focal point for the US during the Cold War, but later on the U.S. government paid much less attention to the region, including somewhat dubious awareness of America actually being an Arctic State (country). Not many Americans actually know that their country is an Arctic State and more or less the same number is interested in the American activities within the Arctic Council. This chapter aims to present some opportunities and challenges posed by governing the Arctic, and in particular a brief outline of the U.S. approach towards the region, climate changes and off-shore drilling through its track record in the span of about last two decades, until the year 2018. It also attempts to outline some of the reasons connected with this country's years of hesitation to ratify one of the fundamental international instruments, i.e. the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, compounded by the changes in American Administration.

**Keywords:** Arctic, U.S. Arctic strategy, climate, UNCLOS, off-shore drilling

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<sup>1</sup> Roman S. Czarny, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland. <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1923-7660>

*We seek an Arctic region that is stable and free of conflict, where nations act responsibly in a spirit of trust and cooperation, and where economic and energy resources are developed in a sustainable manner that also respects the fragile environment and the interests and cultures of indigenous peoples.*

2013 US National Strategy for the  
Arctic Region

### **Importance of the region**

Much has been written about the importance of the region, be it in the context of the climate and its global impact or the riches the Arctic might hold. After even a glimpse on the map, the strategic importance of the region becomes obvious in terms of security. “The developments in the Arctic will have lasting ramifications for international relations, international law, international climate change policy, international trade, and international human rights. The Arctic’s strategic location will not only influence government policies, but also affect strategic business decisions and global economic development over the coming decades. The Arctic Institute believes that an interdisciplinary approach to Arctic studies, bringing together researchers and experts from a variety of disciplines, is key to fully understanding the ongoing transformation of the region and making progress towards sustainable Arctic development” (The Arctic Institute, n.d.). The truth is that virtually the whole Mendeleev’s Periodic Table can be found in the Arctic, not to mention abundant fisheries, new maritime passages and incredibly rich wildlife. For the maritime life alone, after all, there must be a reason why whales migrate up north to find the richest aqua hunting grounds.

Generally speaking, it has been more or less universally agreed that there exist three basic instruments through which Arctic should be governed, namely, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS – adopted in 1991 by all Arctic Eight), the Arctic Council (AC – established in 1996), and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS – dated to 1982 but officially came into force in 1994).

As the Arctic has become a very hot topic in recent times, owing to climate change and the growing interest of international players in the region, it is virtually impossible to review the literature on the subject of the Arctic because it is an incredibly extensive and constantly increasing a body. Therefore the U.S. as a 'reluctant' Arctic country will be presented through a review of select literature on the subject concerning American history of becoming an Arctic country, security, governance, and economic development in the region.

This chapter aims to present some opportunities and challenges posed by governing the Arctic (The Arctic Council), and in particular a brief outline of the U.S. approach towards the region, as changeable as the American administrations, with seemingly one constant: the reluctance. The work includes separate parts devoted to "America and the Arctic" (explaining how the U.S. has actually become an Arctic country, as well as major policies and/or strategies concerning Alaska and the whole region, together with American attitudes towards Alaska), "U.S. and UNCLOS" (presenting some difficulties in ratifying the law by the U.S. and the pressing necessity of doing so), "The Role of the Arctic Council" (as the second important instrument in governing the Arctic – alongside UNCLOS - together with U.S. presidency of it), "U.S. and the Climate" (describing the changing American attitudes towards the issue), and "U.S. and Offshore Drilling" (attempting to demonstrate the financial or economic side of the issue).

The conclusion, hopefully, holds the answer to the alleged American reluctance towards Alaska and the whole Arctic region.

### **America and the Arctic**

"The Arctic ice is melting" – this is how most of the recent articles on the subject start. It appears that no self-respecting science writer could possibly question that statement. However, when one examines the details, there appear many sceptics, non-believers, lets-wait-and-see-attitude-holders and simple detractors who argue that it is a natural process which has been observed before and there is nothing we not only could but should do about it.

Such is not the attitude of the major stake-holders in the Arctic, admittedly to a varying degree, i.e. the Arctic Eight (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the U.S.), as proven throughout recent history. All the directly involved countries, accompanied by a multitude of other players - state, non-state, or multi-national organizations –

have voiced concern about the region for more than two decades now. The question remains, however, whether the impact of global warming would have become so imperative and so world-wide if not for the promise of unspeakable riches that the Arctic holds and the opportunities it provides in the way of new transport routes, fishing opportunities, and tourism openings. The question remains open but it is beyond doubt that any major change in the climate has always brought new opportunities as well as challenges. The above statement could be exemplified by the Little Ice Age (ca. 1350 to ca. 1850 – not that all scientists agree on those dates). Ivan the Terrible, seeking new sources of income, among many other things, managed in the years 1558-1580 to conquer and colonize Siberia, the land rich in animal fur so desperately needed and desired at every European court of the time. Thus the new, powerful and immensely large new Russian Empire was born and Ivan IV Vasilyevich became the Tsar of All the Russias.

A valid question might be posed here whether the emerging climate change could bring something similar in terms of shift of power in the world and of such profound consequences for the future as before. After all, one could start with the Vikings through Egypt and Ivan the Terrible to today and easily document that every single change in global climate has brought major consequences to the world. Naturally, nobody knows the answer to the question and only time will show what this shift in climate might bring this time in terms of the world order. In the era of international cooperation, will it eventually lead to real international cooperation and increased safeguarding national security interests and energy resources or will the race for the riches trigger confrontation and competition, not excluding the possibility of potential armed conflicts? Or perhaps we should expect a major environmental disaster of the scope of the Aral Sea? Following the principle of dualism, it is obvious that every opportunity must be accompanied with a challenge, and of the latter category there are plenty. On the one hand, the Arctic promises so many things, but on the other, there is price to be paid for all of that.

A lot has changed in the period of time from the first US chairmanship in 1998 to its latest ending in 2017. “For example, in 1998, the minimum extent of Arctic sea ice was 12 million square kilometers; in 2014 it had shrunk to 5 million square kilometers. The average Arctic temperature today is one degree Celsius higher than it has been over the past 30 years” (Conley, 2015). The Arctic has changed rather dramatically and new actors appeared on the scene, e.g. China.

Since the United States assumed the chairmanship in the Arctic Council at the ministerial meeting in Iqaluit, Nunavut in Northern Canada, from April 24-25, 2015, which also marked the end of the Canadian chairmanship, it is only fitting to start with this international body which may be perceived as the essence of the Arctic matters. Much has been written about the role of the Arctic Council in shaping the future for the region which name the Council bears. Apart from the fact that scientists can hardly agree on the scope of climate changes and the definition of the Arctic Region itself (Czarny, 2015), especially the last two decades brought about a multitude of programs (nearly every country has found it necessary to formulate its own plan of action for the High North called a national strategy; the US has produced its official national strategy as late as May 2013). Such Arctic strategies are supposed to safeguard/secure or perhaps simply exploit the region, particularly by generating wealth from extracting its energy deposits but also in terms of safety, security, environment protection, maritime traffic, the rights of indigenous peoples, deepening the knowledge on the region and the general governance of the Arctic. Obviously, some policies are more comprehensive than others and to a varied degree they follow what had been internationally agreed upon but always with an attempt at safeguarding own national interests, hoping for own slice of the pie composed of the Arctic riches.

If the multiplicity of international organizations related to the region and the number of states involved are any indication of the importance of the region, then the Arctic certainly must be in the lead. Enumerating the member organizations and the affiliated or simply interested entities associated with the Arctic Council would certainly take most of this chapter, and the matter has been discussed extensively in scientific literature, with the necessary and ever-changing updates. The Council, which includes the eight states with Arctic territory and representatives of the region's indigenous populations, has evolved into a decision-making organization with a permanent secretariat and a budget. The organization now attracts great attention of the rest of the world. However, many Americans are skeptical about the Council, quoting fears of its inefficiency, lack of decision-making power and growing similarity to the UN which by some is considered the ultimate example of bureaucracy which is all about talking and not much, as the pragmatic Americans would put it: 'getting things done'. Some of the objections may be valid as "the Arctic Council is not a fully-fledged international organization as it is based on 'soft' international law. Therefore, in view of the lack of legal international foundation, it is an institution of limited possibilities"

(Czarny, 2015), although the fact that the Council has also a representation of the Indigenous Peoples gives it an additional if not full legitimization to act and decide about the region.

As mentioned a few times before, the U.S. is an Arctic State by virtue of its purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867. Alaska which has both territory above the Arctic Circle and a coastline on the Arctic Ocean makes the United States an Arctic country, “though most Americans don’t know it, and most of Congress doesn’t know it” (McNeil, 2015), claims Crocker Snow, director of the Fletcher School’s Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy. Throughout its history, the U.S. has seldom recognized this fact although it gave the world such outstanding polar explorers like Robert Peary and Richard Byrd, as well as modern-day Arctic scientists such as Robert Corell. In addition, the Arctic was central to the United States’ nuclear deterrent posture during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the Arctic has seldom figured prominently in U.S. policy discussions. “Thus the United States may be characterized as the ‘reluctant’ Arctic power” (Hueber, n.d., p. 2).

The alleged “reluctance” of the United States is a matter of opinion, expressed with particular ease especially if you are a university professor and a Canadian, with a typical love exhibited by close neighbors of unequal stature. However, there may be more than a grain of truth in this statement, as echoed by many Americans themselves.

“Unfortunately, the U.S. national-level focus on Arctic issues and policy is quite modest, a factor that will undermine and limit U.S. capabilities as leader of the Arctic Council” (Rosenberg, Titley, 2014). Though this organization is not the only platform to influence Arctic policy and activity, it is an important one and deserving more attention by the U.S. Despite the appointment of the former U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr. as special representative for the Arctic [the Obama administration] and a number of national roadmaps, principles guiding decisions and strategies, the Arctic remains just a policy and an investment afterthought.

And, as put by Heather Exner-Pirot (2015), also a Canadian, “Admiral Papp has expressed that he would like to promote an appreciation amongst Americans that the United States is an Arctic nation. He will be successful if he can use the platform afforded by the Arctic Council chairmanship to help educate Americans about how the Arctic is more than the caricature of sea ice, shipping, and polar bears that the media has made it out to be.”

The U.S. first held the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 1998-2000 adopting “human health” as the overall theme. The American overall activi-

ties supported not only major Arctic health initiatives such as International Circumpolar Surveillance to monitor diseases and human health but they also initiated the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, the first scientific climate impact assessment of the Arctic (Berckmans et al., 2014).

Some experts claim that although Alaska is an important player in Arctic affairs, the United States has a lackluster record of leadership in the region. “Arctic regional cooperation began in earnest in the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The kind of matters the Arctic Council was given a mandate to address - environmental protection and sustainable development -are motherhood and apple pie kinds of issues that all Arctic nations could accept and support. But the United States chose to play a mostly minor role in the Arctic Council, ensuring, for example, that military issues were excluded from discussions, and that no defined monetary contributions were assessed” (Exner-Pirot, 2015).

Nevertheless, though it took the US quite some time to formulate its official strategy on the Arctic, it was officially released in May 2013.

“Through the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, we articulate our strategic priorities to position the United States to meet the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. We will seek to prioritize and effectively integrate the work of Federal departments and agencies with activities that are already underway in the State of Alaska and at the international level. And we will partner with the State of Alaska and Alaska Natives, as well as the international community and the private sector, to develop innovative solutions and new ways of operating. The Arctic is changing. We must proceed, cognizant of what we must do now, and consistent with our principles and goals for the future” (The White House, 2013).

In the U.S. Arctic Strategy, there are three major themes. Firstly, the document notes a desire for the advancement of national interest with consideration to all activities (commercial, scientific and military) in the Arctic whether by sea or air with consideration to international law. Secondly, the pursuit of responsible Arctic stewardship by encouraging environmental protection and resource conservation is clearly mentioned as a priority. Thirdly, the document emphasizes the importance of strengthening international cooperation both through bilateral and multilateral relations, including working within the Arctic Council. As expressly said in the document, the strategy is built on three basic lines of effort, namely:

- Advancing US security interests: “We will enable our vessels and aircraft to operate, consistent with international law, through, under, and over the airspace and waters of the Arctic, support lawful commerce, achieve a greater awareness of activity in the region, and intelligently evolve our Arctic infrastructure and capabilities, including ice-capable platforms as needed. U.S. security in the Arctic encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from those supporting safe commercial and scientific operations to national defense” (The White House, 2013),
- Pursuance of responsible Arctic Region stewardship: “We will continue to protect the Arctic environment and conserve its resources; establish and institutionalize an integrated Arctic management framework; chart the Arctic region; and employ scientific research and traditional knowledge to increase understanding of the Arctic” (The White House, 2013).
- Strengthening international cooperation: “Working through bilateral relationships and multilateral bodies, including the Arctic Council, we will pursue arrangements that advance collective interests, promote shared Arctic state prosperity, protect the Arctic environment, and enhance regional security, and we will work toward U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Law of the Sea Convention)” (The White House, 2013).

The approach of the United States is to be based on or rather informed by the guiding principles of safeguarding peace and stability, making decisions using the best available information (including most current science and traditional knowledge), pursuance of innovative arrangements, and consultations and coordination with Alaska Natives.

As shown in the initial address by President B. Obama, Alaska’ and Alaskan Natives’ rights and interests come first, which in a way is understandable, and only then consideration should be extended to international organizations. However, given the United States system of government and the relative political and economic independence of its states, even the state of Alaska already poses problems for Washington D.C. and its strategy. The proposed focus on climate change has opened a gap between the federal government and Alaskan stakeholders since “Alaskan legislators recommended focusing on jobs and economic opportunity, as well as practical issues such as suicide prevention and sanitation facilities” (Exner-Pirot, 2015).

“Before once again gaining the attention of the US Government, the Arctic was a concern almost exclusively for the state of Alaska. As Alaska

is a sparsely populated state, it occupies only one seat in the US House of Representatives; in addition, over 65 per cent of Alaska's land is owned and managed by the US Government" (Bergh, 2012). Alaska's lack of influence in the federal government has led to tension between the state and federal governments, notably over oil drilling in national wildlife refuges (including the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge) and the reduction of federal grants earmarked for Alaska (Bolstad, 2016). Representatives of the Alaskan State Government have addressed US Senate committees on changes in the Arctic and their impact on national security, foreign policy and energy security (Parnell, n.d.).

Jobs in Alaska seem to be of particular interest to the governing authorities of the state and the White House proposed ban on in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and parts of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas has drawn much criticism. "Lisa Murkowski, a Republican senator from Alaska, has accused Mr. Obama of launching a 'stunning attack on our sovereignty and our ability to develop a strong economy'. Bob Herron, a Democratic member of the Alaska legislature, told a recent US Senate hearing organised by Ms. Murkowski: 'We feel it is important to [show] that we are not a snow globe. We are not little Eskimos in an environment that needs no development'" (Jopson, n.d.).

### **U.S. and UNCLOS**

The strategy theme number three draws attention, particularly in the part relating to the promise of working toward U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Much has been written on the subject of the U.S. yet not ratifying the Convention which, as agreed by almost everybody, should be one of the fundamentals of negotiations and problem solving, should conflicts arise. The reasons why the U.S. has never ratified the Convention are complex and many, and they could be discussed in a separate paper, but perhaps a bit of history is necessary at this juncture.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the Law of the Sea Convention or the Law of the Sea Treaty.

The law of the sea developed from the struggle between coastal states, who sought to expand their control over marine areas adjacent to their coastlines. By the end of the 18th century, it was understood that states had sovereignty over their territorial sea. The maximum breadth of the territorial sea was generally considered to be three miles - the distance that a shore-based cannon

could reach and that a coastal state could therefore control.

After the Second World War, the international community requested that the United Nations International Law Commission consider codifying the existing laws relating to the oceans. The commission began working towards this in 1949 and prepared four draft conventions, which were adopted at the first UN Conference on the Law of the Sea:

The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) from February 24 until April 29, 1958. UNCLOS I adopted the four conventions, which are commonly known as the 1958 Geneva Conventions:

- The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,
- The Convention on the High Seas,
- The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
- The Convention on the Continental Shelf.

While considered to be a step forward, the conventions did not establish a maximum breadth of the territorial sea. The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) from March 17 until April 26, 1960. UNCLOS II did not result in any international agreements. The conference once again failed to fix a uniform breadth for the territorial or establish consensus on sovereign fishing rights. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) from 1973 to 1982:

UNCLOS III addressed the issues brought up at the previous conferences. Over 160 nations participated in the 9-year convention, which finally came into force on November 14, 1994, 21 years after the first meeting of UNCLOS III and one year after ratification by the sixtieth State. The first sixty ratifications were almost all developing states.

A major feature of the convention included the definition of maritime zones- the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf, the high sea, the international sea-bed area and archipelagic waters. The convention also made provision for the passage of ships, protection of the marine environment, freedom of scientific research, and exploitation of resources.

The Convention's opponents have resorted to an alleged dilution of U.S. 'sovereignty' as the basis for their opposition. "As Secretary Clinton noted in her testimony, the United States is a party to hundreds of international treaties and conventions that limit United States freedom of action

in exchange for corresponding commitments from other nations. Not only does the United States, with the second longest coastline and the largest navy in the world, have far more to gain from UNCLOS than most other states” (Kass, 2012). Opposition to the Law of the Sea treaty in the United States comes mostly from Republican senators, wary of granting too much control to the United Nations. “No international organization owns the seas,” Ohio Republican Rob Portman, one of the two lawmakers to announce opposition to the treaty, said in a statement on his website. “We simply are not persuaded (...) this treaty will be more favorable to U.S. interests than bilateral negotiations, voluntary arbitration, and other traditional means of resolving maritime issues” (Hargreaves, 2012).

In the Arctic at least, the resources the U.S. might lose out on are relatively small – most of the sizable conventional oil and gas reserves fall within 200 miles of the coast, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. As said in the CNN Money, “Everyone is laying claim to the Arctic, except the U.S. As nations rush in to stake out their part of the Arctic Ocean, the U.S. is being shut out of the process and potentially giving up a large swath of the Arctic” (CNN Money, n.d.).

The official Arctic policy is something quite new in American politics, as previously all that was available were Presidential Directives which stated in general that the United States was an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic Region, and that the country sought to meet its national security needs, “protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues” (The White House, 2013).

The newer document titled Arctic Region Policy was a departure from the previous U.S. actions in that it was Arctic specific. “Traditionally, US policy has dwelt with the Arctic and Antarctic simultaneously. This time, the decision was made to develop an Arctic-only policy. The policy is both frank and direct, and it has significant ramifications for all Arctic nations – Canada included. While it is not yet clear if and how the Obama administration will choose to implement the policy, the policy itself does not signal a significantly different direction for the United States. Instead, it offers a clear picture of what the United States considers to be its core Arctic policy objectives and provides a guide on how to achieve them” (Hueber, 2009).

Then came the program for the U.S. chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2015-2017) which had three focus areas:

- Improving Economic & Living Conditions for Arctic Communities,
- Arctic Ocean Safety, Security & Stewardship,
- Addressing the Impacts of Climate Change.

At the time of the latest US presidency, the American team was composed of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, Chair of the Arctic Council; Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic; Hon. Fran Ulmer, Special Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State on Arctic Science and Policy; Ambassador David Balton, Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials; Julia Gourley, U.S. Senior Arctic Official; Dr. Nikoosh Carlo, Senior Advisor to the Senior Arctic Official Chair; Dr. Adrianna Muir, Deputy Senior Arctic Official; Nomi Seltzer, Arctic Affairs Advisor; Erin Robertson, Arctic Press and Public Affairs Officer; Matthew Kastrinsky, Administrative Officer.

Admiral Papp, Special Representative for the Arctic Region, who was going to effectively lead the U.S. team in the Arctic Council, in the *WWF* magazine called *The Circle*, identified the chairmanship theme as “One Arctic: Shared Opportunities, Challenges, and Responsibilities” (Papp, 2015). The theme, according to him, reflects the fact that although there are many dimensions to the Arctic, in the end it is one region of peace, stability and cooperation.

Even the composition of the American team raised many questions. The U.S., as nearly everyone knows, does not have a Prime Minister, so who should represent this country, for example, at a meeting of Prime Ministers? Moreover, in view of upcoming presidential elections in the year 2016, the then Democratic regime had to do everything to assure that American sovereignty and security were at the front of all declarations and activities, including the international ones, for the sake of the domestic front.

As said by H. Exner-Pirot (2015), not known to be a staunch admirer of American policies towards the Arctic, “Admiral Papp has been given the unusual title of ‘Special Representative’ to the Arctic, amidst a plethora of Arctic Ambassadors who spearhead Arctic policy for their respective countries. He was also named ‘Coordinator’ of the U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship, a position that does not exist in the Council’s terms of reference. Traditionally, the Foreign Minister or Secretary of State of the designated country officially chairs the Council, and a diplomat is appointed to chair the senior arctic officials responsible for the work of the Council on a daily basis. Admiral Papp, apparently, will be neither of those.”

The situation was rendered even more complex by the presidential elections and the fact that the Democratic President had to work with the Re-

publican majority in the Congress. Naturally, on the average, no Republican senator should possibly agree with any policy of the Democratic President and the former may find it very difficult to take a bipartisan attitude when taking a vote on anything proposed by the latter. In addition, any debate on the Arctic in the U.S. seems to evoke the old nightmares: Southerners trying to decide about the fate of Northerners, federal government versus state, the issues of sovereignty and fear of submission to foreign laws, and the accusations of inefficiency of international bodies (the UN in particular). Moreover, Nordic countries, in spite of their sporadic squabbles and sporadic divergence of interests (Kubiak, 2012), present a more or less united front while there is hardly common interest or a united front of North America (the U.S. and Canada, and possibly Greenland).

The November 9, 2016 Press Report about Preparation of New Arctic Policy, which appears to sum up the American efforts in terms of guiding principles for the Arctic region, states the following:

“Under the cover of the 2016 election season, the Obama administration has been busy crafting a new Arctic policy that will have significant environmental, economic, and national security ramifications. It is likely to be left incomplete, with final decisions being left for the next administration to consider in 2017.” A few signs of its development emerged. Although it was overshadowed by electoral politics, the new U.S. Arctic policy is worthy of public consideration, as it will likely shape the business and political climate in the region for decades to come. There are three apparent objectives in this policy. First, the government will seek to adequately protect the Arctic environment, particularly in Alaska. Second, the U.S. will attempt to bolster the economy by taking full advantage of the region’s potential for hydrocarbon development. Third, the U.S. will re-establish itself militarily in the region by placing strategic assets in Alaska (Anderson, 2016). The sentence, seems to extremely important as it clearly shows that the implementation of the “Strategy” is basically left to the new administration. One should also mention that the U.S. held the chairmanship of the Arctic Council from April 24, 2015, to May 11, 2017, a period which began during the Obama Administration and continued into the first 16 weeks of the Trump Administration.

In December 2016, the Executive Office of the President released Inter-agency Arctic Research Policy Committee’s (IARPC) Arctic Research Plan: FY2017–2021 to advance research in areas of common interest to IARPC Agencies. The IARPC 5-year plan was drafted with contributions from all IARPC agencies and reviewed by the public. It intentionally builds on

the strong intellectual accomplishments and ideas of the research community at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels as well as inclusion of ideas from the academic community, non-governmental organizations, and industry.

As for the attitude presented by the President of the United States, Donald Trump, towards the Paris emissions target, one can only quote a statement made by a representative of the EU that “we tried very hard to convince the President, but we have not succeeded.” President Trump called his decision to pull the U.S. from the Paris climate agreement “a reassertion of America’s sovereignty,” and made a comment that he was “elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris.” The White House says America will follow the lengthy exit process outlined in the deal, meaning it will remain in the agreement (at least formally) for another three-and-a-half years – taking us right up to the next presidential election in November 2020.

Though the U.S. will remain part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Trump declared: “As of today, the United States will cease all implementation of the non-binding Paris accord” (Hunt, n.d.). In spite of various consulting bodies’ calls for the U.S. to ratify UNCLOS, the prospects of attaining it seem to be rather bleak. President Obama was not able to do it because of the Republican dominated Congress while President Trump does not seem to be interested. However, there are indications about the current administration’s attitude.

“The United States is unlikely to accede to UNCLOS in the near term, or perhaps ever. However, this does not mean that the United States should not take every action necessary to secure oil and gas resources on its extended continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, and throughout the world. The United States can accomplish this end while acting as a sovereign nation, continuing the tradition of American Presidents in proclaiming the nation’s maritime and resource rights, and without acceding to a deeply flawed treaty or seeking the approval of an international commission of experts housed at the United Nations” (Groves 2012).

### **The role of the Arctic Council**

The Arctic is no longer a periphery in global awareness as it has grown progressively in political and economic importance. Climate changes and the promise of natural resources availability have brought both environmental concerns and the possibilities of new investment and development. One should always keep in mind, however, that for the Native inhabitants

this region is not a laboratory for scientists and not a Wild North to be staked out, competed for and won or lost, but simply home, regardless of the interests of big corporations or even *raison d'état*.

If we take the member states of the Arctic Council (8) and their respective memberships in various organizations (e.g. the EU, NATO, NAFTA), add to them permanent participants (6), permanent observer states (currently 13), intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations and a plethora of NGOs with the observer status, and a multitude of states and organizations currently applying for the observer status, together with their affiliations, and complement that situation by the variant of the changing chairmanship, and then multiply the received number by international, multilateral political and economic relations of each of the entities, the result will be mind-boggling. The situation is dynamic, ever-changing and what is written today probably will no longer hold true tomorrow. With the right of veto enjoyed by the state members and the complexity of various interests, a comparison with the United Nations Organization immediately seems to suggest itself. Even if we examine the investors, following the obvious trail of money, in the global world of economy today and the very complex ownership of companies, the picture does not become much clearer.

Much is being said about security, resources, maritime passages, environment, sharing, defense strategies, Indigenous Peoples' rights, sustainable development, and governance, and they all are undoubtedly important matters. However, if the issues become so complex that no layman appears to be able to make heads or tails of them, it probably is about money. Hence it seems, in a nutshell, that what drives the countries to join the Arctic Council is the economy. In addition, it is a wonderful PR tool, especially for the Scandinavian countries.

One may criticize the Council but there is no one who disagrees with the statement that it is much better to debate, discuss matters and state of affairs, and talk about pressing issues rather than to resort to military confrontations. There is no doubt that it is an extremely important region and the issues pertaining to it are much pressing, if not imperative. The climate is indeed changing and bringing awareness about the Arctic to people all over the world is of utmost significance. Whether one perceives the international efforts pertaining to the Arctic as valid and/or effective is a matter of opinion, but facts are pressing and require much attention and actions. The situation seems

to be perfectly illustrated by the saying attributed to Daniel Patrick Moynihan: “You’re entitled to your own opinions. You’re not entitled to your own facts.”

The Arctic is a dynamic international region, with novel governance arrangements, strong cultures, abundant natural assets, and immense political challenges. “The Arctic Council is on the right track to address many of the region’s challenges through its respect for local input and capacity building. The United States will do well to support momentum in achieving common goals of the Arctic Council as a partner, not a leader” (Exner-Pirot, 2015). Being a partner may also prove difficult for the United States as being number one is so imbedded in the political culture and the collective spirit of that country.

For a number of years now, there has been an increase in the number of institutions active in the region – the most prominent of which is the Arctic Council. There is no doubt that over the years the Council has contributed to maintaining the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation. The Council offers and has created a forum to discuss matters of vital importance to the region, e.g. environmental management and sustainable development policies. “Its success has been attributed to its collaborative governance approach, which brings together government officials, the region’s Indigenous peoples and scientific experts. The Council contributes to framing and reconciling the Arctic policies and actions of governments, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders in the region” (Higginbotham, Spence, 2018).

The crucial statements, however, are in the final bit of information called “about us” and presented on the official site of the Arctic Council: “The Arctic Council is a forum; it has no programming budget. All projects or initiatives are sponsored by one or more Arctic States. Some projects also receive support from other entities. The Arctic Council does not and cannot implement or enforce its guidelines, assessments or recommendations. That responsibility belongs to each individual Arctic State. The Arctic Council’s mandate, as articulated in the Ottawa Declaration, explicitly excludes military security” (The Arctic Council, n.d.).

### **U.S. and the climate**

In the year 2007, there came out the report by the unsponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It was signed by over 100 senior

international scientists and confirmed that the warming trend was “irrevocable” and more than likely caused by greenhouse gas emissions. “Even with successful mitigation, the report predicted, the warming trend would continue to increase over the next few decades, and it warned of dire consequences unless there was immediate action to reduce emissions” (Grant, 2010, p. 412). It also highlighted the need for more research and education on means of adaptation (Summary for Policy Makers, 2007).

President George W. Bush refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol signed by Democratic President Bill Clinton or to legislate sufficient measures to slow the increase of harmful emissions. “The Kyoto Protocol, which had been negotiated in 1997 and came into force in 2005, was designed to coordinate the efforts of industrialized nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and thereby slow the rate of global warming. Depending on their degree of industrialization, thirty-six nations were given individual reduction targets for 2012 based on their 1990 levels of emissions. Seven of the eight Arctic countries ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Only the U.S. refused. Highly industrialized western European countries with their dense populations took on the challenge, initially with remarkable success” (Grant, 2010). By 2004, Denmark’s reductions were reportedly ahead of plans to reach its Kyoto target, whereas the U.S. had increased its level of emissions by more than 20 percent (UNFCCC, n.d.).

President Barak Obama’s committed to cut greenhouse gas emissions in the United States by 14 percent by 2020 which was supported by the Democrats’ American Clean Energy and Security Act, introduced in the House on 30 March 2009 (Broder, 2009). Protests against the bill mounted in 2009, led by several U.S. organizations including the Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow, funded by ExxonMobil and wealthy Republicans, as well as a group called Energy Citizens backed by the American Petroleum Institute. “The full extent of the anti-green campaign was revealed in a recent book by the president of a highly respected public relations firm with the assistance of an investigative journalist. *Climate Cover-up* exposes the orchestrated scheme to discredit the scientific reports on global warming and confuse the public debate. The primary industries involved were the oil and coal companies in the United States and the tar sands operations in Canada. Using leaked memos and investigative techniques, the authors show that the campaign’s so-called scientific experts were actually paid lobbyists. For months, the media recounted the misinformation, creating a phony climate change debate and mass confusion. By mid-November, the Associated Press

appeared to be the first newswire to check the facts with its own statistical study which confirmed the clever use of language and selective evidence used to debunk the UN reports”(Grant, 2010).

“According to data from the World Resources Institute, the US accounted for an astounding 26.6% of global greenhouse-gas emissions from 1850 to 2013. America’s population today is just 4.4% of the world’s population. In short, it is America, where per capita emissions have always been several times higher than the world average, that owes the world climate justice, not the other way around” (Sachs, 2017).

The most recent data for the year 2014 from the International Energy Agency’s Energy Statistics 2016 show that “the world’s CO2 emissions from energy and industry averaged 4.5 tons per person (32.4 billion tons per 7.2 billion people in the IEA tabulation), while US emissions were nearly four times that level, 16.2 tons per person (5.2 billion tons for 320 million people). Trump carries on about the Paris agreement’s supposed bias in favor of India, but fails to acknowledge that India’s per capita emissions are 1.6 tons, just one-tenth of the US level” (Sachs, 2017).

Jeffrey D. Sachs (2017), in his Project Syndicate, does not exactly mince words when talking about the attitude towards climate issues of the current American president, as evidenced by the very title of his article “Trump’s Climate-Change Sociopathy” and leaves no doubt as where the U.S. stance may lead us: “President Donald Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the Paris climate agreement is not just dangerous for the world; it is also sociopathic. Without remorse, Trump is willfully inflicting harm on others. (...) Trump is knowingly and brazenly jeopardizing the planet.”

Professor Sachs continues to criticize the stance of the United States, perhaps not without reason, in his later article, once again bearing a very meaningful title “We Are All Climate Refugees Now,” dated to August 2, 2018. He writes: “After 1992, the United States, the world’s most powerful country, ostentatiously ignored the three new treaties, signaling to other countries that they could slacken their efforts as well. The US Senate ratified the climate and desertification treaties but did nothing to implement them. And it refused even to ratify the treaty to protect biological diversity, in part because western-state Republicans insisted that landowners have the right to do what they want with their property without international meddling. More recently, the world adopted the Sustainable Development Goals in September 2015 and the Paris climate agreement in December 2015. Yet, once again, the US government has willfully ignored the SDGs, ranking last among the G20

countries in terms of government implementation efforts. And President Donald Trump has declared his intention to pull the US out of the Paris climate agreement at the earliest possible moment, 2020, four years after the accord entered into force” (Sachs, 2018).

Mid-point through the American presidency of the Arctic Council, in the year 2016, in his commentary on the chairmanship, Ambassador David Balton stated, among others, the following; “The issues confronting the Arctic Council have also grown – in number and significance – in reflection of the dramatic changes in the region. The warming Arctic climate in particular commands unprecedented attention, as governments, Arctic residents and civil society strive to understand and address the potentially profound consequences of climate change for the Arctic and the planet as a whole.”

The Ambassador continues by enumerating the achievements of the U.S. as perceived by him, which among others include: making the access to Arctic Council documents easier, improving the Arctic Council website and the interaction of the Council with other international bodies, particularly the observers. But above all, D. Balton emphasized attempts at making the work of the Council more systematic, especially with respect to climate change and sustainable development.

The importance of climate change is evoked again in Kamrul Hossain and Harsh Barala’s Assessment of US Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. The authors bring back the Obama era and the promises made by the then American administration.

“Climate change has already become synonymous with the term ‘Arctic’ because climate change is referred to in almost all discussions of the Arctic. Because short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) disproportionately impact the Arctic environment, the reduction of black carbon and methane emissions have been highlighted both in the US chairmanship agenda and in the US’s Arctic strategy. SLCP reduction is critical in limiting the rise in global temperatures, as set out in the Paris Agreement in 2015. As the name suggests, SLCPs, as opposed to carbon dioxide, which stays in the atmosphere for hundreds of years, (Henson, 2013) disperse in the atmosphere in a relatively short time ranging from a few days to about a decade. These SLCPs have a severely detrimental impact on human health and the atmosphere, especially in the Arctic, because they trap a great deal of heat on a per-unit basis and the black carbon that falls on Arctic ice or snow reduces reflectivity and increases heat absorption, resulting in rapid ice melt (Rautalahti, Kupiainen, 2015). The US has also prioritized support for the AC’s work on adaptation and

resilience efforts through the creation of an Early Warning Indicators System, as well as the creation of a Pan-Arctic Digital Elevation Map to increase our understanding of the impacts of climate change on the shorelines and surface areas of the Arctic” (Hossain, Barala, 2017, pp. 4–5).

The American new (Trump’s) administration’s sentiment towards UNCLOS is fairly predictable and as for the attitude towards other international agreements, Professor Sachs leaves no doubt either: “A global agreement [the Paris climate agreement] that is symmetric in all ways, across all countries of the world, is somehow a trick, he huffed, an anti-American plot. The rest of the world has been ‘laughing at us.’ These ravings are utterly delusional, deeply cynical, or profoundly ignorant. Probably all three. And they should be recognized as such” (Sachs, 2017).

Another staunch critic of the Trump administration or rather president Trump himself, has been the world famous TV station CNN. Fareed Zakaria, in his program called GPS (Global Public Square) has said (August 2018) that the U.S. is leading the world in a wave of nationalism, protectionism and populism that might send everything crashing down again. Perhaps the change in the American administration will also bring a new attitude dissimilar to “Making America Great Again” at the cost to the whole planet. President-elect Joe Biden promises a very progressive climate policy and plans to rejoin the landmark Paris climate agreement, reversing the withdrawal by President Donald Trump. He’s also called for the U.S. to have net-zero emissions by 2050.

Obviously, these are opinions possibly somewhat supported by facts. However, when thinking about the Arctic, what has America done in concrete terms to further the cause of the Arctic or mitigate the climate changes under the previous administrations?

### **U.S. and offshore drilling**

President George W. Bush opened up new areas to offshore drilling for the first time in decades when he lifted a longstanding moratorium on new drilling off much of the nation’s coasts.

The Obama administration initially said it would expand offshore drilling and allow new leases off the Atlantic coastline, parts of the Gulf and the north coast of Alaska. However, towards the end of his term in the office, Barack Obama “called for what he described as a permanent ban on offshore oil and gas drilling along wide areas of the Arctic and the Atlantic Seaboard,

a move meant to bolster his environmental legacy” (Tabuchi, Wallace, 2018). President Trump’s proposal seeks to reverse that legacy. Under its new plan, the Interior Department would open 25 of 26 regions of the outer continental shelf to drilling. That would leave only the North Aleutian Basin, the traditional territory of many Native Alaskans and home to one of the world’s biggest salmon runs, off limits to drilling.

It appears that the Trump administration is going to open nearly all of America’s coastal waters to offshore oil and gas drilling. Legally, most coastal states control leasing off their shorelines out to three nautical miles and the area beyond that (usually up to 200 nautical miles) is in essence the property of the federal government, including seabed and the mineral resources. In the United States, it is the Department of the Interior which parcels out offshore leases in those areas under five-year plans. Not all state governors agree with the new plan of the current administration, notably the state of Florida. Other states are also seeking exemptions as the new proposal turns upside down the long-term efforts to balance the nation’s energy needs with protecting ocean ecosystems (Tabuchi, Wallace, 2018).

According to the estimates of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the areas opened up to drilling under President Trump’s plan hold nearly 45 billion barrels of oil, of which 21 billion barrels would be economically recoverable assuming oil prices remain around \$60 a barrel. However, there is not much recoverable oil and gas in the South Atlantic or the Straits of Florida, or off the Washington and Oregon coast, or off Alaska outside the north shore. “The abundance of cheap oil and gas from onshore fracking in the United States has already diminished the incentive for companies to go drill in new offshore zones. Given the risks and costs of building wells in seas that have seen little development to date, not to mention the possibility that a new administration could again change offshore policy down the road, analysts don’t expect a rush into newly opened waters soon” (Tabuchi, Wallace, 2018).

President Trump has been rather quiet on the Arctic front, with perhaps the notable exception of his greenlighting drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (contested in court) and an announcement that the U.S. is planning to build six new icebreakers. “Congress Authorizes Six Icebreakers in Pentagon Bill. The nation’s annual defense policy bill cleared Congress Wednesday with a pay raise for the troops and a provision allowing up to six icebreakers. If the icebreaker part sounds familiar, that’s because last year’s defense authorization bill had something similar, but it was stripped out before final passage” (Alaska Public Radio. Arctic Update, 2017). The decision

to eliminate high-level diplomatic positions within the U.S. State department, including the special envoys for climate change and the Arctic, sent a message of downgrading the U.S. interests in the Arctic to the international community. It showed the world that Trump Turned His Back on the Arctic (Enge, 2017).

### **Conclusion**

In the year 2017, at the end of the American chairmanship of the Arctic Council, Victoria Herrmann, in an article titled “The Arctic Council in Transition,” published by the Arctic Institute, praised Barack Obama for being the first ever sitting president to have visited the Arctic who invited arctic stakeholders, state ministers, and researchers to the Anchorage conference called GLACIER dealing with climate change (Herrmann, 2017).

Lawson W. Brigham (2015) claims that equally important was American domestic political venue with three major themes to address: remind Americans the United States is an Arctic nation; emphasize the importance of rapid Arctic climate change observed in Alaska; and, provide an opportunity for President Obama to speak with Alaskans and hold key meetings with indigenous people who live in America’s Arctic. The GLACIER Conference and the President’s visits to a few Alaskan communities gained global media coverage which highlighted the Arctic, Alaska and global climate issues.

It appears that everything was on the right track and progressing smoothly until the change in the administration. Although it is much too early to evaluate the U.S. Arctic performance under Trump’s administration, if any, the prospects of American deeper engagement in the Arctic matters seem to be rather bleak and the prospects of ratifying UNCLOS nearly close to zero.

Some authors and followers of Arctic issues admit that during its Arctic chairmanship, the U.S. made significant progress in the implementation of its Arctic strategy by addressing issues of climate change, the well-being and resilience of the Arctic communities, maritime safety, marine cooperation, and biodiversity management (Hossain, Barala, 2017). However, the point is whether the Trump Administration will continue the efforts to promote the Arctic agenda as President Trump ordered his administration to begin demolishing a wide array of “Obama-era policies on global warming — including emissions rules for power plants, limits on methane leaks, a moratorium on federal coal leasing, and the use of the social cost of carbon to guide government actions” (Plumer, n.d.). Moreover, allegedly, more pro-

grams dealing with climate change, pollution clean-ups and energy efficiency are to be abandoned in the new budget, while parts of the Environmental Protection Agency are to be demolished and big cuts introduced (Milman, n.d.)

The American policy on the Arctic, including the perception on climate effects and decisions regarding offshore drilling, has definitely changed with the new administration. Only time will tell how it will all pan out but the reversals and the lack of continuity do not make observers very optimistic about the role of the Arctic in the American political, economic, social, and environmental agenda. It should be emphasized one more time that the U.S., unlike other countries, e.g. Russia or Norway, does not make the Arctic its priority. There is no particular urgency in developing Alaska's oil and gas resources because the product from there is simply too expensive. The U.S. has other states – to mention only Texas and California - on the continent that produce less expensive oil and shell gas is fairly cheaply imported from Canada. Therefore, the United States, though cautious about its energy security, is neither too interested nor particularly desperate about the potential resources in the Arctic, given also the availability and political importance of very inexpensive oil imported from the Middle East. In terms of simply pragmatic/financial viewpoint, and Americans pride themselves on being pragmatic, Alaska has been for all intents and purposes more of a financial burden for the federal government than a revenue-generating state. At the moment, it seems that the Arctic needs the United States more than the U.S. needs the Arctic.

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# NEW „DEMARICATION” OF BORDERS ON THE POST-SOVIET SPACE: THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AFTER THE SECOND KARABAKH WAR

**Abstract:** The chapter discusses the possible geopolitical consequences and relations between the countries in the South Caucasus region after full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. The ceasefire deal signed on the night of November 9-10, 2020, ended the six-week war. As a result of the war, Azerbaijan partially regained control over its borders, but part of the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Republic came under the control of the Russian peacekeepers who were stationed along the front line. The victory of Azerbaijan in the second Karabakh war was the precedent in the post-Soviet space when the state restored its territorial integrity by military means.

**Keywords:** Armenia, Azerbaijan, Karabakh war, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Caucasus

## Introduction

Throughout the past 30 years the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been one of the main problems in the post-Soviet space. This is the longest and oldest conflict in the territory of the former Soviet Union. In 1988,

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<sup>1</sup> Razhden Chikhorja, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1258-4560>.

the inter-ethnic clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis turned into full-fledged war over Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region within the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Inhabited predominantly by ethnic Armenians, the region announced its withdrawal from the Azerbaijan SSR and declared itself an independent republic. A full-scale war over the region has started. During the war, ethnic Armenian majority, backed by Armenia, established its control over autonomous region and seven adjacent areas around the enclave previously populated by Azerbaijanis (Adamczewski, 2012; Górecki, 2020).

In 1994, the two conflicting sides signed the ceasefire agreement. In fact, the second Armenian state was created on the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, but Nagorno-Karabakh Republic has not been recognized by any UN member state, including Armenia. Azerbaijan by peace negotiations sought to restore the territorial integrity, but it was not possible to find an acceptable solution for both parties.

Over the past decades, there had been sporadic clashes between both sides on the front line in the Nagorno-Karabakh region as it was in April 2016 (so-called “four-day war”) and directly on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in July 2020 (so-called “Tavush clashes”). But on September 27, 2020, the new round of the large-scale armed clashes in the history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began. They have been one of the biggest shake-ups in the region after the Russo-Georgian war in 2008.

During the six weeks of fighting, the Azerbaijani armed forces had gained control over more than 10% of the lands that were lost after the first Karabakh war (1992-1994). On the night of November 9-10, 2020, the leaders of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed trilateral agreement regarding the truce. The key points of the peace deal stipulates:

- 1) Azerbaijan retains control over areas recaptured in the fighting since September 27 (including territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region),
- 2) Armenia withdraws its forces from areas around Nagorno-Karabakh region,
- 3) Russian peacekeeping troops take a control along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh,
- 4) Armenia will get a transport ground corridor to Nagorno-Karabakh through the Lachin region in Azerbaijan.

In exchange, Baku will get a ground corridor to its enclave (Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan) through the Meghri region in southern Armenia<sup>2</sup>. All corridors will be under control of Russian Federal Security Service Borders Guards for five years.

The second Karabakh war changed the configuration of power in the region and created new borders “demarcation” and zone of privileged interests in the region. A similar “demarcation line” was drawn in the early 1990s in Georgia and Moldova, when Russian peacekeepers entered the conflict zones in these countries<sup>3</sup>. The situation with Ukraine is somewhat different. Since 2014, the war with separatists has continued in the eastern part of Ukraine, and Russian troops are stationing in the conflict zone, but Moscow officially denies this fact. Russia has drawn its “demarcation line” on the territory of the former Soviet republics. “Violation” of this “demarcation line” leads to a military confrontation with Russia, as happened with Georgia when it tried to re-establish its internationally recognized borders in 2008.

### **Implications for Russia**

The Trump administration's moderate activity in the Southern Caucasus has emerged a power vacuum that has been enabled by two strong regional players – Russia and Turkey. The escalation of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh created the risks of a direct clash between Russia and Turkey. The Western powers has shown little practical activity during the ongoing conflict (Hess, 2020). The war in Nagorno-Karabakh was stopped without the participation of the West, but instead of the West, Russia faced Turkey.

In many questions, the attitudes of Moscow and Ankara coincide with weakening the Western presence in the South Caucasus, but regarding other issues both sides are in different positions. The two are at odds over the Syrian conflict, and the conflict in Libya. The Nagorno-Karabakh region has become

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<sup>2</sup> A similar scenario regarding corridors between Armenia and Azerbaijan, called the Goble Plan, was first proposed by American diplomat Paul Goble in 1992. According to the plan: seven regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh are returned to Azerbaijan. Baku transfers the Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin corridor to Armenia, and receiving the Meghri corridor- a narrow section on the Armenian-Iranian border. The plan had been rejected by Armenia and Azerbaijan. For Armenia, the loss of Meghri would mean the loss of the border with Iran. For Azerbaijan, the recognition of Karabakh as independent state was unacceptable. (Radio Free Europe, 2000).

<sup>3</sup> The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, until recently, differed from other conflicts on the territory of Georgia (Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region, the so-called South Ossetia) and Moldova (Transnistria), in that way that there had never been any peacekeeping forces in the conflict area.

another theater of proxy war of their confrontation. Turkey seeks to expand its influence in the Black sea region and in the Southern Caucasus region. And thus, Ankara invades Moscow's "zone of privileged interests". Turkey's aspiration to realize the concept of the "Turkic world" collides with the concept of the "Russian world". Turkish-Russian tensions risks of acquiring a geopolitical character.

According to the ceasefire agreement, Russian peacekeeping troops have been deployed along the line of contact in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and along the so-called Lachin corridor – road linking Armenia with ethnic Armenian enclave of Azerbaijan. By this way, Moscow expanded its military presence in the South Caucasus and gained an effective lever of political influence on Baku and Yerevan (Tocci N., & Mikhelidze, N. 2020).

Russia also considers the fact of preventing Turkish peacekeepers from entering Nagorno-Karabakh for its victory. However, the Kremlin had to make concessions and agree to establish a joint Russian-Turkish center for ceasefire and end of all hostilities monitoring in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Thus, Moscow has given legal consent to Ankara's joining in the settlement of the conflict. Turkey – regional rival and the main unwanted mediator for the Kremlin, is entering in the negotiation process<sup>4</sup>.

### **Implications for Azerbaijan**

After the second Karabakh war, the situation for Baku acquired another, previously non-existent character. Azerbaijan achieved its goals – recaptured lands, but in return, it received Russian military troops on its territory. Although until recently, Azerbaijan was the only state in the Southern Caucasus region where Russia did not have its own military base<sup>5</sup>. Moscow's peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh can be in fact a Russian military base on the territory of Azerbaijan.

There are at least three different explanations why Azerbaijan gave the green light for Russian peacekeeping forces to enter the Armenian enclave: 1) to avoid more military casualties in case of completely recapture the breakaway region 2) to balance its relationship with Turkey and diminish the Tur-

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<sup>4</sup> At the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey was withdrawn from the negotiation process and the OSCE Minsk Group was created peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by a co-chairmanship consisting of France, Russia and the United States.

<sup>5</sup> Until 2013 Russia rented Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan. Nowadays, Russia has a military base in Armenia and from 2008 two military bases in breakaway regions of Georgia (Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region so-called South Ossetia).

key's influence 3) entering of Russian peacekeepers saved Azerbaijan from assuming guarantees for the safety of the Nagorno-Karabakh region's ethnic Armenians.

Azerbaijan gained a strong ally – Turkey. This cooperation between Ankara and Baku was based on mutually beneficial terms. Ankara has supported Baku in the implementation of joint energy projects, and today the strategic partnership between the countries is at the highest level. Due to the military-technical support given by Turkey, the Azerbaijani authorities managed to partially solve the main political goal of restoring the country's territorial integrity, which will provide the current leadership of Azerbaijan with new legitimization. At the same time, after the partially restoration of territorial integrity with the support of Turkey, Baku will have to face the strengthening of Ankara's influence, but Azerbaijan also has its own national and state interests, which do not always coincide with the interests and ideas of other countries.

### **Implications for Armenia**

Losing the war caused deep trauma in Armenia. The main problem was that Armenian side has been under illusions that close relations with Moscow, reinforced by membership in the military alliance (CSTO) and Russia's military base in Armenia, are the guarantee that Azerbaijan will never decide on a military operation of restoring territorial integrity (Muradov, 2020; Cornel, 2020).

Until a certain time, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a good lever of pressure on both Yerevan and Baku. However, the growing economic and military power of Azerbaijan could not be noticeable for Moscow. The Kremlin prepared a roadmap, but the Armenian side did not make concessions. Moscow's lack of support in the conflict with Azerbaijan, to a certain extent, was Moscow's desire to punish Yerevan for its non-constructive position (Popescu, 2020).

Formally, Russia had no reason to intervene in the conflict<sup>6</sup>. Moscow and Yerevan are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), but Russia's security guarantees for Armenia do not extend to Karabakh,

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<sup>6</sup> The cause of the Russia's armed forces involvement in the hostilities could have been an incident on the Nakhchivan section of the Armenia-Azerbaijan state border (on November 9, 2020), when the Azerbaijani side shot down a Russian military helicopter by mistake, killing two pilots.

internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. In addition, Russia, as one of the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, sought to demonstrate neutral stance and not support any side. Russia's military intervention (or hybrid intervention) in Karabakh on the side of Armenia, could lead to symmetrical actions of Ankara and a potential military expansion of Turkey on the side of Azerbaijan, which Moscow tried to avoid in every possible way.

By the peace deal Kremlin making Yerevan more subservient. In case of Armenian leadership's anti-Russian policy, the Armenians could lose the rest of disputed region controlled by the Russian peacekeeping forces. Moscow aims to prove that it saved Armenia from a total military defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh region by its actions. Russia blames the leadership of Armenia for the escalation of the conflict and also the changing Armenia's vector of foreign policy. According to Moscow, the pro-Russian foreign policy of Armenia held back Baku and Ankara from revanchist attempts of military resolution of the Karabakh conflict. A new pro-Western leadership coming to power in Armenia<sup>7</sup> and an attempt to revise relations with Moscow exacerbated the situation around the Karabakh conflict and led to its escalation and as a result to the military defeat of Armenia<sup>8</sup>.

The November peace deal is undoubtedly a political and moral trauma for Armenia. The country may develop feelings of revanchism, similar to which led Azerbaijan to the war in 2020. From the Armenian point of view, Moscow's delayed action for supporting Yerevan, which it had counted on, is perceived as a betrayal on the part of its military ally. Moscow's restrained reaction during the military phase of the conflict dealt a certain blow to the image of the Kremlin in Armenia, which in the future may lead to an increase in anti-Russian sentiment.

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<sup>7</sup> The defeat of the leadership of Armenia, which came to power as a result of the non-violence, can serve as an argument for Moscow in asserting the thesis that color revolutions lead to territorial losses, citing the examples of Georgia, Ukraine, and Armenia.

<sup>8</sup> Moscow's relations with Baku and Yerevan were not equal. Moscow has always been more delicate towards Azerbaijan being rich in oil and gas reserves, than towards the much scarce resources of Armenia. For example, Azerbaijan, which had been a member of the CSTO since 1993, was able to freely leave this organization in 1999, and in 2012 it did not renew the lease agreement for a Russian military radar station, and this fact did not deteriorate relations between Moscow and Baku. But in the meantime, Armenia as a member of the CSTO since 1993, which extended the stay of the Russian base until 2044, after raising the question of the expediency of membership in the CSTO and presence Russian military base in Armenia, it ran into deterioration in relations with Moscow.

## Implications for Iran

The opening of transport corridor for Iran might impact Iran's relationship with Armenia, with which Tehran has good-neighborly relations over the past decades. Armenia is a Christian country, Azerbaijan and Iran have a common religion, they are states with predominantly Shia Muslim population. But, Baku focuses on the ethnic factor, and therefore, is more inclined to establish relations with ethnically close Turkey.

Azerbaijan's pro-Western and pro-Turkish orientation is a powerful irritating factor in Iranian-Azerbaijani relations. Turkey is Iran's main geopolitical rival in the region. It is becoming increasingly evident that Turkey will expand its presence in the Southern Caucasus region despite Russian opposition. The strengthening of Turkey in the region has been a matter of much concern in Tehran<sup>9</sup>. Part of the ceasefire agreement about opening of a transport corridor through the territory of Armenia, will have negative impact on Iran. This may weaken the transit potential of Iran (and also Georgia). Until now, land connections between Azerbaijan and its western landlocked exclave Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through the territory of Iran.

Another important factor which affects current relations between Tehran and Baku is the presence of the ethnic Azerbaijani population in the north-western regions of Iran. According to the most overestimated values, their number may be around 20 million, which will make up an estimated one-fourth of Iran's population.

Growing irredentist sentiments among the Iranian Azerbaijanis is serious risk for internal Iranian security (Sofuoglu, 2020). Iran is worried that Azerbaijan's victory in the second Karabakh war could arouse national sentiments among the Iranian Azerbaijanis encourage them to strive to create an alliance or a common state (Great Azerbaijan) with its northern neighbor. Officially, the leadership of Azerbaijan did not support it (by the reason secession in Nagorno-Karabakh region), but this issue occasionally arises in relations between the countries<sup>10</sup>.

Iran in the international arena consistently refuses to recognize any self-proclaimed states, including the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and always

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<sup>9</sup> The deterioration of relations between Tehran and Baku in the early 1990s, was connected with presidency in Azerbaijan nationalist leader A. Elchibey, that hatched the idea of creating Greater Azerbaijan with ethnic Azerbaijanis living in northwestern Iran. (Sofuoglu, 2020).

<sup>10</sup> The second Karabakh war has brought additional tension in Iran's Azerbaijani provinces: in some cities have erupted protests in support of the Azerbaijan in its military conflict with Armenia. (Goble, 2020).

supported the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan<sup>11</sup>. However, Iran is also developing active political and economic ties with Armenia, which caused concern for Azerbaijan. However, Iran played an important role in the life of Azerbaijan. In conditions of isolation, the landlocked Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic transport communication is available through Iran.

Another aspect of Iran's concern is the threat of its isolation and the threat to the country's security. Tehran's especially negative reaction is caused by close relations between Baku and Tel Aviv<sup>12</sup>. Tehran has misgivings that Azerbaijani territory will be used by Israel for surveillance and maybe even an attack on Iran. In turn, Baku fears Tehran's influence on Azerbaijan through Shiite religious structures.

### **Implications for Georgia**

The results of the Karabakh war 2020 were mixed for Georgia. On the one hand, by the actual liquidation of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia's breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions have lost their cooperation partner. On the other hand, instead of the self-proclaimed state, a new territory with Russian troops appeared in the South Caucasus, and Georgia found itself in a ring. Officially Tbilisi has remained politically neutral in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, since both Azerbaijani and Armenian populations live on the territory of Georgia. Nevertheless, informally, Georgia watched with interest the restoration of the integrity of Azerbaijan. Tbilisi and Baku are strategic partners and cooperate within the framework realization of big transportation and energy projects: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. There are no contradictions in the bilateral

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<sup>11</sup> During the first Karabakh war in 1992-1994, Iran did not join to Turkey and Azerbaijan in closing their borders with Armenia. Whereas Armenia has only two windows to the outside world: through the borders with Georgia and Iran.

<sup>12</sup> Military-technical cooperation is one of the most important aspects of Azerbaijan's partnership with Israel. Israel to re-equip the Azerbaijani army with advanced weapons and military equipment (Rahimov, R. 2020).

relations between Georgia and Azerbaijan, with the exception of unresolved issues of disputed sections of the state border, which has not yet been delimited<sup>13</sup>.

For Georgia, the main economic risk of opening a corridor through Armenian territory, stipulated by the agreement, is the possible threat of loss of transit potential. However, at the moment, the risk of the implementation of energy projects through Armenia is extremely low.

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, it can be summed up that after the second Karabakh war the political map of the South Caucasus region has changed significantly. Armenia suffered a total military defeat which in the future will affect the country's internal political stability. The West also lost because of proving unable to stop armed conflict. As a result, the place of the West was taken by Turkey, which had its own interest in strengthening influence in the South Caucasus and notched up a success. Talking about gains and losses of the conflicting sides it should be noted that Russia is the clear winner of the war. Kremlin stopped hostilities and is military present in Azerbaijan. By introducing a peacekeeping contingent into the territory of the conflict zone, Moscow gained significant instruments to expand its influence over Baku and Yerevan as well. Turkey is another winner of the war that gained a foothold in the South Caucasus by participating in the settlement of the conflict. Iran found itself in a disadvantageous situation, near the northern borders of which, after the conflict, Russian troops, but also Turkish ones, will be deployed.

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<sup>13</sup> The states cannot agree on the disputed section of the border where the Georgian Orthodox monastery complex is located. This is an important spiritual center for Georgia. For Baku, this territory has military strategic importance. After the partial restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, progress may come in the demarcation and delimitation of the Georgian-Azerbaijani border.

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Map of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas of Azerbaijan following the results of the war (source: Expert.ru)



## MULTICULTURALISM AND THE NOTION OF HYBRID IDENTITY

**Abstract:** The issue of national, sexual, ethnic or cultural identity is extremely topical in contemporary societies, because, as never before, they are subject to constant modifications in the sphere of culture, customs, and ethics. Globalization and emigration also show that the cultural framework of individuals is not unchanging and can be transformed. The situation of “unstable”, “liquid” modernity is not conducive to self-identification. As a consequence, the traditional approach to identity becomes obsolete. The chapter is devoted to theoretical considerations on multiculturalism, as well as to the concept of hybrid identity, which may become effective instrumentation in attempts to analyze multicultural and multiethnic societies.

**Keywords:** multiculturalism, identity, hybrid identity

### Introduction

One of the most prominent sociologists of our times, Bauman describes the 21<sup>st</sup> century as follows: “We are in a similar situation to the participants in the industrial revolution in England: we are doing it without seeing that we are taking part in the complete reorganization of the order of everything. To some extent, as members of modern society, we are witnessing

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<sup>1</sup> Sylwia Hlebowicz, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland. <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0417-621X>

an *unconscious breakthrough* consisting mainly in the polyphony of political, cultural and social discourse (Bauman & Żakowski, 2010).

Indeed, we observe nowadays a much higher level of exchange of goods and ideas than it was in the case of previous generations. This is done through the internationalization to which the means of communication, cultural production and thus culture itself are subject. This means that the set of references with the advent of modernity has significantly expanded and went beyond the traditional identifications associated with an ethnic or national group. In this way, a series of new proposals based on invented traditions arise. Presently, man are faced with the difficult task of choosing the proposed collective identities. This choice indicates the process of creating new collective identities based on social identification at the level of social organizations or supranational structures (Ostafińska-Konik 2007, p. 146).

Globalization defines the framework of *cultural hybridization*, which in turn allows each actor to use the many options offered and choose from multiple sources of identity. This means the individual shaping of identity by selecting from among the available options (Giddens 2004, p. 79). *Globality* does not provide a point of reference for the identification or socialization of individuals. Theoretically and practically, a particular form of social organization and identification representative of the nation-state is not the only solution. Already in past epochs, there have been different kinds of social and political institutions. This means that even when there is no *national identity*, that is, an identity resulting from identification with a nation, a nation-state, it is possible for another form of collective identification (religious, ethnic, etc.) to emerge, having many features of national identities. Identification at the level of the national community is, in a way, a natural process, given to an individual at birth - through the acquisition of language and culture, we become members of a given nation. The acquisition of national identity is therefore somewhat unreflective, it is the result of the cultural process of inheritance, although, as Kłoskowska (1996, p. 17) notes:

[...] one can [...] talk about the social ascription of a man to some nationality and culture, but it is not a dependency that is neither exclusive nor impossible to weaken, modify or even break. This attribution can be a source of valuable experiences, but also heavy burdens.

Indeed, in times of “liquid reality”, the concept of identity changes its initial meaning. As Smart (1993, p. 173) notes, “the fragile unity of national societies has collapsed under the influence of transnational and global changes

and systems, and internal differentiation, expressed in the form of local, regional and ethnic cultures, has again started to play an important role”.

The aim of this chapter is to present the concept of hybrid identity as a form of national belonging. Even though the very concept is not new, it seems to be generative in the analysis of modern societies. To contextualize and extend the research perspective, the text presents successively the issues of identity, multiculturalism and the associated hybrid identity.

### **The notion of identity and multiculturalism**

The issue of identity is inseparable from ethnicity, although in the era of globalization it takes on other dimensions.

The term *per se* was borrowed by sociologists and then by political scientists from psychoanalysis (Boksański 2005). National identity is understood as a form of collective or group identity. The overriding issue is that the individuals concerned belong to a social group. Group identity cannot be viewed through the prism of individuals. The community is not one organism, but a group in which everyone has their features, therefore, as a creature, it will not be homogeneous (Włodarska-Frykowska 2017, p. 22).

Boksański (2005, pp. 32, 33, 36) explains that identity in the normative approach is synonymous with the *essence* of man or his formation in which the sense of his existence is realized. This is the purpose of human existence. Identity should be understood as a stable system of self-identification of an individual, which is confirmed by the external environment. It has two meanings: continuation (or staying) and difference. The author of *Collective Identities* divides the factors constituting the communities of ethnic groups into objective (i.e. ethnic groups understood as permanent, clearly distinguishable groups in which people use their language, have a separate religion, traditions) and subjective (i.e. self-identification) (Boksański 2005, pp. 78-79). Anthony Smith distinguishes the following identity characteristics (1991, p. 115):

- historical territory or homeland,
- commonly shared myths of origin,
- historical memory,
- common mass culture,

- common, legally defined powers and responsibilities of all members of the community.

According to Kukulka, there are three basic elements of national-state identity (1999, pp. 11-12):

- ethnic and national identity, created as a result of uniting members of a given community through historical and linguistic bonds,
- identity created through participation in a given group or political system, and its characteristic feature is “an emotional relationship or an affective belonging to a given community” (Włodarska-Frykowska 2017, p. 22),
- an identity based on geopenisism or topophilia, i.e. an emotional connection with a given place. Cultural and historical spaces are the main determinants of building a sense of identity. The sense of identity is the result of nation-building processes and is characterized by great dynamics, as it is constantly adapting to the changing world.

Socio-political changes occur very quickly in modern societies. Much academic effort is devoted to the research of multiculturalism and theories of the coexistence of many cultures within one country. Multiculturalism is understood here as “a social phenomenon in the form of the coexistence of dissimilarity, and therefore it is an empirical fact”, and is inseparably connected with identity (Nikitorowicz 2015, p. 28).

Nikitrowicz (2015, pp. 29-32) notes that the phenomenon of multiculturalism concerns mainly the areas of identity, ideology and education. In the sphere of identity, it is self-definition of belonging to two or more cultures, recognizing its norms, values and sanctions, as well as anticipating internal conflicts and the possibility of solving them. This phenomenon is a result of responsible and free self-determination of an individual, conscious assuming a task in a specific socio-cultural space, positioning himself in relationships with other people, determining the hierarchy of values, rules and norms of conduct. In the conditions of contemporary multiculturalism, unreflective loyalty to the values of the native group has been replaced with many offers, diverse axiological and teleological systems, a whole range of ideologies and manipulations of various scope and range (Nikitrowicz 2015, p. 29).

As for the ideological sphere, the literature on the subject often distinguishes four metaphors of multicultural societies (Day 2000):

1. *Melting pot* presents a homogeneous approach, assuming that a multi-ethnic society “fuses”, creating a homogeneous whole, adjusting to the dominant culture. In other words, it is either an assimilation or acculturation approach. The name of the term is taken from the play by Israel Zangwill of the same name, which premiered in 1908. It depicts the life of a Russian Jewish immigrant family, Quixanos. David Quixano survived the extermination in which he lost his mother and sister. Wanting to forget about a traumatic event, he composes an *American Symphony* expressing the desire to see a society free from ethnic divisions and hatred.
2. *A salad bowl* presenting a heterogeneous approach, assuming that many cultures can function autonomously within a state entity, just as the ingredients of a salad while maintaining their taste, make a dish unique. On this theory, any domination of one racial, ethnic or religious group should be avoided. The cultures are mixed but retain their characteristics.
3. *Patchwork quilt* – this is a concept taken from the statements of the civil rights activist Jesse Jackson: “our flag is red, white and blue, but our nation is a rainbow - red, yellow, black and white... America is not like a blanket - one piece of unbroken cloth, the same colour, the same texture, the same size. America is more like a quilt - many patches, many pieces, many colours, many sizes, all woven and held together by a common thread ” (July 18, 1984).
4. *Sunflower*, a concept created by professor Yu Zhisen from the University of East China, according to which the coexistence of many cultures is based on fixed values (flower center) from which various races, nations, traditions, etc. grow. They are connected but retain their characteristics.

As the list indicates, the contemporary approach to identity in a multicultural society is characterized by liberalism and an orientation towards diversity.

As far as the educational sphere is concerned, it is related to the creation of an educational system aimed at initiating and implementing intercultural dialogue through the implementation of projects and programs shaping the attitudes of openness, understanding and understanding with other cultures, experiencing and sensitizing to cultural otherness. It is a difficult task to perform, not only due to the complexity and interdisciplinary nature of the issue but also due to objective circumstances. The issues of mutual relations between different individuals or groups have been and are usually a sensitive area, rarely exposed to scientific research (Nikitrowicz 2015, pp. 30 - 31).

Multiculturalism is assessed ambivalently by researchers. Critics argue that this idea negatively affects social cohesion and questions the essence of national communities and that wealthy states and societies live a utopia, claiming to care for cultural diversity. In recent years, the negative effects of the multiculturalism policy based on liberalism (political correctness, cultural relativism), as well as unilaterally and populist formulated principles of citizenship and democracy have been emphasized. People even started pointing to the collapse of the ideas and principles of *multiculti*, forgetting that we were and are in a difficult and long-term process in which failures and failures have occurred and will occur (Nikitrowicz 2015, p. 26).

Advocates of this phenomenon note that, in the modern world, multiculturalism is a rudimentary strategy in the integration process that can bring positive results in the long run. The issue of identity, in a multicultural context, has become a category that describes and analyzes reality and is more and more often presented in continuous, changeable, contextual and unpredictable development (Golka 1997, pp. 54-55).

Multiculturalism is therefore a serious social and political challenge. It is understood as an ideological system and is closely related to a specific policy. Kurczewska emphasizes that multiculturalism is a relatively coherent doctrine of political emancipation of discriminated cultural groups whose members, considering their cultures authentic and separate from others, claim the right to equate themselves and their cultures with the dominant culture in the public sphere (Kurczewska 1999, p. 42). Boski, analyzing multiculturalism from a macrosocial point of view, notices that “instead of living next door, active participation of all interested entities that support and protect the organs of state power is promoted” (Boski 2008, p. 165). According to Burszta, the experience of the diversity of cultures as the diversity of decalatively equal cultures is synonymous with the consolidation of the overall concept of culture. Thus, the concept of culture acquires an operational and universal value, thanks to which the understanding of *cultural difference* results from the prior determination that the multiculturalism of the world is a fact, and the task of science is to describe and explain it (1999, p. 25).

### **Hybrid identity – a theoretical perspective on the phenomenon**

Considerations on multiculturalism most often have a binary structure – *minority vs majority*, *close vs foreign*, and the relations between them can only change the proportions, hence the multitude of theories mentioned above.

However, an interesting concept in the context of this chapter is the concept of hybrid identity. This concept significantly reverses the research perspective, as it does not focus on the multiplicity of cultures in a given society, but on the multiplicity of cultures in one person.

Hybridity has been presented in the literature a blending of cultures and representation of coexistence of difference in which new structures and perspectives emerge (Canclini 1995). Sakamoto (1996, pp. 115-116) claims that *giving up the desire for a pure origin, hybridity retains a sense of difference and tension between two cultures but without assuming hierarchy. It is not just a new identity but a new form of identity.*

Wagner (2017, pp. 241-242) defines the following features of “hybrid” identity: multiple cultural backgrounds, experience exchange between self and external assignment as well as the ongoing process of own identities negotiation. Yet, the fundamental characteristics of the hybrid identity is the belongingness, which may appear in various forms. Some migrants, especially those from the first generation, have a clear sense of mono-affiliation to the country of origin. But even if this feeling emotionally persists, however at a cognitive level multiculturalism is recognized, which indicates a degree of hybridity small to medium, with only a few reflections and internal negotiations (Foroutan 2013, p. 93).

Nikitorowicz (2015) notes that contemporary identities are very often hybrid, as a result of the overlapping and crossing of cultures (local, regional, ethnic, national, religious, civic of a given country, as well as roles of various types, roles going beyond the civic duties of the state), i.e. roles in the context of inhabiting a specific continent and global roles). An important characteristic of hybrid identity is the category of the cultural borderland, which is a real laboratory of “reactions to cultural otherness and interaction with it, as well as the state of consciousness in the face of multicultural experiences” (Nikitorowicz 2019, p. 12).

The notion of borderland is engaging from many perspectives – semiotic, philosophical, literary or political. However, regardless of the point of view we choose, the category of change, dichotomy, dynamics of forces with different vectors will remain common to them. Undeniably, being situated between two (or more) cultural, religious and ethnic spaces mobilizes, or even forces, to define one’s own identity themselves to be able to relate to other variables. The attitude towards *the other* or *different* may take various forms (isolation or harmony), but in these conditions, internal isolation is not possible (Nikitorowicz 2000).

The concept of hybrid identity assumes that an individual, based on inherited values, relates to other cultures, notices their representatives, and situates them in a specific and ideological space. The process of evaluation and re-evaluation is dynamic, it is subject to changes and interactions, both in the personal and socio-political space. From the praxeological point of view, the hybrid identity consists of a second (or third) element that functions as a supporting element. Both components are not antagonistic, but act complementarily. Thus, the native culture is not appropriated, but “it is expanded and given a new quality, enabling efficient and effective functioning in the emerging multicultural societies. Equal functioning in two cultures can also take place, but it is difficult to indicate which of them is dominant and which is supporting (Nikitorowicz 2019, pp. 13-14). Consequently, it is possible, referring to cultural valence, to define different paradigms of these two components (Kłoskowska 1996):

- universality (emotional priority of one culture),
- bivalence (two cultural identities, without indicating the dominant one),
- ambivalence (complexity),
- polyvalence (multiplicity).

In favourable social and political circumstances, an individual creates his system of hybrid identity, which is why it is so important not to narrow down national fields, limit the influence of stereotypes and ethnic antagonisms. Shaping a conscious hybrid identity is connected with identity opening, which in turn has an impact on the shape and functioning of local communities and, consequently, the entire society. Nikitorowicz describes the positive effects of this process as follows (2019, pp. 20-21):

- a state of mind that does not divide nations or religions for good and bad, but perceives people who are enculturated and educated differently,
- the motivation for continuous interactions resulting from the awareness of belonging to two or more cultures,
- the need to experience bonds and a sense of community, allowing others, while eliminating their exclusion and marginalization,
- integrating ties through cognitive, negotiating and motivational dialogue, ties creating dialogue as an imperative for development and shaping world peace.

This process is directly related to the attitude of the majority group, its openness to the manifestations of diversity and otherness in the dominant socio-cultural and political discourse.

### Conclusion

This chapter aimed to present the basic theories related to multiculturalism in the era of globalization and the notion of hybrid identity related to it. As a result of dynamic socio-economic changes, societies are undergoing metamorphosis at a much faster pace than it was just a few decades ago. Being open to new ideas, trends and intellectual currents may lead to cultural relativism and, consequently, to undermine the national or cultural identity. As Bauman (2010) aptly noted, we live in a time of *unconscious breakthrough* that is happening so quickly that it is hard to spot.

The transfer of cultural values causes that many people are forced to re-define their sense of national belonging. It should be noted that local cultural identities are experiencing a great revival in various parts of the world at a time when the traditional role of the state is profoundly changing. It is significant that as political changes at the regional and global level weaken the bond of an individual with his state, it becomes a weaker and weaker basis for identity identification (Giddens 2004, pp. 74, 79).

With this socio-political context in mind, the concept of hybrid identity seems to be extremely generative. Its innovation lies in the fact that it assumes that diverse cultural codes may *coexist* in an individual. Whereas so far research on identity has been based on various kinds of dichotomies, thus implying that they exclude each other. Interestingly, the cultural values form different patterns within an individual, depending on the situations individual finds themselves. Again, it should be noted that the systems of these values work complementary to each other.

In the ongoing transformation of societies, there are two clearly noticeable tendencies. On the one hand, there are actions towards *globalization*, and on the other, *regionalization*, i.e. searching for timeless values, universal, creating universal ties on the globe and values “private homeland”, important for distinct communities and groups, in line with their culture and the way they function so far. It can be safely asserted that there is no antagonistic relationship between globalization and regionalization, ethnicity and inter-ethnicity. Quite to the contrary, these are two aspects of one reality, complementing each other.

Democratization enabled the emergence of new forms of cultural diversity, new cultural minorities, as well as empowered the existing ones. It initiated the process of searching for one's own group identities. The progressive process of multiculturalism gave rise to new problems and new research questions, the need to look for new answers about character folk and national culture, features of minority cultures, contacts, communication, influencing neighborly and other cultures. Minority groups are becoming more and more aware of their psychocultural separateness in the private sphere and are convinced that they should have the right to show this separateness in the public sphere. Thanks to the increase in self-awareness, there has occurred social and cultural pluralism. The crux is to be and feel rooted in one's homeland, and simultaneously, not to give up and not to destroy *primal ties*, and to recognize oneself as a member of a wider nation, state and cultural community.

In a pluralist society, there is a process of investigation through individuals and groups to common values through constant negotiation of values and interests, is formed sensitivity to others and the need for mutual respect and mutual recognition, there are no higher and lower cultures in it.

The theory of hybrid identity opens up new directions in research on national minorities, because, contrary to previous opinions, the sense of belonging to the majority group does not have to be related only to ethnic origin. As a consequence, residents of Scotland in Great Britain, the Basque region in Spain or the regions of Northern Norway can call themselves full citizens of these countries, while taking into account their ethnic origin. This approach to the issue of identity helps to build a society that is solidary, yet not homogeneous.

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MARYANA PROKOP<sup>1</sup>  
KETEVAN MAISURADZE<sup>2</sup>

## SPECIFICS OF “UKRAINIAN POPULISM”. A CASE STUDY OF THE SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE PARTY’S CAMPAIGN 2019

**Abstract:** Political parties use populist rhetoric in their communication with society while running electoral campaigns. Populist slogans are one of the successful instruments to win elections. Volodymyr Zelensky, the leader of the Servant of the People party was a new member in the Ukrainian electoral market in 2019. Zelensky and his party participated in the presidential and parliamentary elections, and they were an example of new political performance based on populist rhetoric. The chapter analyzes what is the specificity of populism used in the election campaign of the Servant of the People party in 2019 and tries to answer the question whether it is based on the socio-political values of citizens. The hypothesis stated that the Ukrainian populism used in the election campaign by the Servant of the People party is largely based on the socio-political values of citizens. Furthermore, it is largely based on creating a new quality of election campaigning, so we can consider it significantly different from the slogans and election measures used in Ukraine before.

**Keyword:** populism, political campaign, parliamentary and presidential elections, political platform

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<sup>1</sup> Maryana Prokop, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0135-863X>.

<sup>2</sup> Ketevan Maisuradze, Deputy Dean, School of Business and Management of Grigol Robakidze University, Tbilisi, Georgia.

## Introduction

The issue of populism starts to be an inherent element of electoral campaign. Political parties use populist rhetoric in their communication and create populist slogans, which help them to win elections. The nature of populism in Ukraine is characterized by a strong relationship of political parties with their leaders. That is why, a crucial issue to be analyzed more thoroughly is the rhetoric of its party leaders. The presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2019 showed a change in the form of campaign strategies of the candidates. The Ukrainian entertainer Volodymyr Zelensky made his political debut by running for the President of Ukraine and his party – the Servant of the People took part in the parliamentary elections as an example of new political power based on populism performance.

The aim of the present chapter is to analyze and explain the specificity of “Ukrainian populism” used by the Servant of the People party in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019. The main questions are as follow: what is the specificity of populism used in the election campaign of the Servant of the People party in 2019?; is it based on the socio-political values of citizens? The hypothesis states that the Ukrainian populism used in the election campaign by the Servant of the People party is largely based on the socio-political values of citizens. Furthermore, it is largely based on creating a new quality of election campaigning, so we can consider it significantly different from the slogans and election measures used in Ukraine before.

### **Theoretical aspect of populism (attributes of populism)**

In recent years, populism has attracted essential interest of social and political researchers. One of the most significant research areas concerning populism is the consequences of using populism for democratic regimes (and their governances). Cristobal Rovera Kaltwasser & Cas Mudde (2012) point out that using populism in daily political life is toxic for democracy, political stability, and honesty of elections. In 2018, Francis Fukuyama said at the Atlantic Council in Washington, that “current democratic transformations in Ukraine are actually part of the global process of struggle for democracy with populism and authoritarianism, so the success of Ukrainians will be of great significance not only to Europe, but also to the world as a whole” (OP, 2018).

Researchers lead a long-term debate on what exactly populism is: an ideology, a communication style, political strategy, or something else.

According to Michael Feeden (1996), populism is approached as a "thin-centered ideology". He uses morphological analysis to study populism, it means to abandon the conventional macro-approach to ideologies as a sequence of narrations frequently characterized by a single category (freedom, equality or hierarchy). He noticed that the analysis of ideologies is morphological in nature as its essential objective is to inspect the internal structure of ideology. Therefore, ideologies should be perceived as structural preparations which have characteristic meanings to the sets of commonly defined concepts (Feeden, 2003; Lipiński, 2017). Corresponding to Feeden's assumption, Artur Lipiński said that he did not write about populism, but his division into thick-centered and thin-centered ideologies provided an indisputable contribution to populism studies. The "thick-centered" (full) ideologies are typical ideologies (fascism, liberalism, socialism). The thin-centered ideology – does not cover all aspects of life, only particular political questions. Feeden's conception was to facilitate theoretical explanation (Lipiński 2017, p. 246). Populism as a communication style means direct communication, inventive expression, formal language of the political elites (Canovan, 1981, p.). Populism as a strategy is a way of implementation populist platform. This strategy determines methods used by a leader to seek or exercise power (Weyland, 2001). Mudde (2004) defines populism as an ideology to divide society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, i.e. the people as a morally good force versus the corrupt and self-serving elite. People feel that their concerns are disregarded by established elite groups and that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people.

Operationalization of category of populism implicates the establishment of the main characteristics which will be helpful to analyze the populism used by The Servant of the People party in the next part of the chapter. Populism introduces some kind of division of the society into two camps: "the people" and the "elites". The populist leader usually shows that he fulfill the 'will of the people'. That is why, we can very often hear slogans in his populist rhetoric, which present him as a man of the people. Moreover, the people and elites have an antagonistic relationship as two standardized groups, which means "the pure people" vs "the corrupt elite" (Sözen, 2010, p. 237-238). Stanley (2008) presents four basic characteristics of populism: the aforementioned existence of two homogeneous units of analysis: "the people" and "the elite"; and antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite; furthermore, the idea of popular sovereignty; and the positive valorization of "the people" and denigration of "the elite". Albertazzi & McDonnell

(2008) completed those approaches with the affirmation of their own culture and the elimination of others. The analysis of the category of populism allows the author to create attributes for populism which, in this research, was used like research tools - comparative criteria.

Table 1. Attributes of populism

<b>Characteristic</b>	<b>Attribute</b>
Reference to the values, needs and goals demanded by society (the situation where the system of those values is faltering)	<b>Values based</b>
Dissatisfaction with the situation in a state Criticism of predecessors for not completing tasks	<b>Negation and opposition to the current state of affairs</b>
Formation of community based on brotherhood and solidarity	<b>A leader</b> who calls for joint actions despite differences for the common good
Output from a state of dissatisfaction and backwardness, finding the scapegoat	<b>Minority</b> as a threat (does not support the will of the majority). An indication of the destructive nature of power
Concept of rapidly changing reality	<b>Simple solutions</b> to difficult problems
Creating the image of an ordinary man of the people with the same problems and feelings	<b>A man of the people</b>

Source: own elaboration

### **Features determining the ‘Ukrainian populism’**

The Ukrainian populism is determined by a lot of features which are connected with the specificity of Ukrainian country and society; geopolitical position of the country; political, economic, social and cultural diversity of Ukraine and values of Ukrainian citizens. Political actors have included the differentiation of country and society in their political platform, and it helps them find what citizens really need and create successful populist slogans.

The geopolitical position of Ukraine has become a relevant element of determining populism. Position of Ukraine at the current stage of development

of international order is complicated and somewhat challenging. The country position is influenced by the interests of the US and the Russian Federation, and the European Union countries. All parts are trying to have Ukraine in their influence zone (Rexhepi, 2016, pp. 95-96). This makes Ukraine point of contention between powerful international actors (for example "Orange revolution" or annexation of Crimea, War in Donbass). That is way, the issue of Ukrainian foreign policy, i.e. a decision to create close relations with western structures (UE, NATO) or Russia, is one of the most datable topics.

The political actors in order to create their platforms included the specificity of Ukrainian society, which is called hybrid society between political apathy<sup>3</sup> and political activity (hyperactivity). The reason for that is difficulty to characterize the essence of Ukrainian society as fully active or passive, because this society does not present consistent behavior. On the one hand, public participation and interest of political life as well as large mobilization in situations where civil interests are violated are clearly visible (e.g., student "Revolution on the Granite" in 1990, "Orange Revolution" in 2004, "Euromaidan" in 2014, a protest campaign "Ukraine without Kuchma" called an "incomplete revolution", or Cassette Scandal associated with the murder of a Ukrainian journalist Georgiy Gongadze in 2000); and, on the other, we can notice a decrease of political activity as a consequence of these events (Prokop, 2016, p. 151). This means we could witness a high voter turnout during presidential and parliamentary elections; but, in contrast, a low involvement of citizens in political life.

The Ukrainian law guarantees Ukrainian citizens the possibility to develop social and political activity. The legislation gives them the right to participate in presidential and parliamentary elections. It guarantees the right to participate in all kinds of referendums and a possibility to call a referendum on their own initiative. However, the law of Ukraine does not provide citizens with the possibility of submitting a bill proposal. However, it does not translate into engagement of society in public life. The activity looks like occasional expression, which interrupts long-term social passivity, and occasional political activity with elements of political apathy (Law of Ukraine, 2001; Law

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<sup>3</sup> Political apathy is to some extent a rational way of mass behavior, which arises as a result of the individuals' conviction that their voice means nothing. Jean Baudrillard studies a relationship between political participation and political regime. In his opinion, democracy comes down to shaping a set of rules aimed at legitimizing a bourgeois power. Thus, the phenomenon of apathy reveals a refusal of participation of the mass of people, who legitimize power through voting, which becomes a proof of the unlawfulness of the bourgeois power (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 23; Prokop, M. & Hrehorowicz, A, 2019, p. 111).

of Ukraine 2004; Law of Ukraine 2011; Constitution of Ukraine, 1996, art. 93; Prokop, 2016, pp. 154-156).

Ukraine is not a homogenous country. It is characterized by political, economic, social and cultural diversity. This diversity presents division on western, eastern and central part of Ukraine. Differences between western and eastern Ukraine in terms of language (Ukrainian and Russian) or economic potential and religion have served as a ground for many concepts of the division of the country. The central part of Ukraine presents the same kind of hybrid approaches of eastern and western part of the country. It was the same myth of a divided Ukrainian nation that was used during the Orange Revolution (Riabczuk, 2015; Kuzio, 2010; Prokop, 2014, May 31). Another important issue is the category of divisions of the state in the context of Ukraine's foreign policy; in this case the west of the country is considered pro-European, while the east is considered pro-Russian. Many researchers of Ukrainian foreign policy, treat it as "two-winged" or "multi-winged". These terms were most often used to describe Ukraine's foreign policy during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) and it meant a lack of a clear, one direction in international cooperation (balanced between East and West) (Головага, 1992, p. 24–39; Riabczuk, 2004; Prokop & Galewska, 2014, pp. 9-10). After the "Orange revolution" Viktor Jushchenko promised that Ukraine will end "multi-winged" foreign policy and will start to be oriented only to the West. By contrast, Viktor Janukowych tried to change the dimension of policy to eastern orientation. New perspectives for foreign policy was given by Petro Poroshenko, who changed the wing of policy to cooperation with the EU and the NATO. After one year of Zelensky's presidency, it is difficult to estimate his choice, which in times of dangerous epidemic is not the most important one. The post-communist hibernation, state nihilism, political apathy and differences in voter preferences have not gone in vain. It all contributed to the deepening of this division within the state, and it constantly presents the specificity of Ukrainian populism.

### **Attributes of populism used by The Servant of the People party**

Operationalisation category of populism allows the author to create attributes of populism, which in this research, was used like research tools - comparative criteria (values based; negation and opposition to the current state of affairs; leader who calls for joint actions despite differences

for the common good; minority as a threat; an indication of the destructive nature of power; simple solutions to difficult problems; a man of the people).

The attributes of populism used by The Servant People party will be compared with the values of Ukrainian society. It allows for determining how much of these values was used by the party. Yulia Shcherbakova (2014) presents an analysis of the values that characterize Ukrainian society, showing them in the context of the values of other societies in other European countries. She found out quite significant differences. First of all, the values such as tradition, security and obedience to authorities are much more strongly present in Ukraine than they are in Europe. Conversely, values such as independence and empowerment are much weaker. Another piece of analysis portrait consists of negative features, such as: the low level of obedience to the law (legal nihilism), establishing the rule of law as not being a priority, less improvement in the people's standards of living, lack of political engagement and interest in politics, and overall low levels of trust and tolerance to others. The picture of Ukrainian society by these analyzes comes across as disadvantageous when compared to other societies of Europe. What should be pointed out, however, is that there are also values which Ukrainian society would like to change and see implemented as new regulations in their country. This includes the democratization of Ukrainian political system and its consequences, such as the rule of law, unconstrained freedom of speech and a standard of living with guaranteed social benefits.

Based on Human Rights Information Center research in 2016-2018, three most important values for Ukrainians are: freedom, security and fairness. Such ideals determinate the political situation in Ukraine, unfinished conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, instability of the country, high level of corruption. According to the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the most ordered values are fairness, security, dignity, equality, order, standards of living. If we compare relevant ideals, in terms of their importance to the community living in the western, eastern, southern, central, and Donbas regions, the most important ideals in each of them are freedom, second and third ones are security and fairness (except western region where fairness was changed by dignity) (Report Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Human Rights Information Center, p. 18-19). Also, sociological researches showed very high level of freedom and fairness in a catalogue of values of Ukrainians.

Table 2. The most important values (regional specificity)

<b>West</b>	<b>East</b>	<b>South</b>	<b>Center</b>	<b>Donbas</b>
Freedom	Freedom	Freedom	Freedom	Freedom
Security	Security	Fairness	Fairness	Security
Dignity	Fairness	Security	Security	Fairness
Fairness	Dignity	Dignity	Equality	Dignity
Order	Equality	Standard of living	Dignity	Equality

Source: own elaboration

Zelensky’s party was building their electoral promises based on values which are quite important for society, for example: freedom, guarantee of law, fairness of power, equality, common country, cooperation of elites with society.

During the presidential and parliamentary campaigns, it was preparing a lot of populist slogans, using crucial for Ukrainian’s issues. One of them was “Zelensky unites the country.” Previous elections candidates presented two different choices between a pro-western and pro-Russian way of being, i.e. Jushchenko (pro-western) and Janukowych (pro-eastern) – 2004; Tymoshenko (pro-western) and Janukowych (pro-eastern) – 2010 (Prokop, Galewska, 2014, pp. 20-24). That is why, the slogans used by the leader of the Servant of the People party met expectations of citizens living in the western and eastern part of Ukraine. He promised to “break the system”. This was the largest standby for Ukrainian citizens; they started to believe him and gave him their support to do it. The success of Zelensky in the elections resulted from using the populist slogans which are much easier to put forward by the candidate. He pursued cautious tactic, he spoke about the Ukraine’s integration with the NATO and the EU, but at the same time, he postulated that this should be decided in a referendum. He mentioned about lowering the taxes for business, but at the same time, he promised to increase social benefits. Unlike right-wing populists, he avoided playing identity policy, whether appealing to ethnic or religious heritage. He constantly balanced between the Russian and Ukrainian languages, because of profits he was gaining from these two languages, i.e. he could agitate citizens from the eastern and western part of Ukraine (Platform of Zelensky, 2019; Platform of The Servant of the People Party, 2019).

Elements of populism in the electoral campaign of Zelensky and his Servant of the People party in 2019 were based on a few populist attributes. Zelensky created the image of a man of the people, "if I am the president, this means that everyone who voted for me is also the president". "Anyone can be a president". He emphasized the diversity of Ukrainians, "We are so different, but so alike", but showed himself as the president of everyone. His position was against to political situation in the country. He criticized the political class and their non-effective work (Platform of Zelensky, 2019; Platform of The Servant of the People Party, 2019).

There are three most significant features of his electoral campaign which made him a populist candidate. First of all, it is his attempt to unite society to fight for changing the country and power by using the campaign slogan "Let's trounce them together!" He did not attack individual candidates, his opponent was the political class which was extensively discredited in popular imaginations as non-effective and corrupt. The second characteristic feature is a lot promises of change in a way of managing the country; he creates illusions of sovereignty. He promises to introduce and guarantee the law of people's rule and to establish legal mechanisms for making decisions by the nation. Finally, he introduces new techniques of electoral campaign connecting with well-known populist solution. He launched a new way for electoral campaign (e-campaign) and he was using a new kind of populism, called populism 2.0. He wanted to be all time in touch with the people, communicate with voters using social media (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter). Using social media and communication with citizens shortcuts a distance between a candidate and voters. Moreover, a candidate proposes citizens to prepare together his political platform, which will cover all citizens needs and proposals. He called on his followers to "write a program with me" and then come up with solutions "Let's do it together!". But such steps do not mean that a candidate wants to create the platform together. Much more realistic is that the same technique was used in order to hide badly-prepared campaign and lack of idea on how to run the campaign (Instagram profile Zelensky; Platform of Zelensky, 2019; Platform of The Servant of the People Party, 2019).

## Conclusion

Ukrainian society is based on a few values which are for them quite important. The desire to see these values implemented in Ukraine has, more than ever, been seen in the recent social protests which took place in Kyiv and throughout Ukraine, and which have become commonly known as the Euromaidan or “revolution of dignity”. The reason of this social movement was also quite illustrative: the decision made by the Ukrainian president not to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union, which in consideration for the values mentioned above, presents how important it was for society. The populism issue is an inherent element of electoral campaigns. Political parties use populist rhetoric in their communication and create populist slogans which help them to win elections.

The aim of the chapter was to analyze and explain the specificity of “Ukrainian populism” used by the Servant of the People party in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019. The main questions were as follow: what is the specificity of populism used in the election campaign of the Servant of the People party in 2019?; is it based on the socio-political values of citizens? The hypothesis stating that the Ukrainian populism used in the election campaign by the Servant of the People party is largely based on the socio-political values of citizens was proved. The research also confirmed that Zelensky’s party used in their political platform a lot of postulates which was based on the values important for Ukrainians. The specificity of “Ukrainian populism” determines a lot of factors: characteristics of Ukrainian country and society; geopolitical position of the country; political, economic, social, and cultural diversity of Ukraine. In this way, the second part of the hypothesis was confirmed that populism created by Zelensky and his party is largely based on creating a new quality of election campaigning, so we can consider it significantly different from the slogans and election measures used in Ukraine before.

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IRYNA KAVIAKA<sup>1</sup>

## UNITED GERMANY AND ITS GEOPOLITICAL ROLE IN EUROPE: VIEWS FROM WEST AND EAST

**Abstract:** German unification considered to be one of the most significant events in contemporary international relations. It highly affected the further processes of democratization in the Central and Eastern Europe, enforced transformation trends inside the European Communities and NATO, made considerable input into disintegration in Yugoslavia and the USSR and reshuffled the influence areas on the continent. During the 1990s new Germany's political, economic, military and cultural role in international relations was widely discussed both among its Eastern and Western neighbors. The aim of this chapter is to discover the main trends in British, American and Russian historiographies of the 1990s concerning geopolitical role of united Germany in Europe.

**Key words:** historiography, united Germany, geopolitics, Mitteleuropa, Rapallo complex, Central Europe, Eastern Europe.

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<sup>1</sup> Iryna Kaviaka, Belarusian State University, Minsk, Belarus. <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5438-8202>

## Introduction

The unification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union can be considered among the most significant events in contemporary international relations. They radically changed the geopolitical situation in Europe and the world. The collapse of the bipolar world order gave urgency to the issues of redistribution of responsibility and influence zones at the regional and global levels, required an analysis of new potential threats and the development of mechanisms for a prompt response to the challenges of the time. It was no coincidence that positive assessments of the Yalta-Potsdam system prevailed among Western and Soviet researchers at the end of the 1980s. That system despite some setbacks guaranteed a certain stability of the world order. Documentary and tacit agreements reached between the USSR and the USA in the post-war period contributed to the creation of a fairly effective and largely predictable model of international relations at various levels. The disappearance of the Soviet Union from the world map created a relative vacuum in the regions of its traditional influence. Nature and geopolitics are equally intolerant of the emergence of vacuum zones. When such situations arise, it is naturally to expect the re-filling of the zone and establishment of its relative balance with the external environment. In the 1990s – early 2000s the interest of Western and Russian researchers in the new role of united Germany in Europe sharply increased. That interest was particularly noticeable in the states which were responsible for post-war Germany and determined the development of the German question in 1945–1990. During the 1990s, the situation in the region remained unpredictable and unstable, which stimulate the researches to analyze its background, aspects and make various prognoses. In the early 2000s, the relevance of the German theme decreased due to the normalization of the situation in the European region and the determination of the post-socialist states further path. In this chapter, we are going to analyze the main problems associated with the revision of Germany's geopolitical role in Europe, which British, American and post-Soviet researchers analyzed in their works in the 1990s – early 2000s.

### West view

Too strong Germany turned out to be unacceptable from a geopolitical point of view for the USA, Great Britain, as well as small states oriented towards the USA – Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Poland, and the Baltic countries. United Germany gradually formed around itself, especially in the Eastern, Southeastern and Central Europe, a large geopolitical space in which German influence predominated. The tendency of German capital movement to the East was traced clearly. Even optimists among American and British researchers could not in the 1990s suppress fears about the consequences of reunification and the behavior of Germans in Europe in the 1990s: *One can not expect that a united Germany will also think and behave like the FRG, which we have known since 1945 ... We could not assume that a united Germany would fit into Western Europe as harmoniously as the former FRG. The tendency will grow again to revive the concept of "Central Europe", where Germany would play the role of a broker between East and West* (Garton Ash, In Europe's name, 1993, p. 230).

On the one hand, the unification of Germany was perceived as evidence of the West's victory in the Cold War, which promised an expansion of influence eastward. On the other hand, one should not underestimate the importance of geopolitical contradictions in the western block of states. A significant strengthening of the continental state – FRG – was fraught with certain risks for the oceanic powers. It was not surprising that after the USSR collapse, the ghost of *Mittleuropa* under the auspices of a unified Germany caused very contradictory feelings among the Americans and the British academic communities. A certain political dualism was reflected in the publications of British and American researchers, which were published in the 1990s. In their works, scientists repeatedly turned to the old geopolitical concept, offering the author's analysis of the prospects for its implementation in the new realities of international relations. The relevance and urgency of this issue significantly decreased after the entry of the former socialist states into the NATO in 1999. The establishment of the American umbrella control over the processes in the region led to the gradual fading of research interest on the part of historians and international experts in that problem.

The events of 1989 and 1990 demonstrated that German history was still relevant. They forced American and British researchers to think not only about the future of Europe, but also to analyze its past once again since 1914. A special issue of the journal of the American Academy of Arts and

Sciences – “Daedalus” – was devoted to events in the region. An issue entitled “Eastern Europe ... Central Europe ... Europe” was published in early 1990 and consisted of feature articles by American, German and Central European researchers (Judt, 1990) (Garton Ash, *Mitteleuropa?*, 1990) (Shopflin, 1990). At the turn of the 1980s – 1990s, as well as in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the question of the Central Europe fate became closely intertwined with the question of German identity. Any major change in the state of the German question and a revision of the German role in Europe implied a revision of the post-war order. The dominant position of the FRG was explained by a number of factors: the recognition of the states of the region in the 1960s, the increase in its economic presence during the 1970s – 1980s. Historians also added factors from the long past to them: the military expansion of the Teutonic Order, the colonization and Germanization of lands east of the Elbe and Oder, the role of Germans in the urbanization of the region, the special role of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation in the region (Boyer, 1989) (Rotshield, 1989).

At the turn and in the first half of the 1990s, the prospect of German control over the Central Europe did not rise optimism among British and American researchers. They stated the interest of Western states in maintaining the stability of the international order. However, in the early 1990s critically minded historians and internationalists were forced to state that with the USSR collapse, the levers of control in Europe passed to Germany. Questions of the future balance of power in the region caused concern and often revived associations with the historical past. Special attention of researchers was attracted by the authorities’ decision to move the capital of the united Germany to Berlin. For many, this city remained a symbol of Prussian traditions and the transfer of the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany would likely to shift the center of state gravity to the East (Layne, 1990-1991, p. 78) (Watson, 1998, p. 212).

Despite the predominance of critical assessments, some American and British authors were already in the early 1990s demonstrated optimism in connection with the German unification. They expressed confidence that the further foreign policy of the FRG would be based on continuity and moderation, which gave no cause for alarm. The use of *Mitteleuropa* as a tool to establish the world power status or to form an anti-Western identity, in their opinion, was in the past. They proceeded from the fact that the geographical position of Germany in the center of Europe determined its natural interest in the regional well-being. There could be no healthy Europe without

a healthy Germany. In the new conditions, the creative function of Germany was to provide financial support to post-socialist countries in their transition to market economy (Okey, 1992, p. 133; Marsh, 1994, p. 9; Morgan, 1989, p. 94; Stent, 1990-1991, p. 66).

British and American researchers came to a common conclusion: regardless of the path taken by the Eastern European states, Germany would dominate the region in any case. In fact, the question of Germany's geopolitical role boiled down to how Germany would dominate and was it really bad? For example, some believed that due to historical reasons Germany would try to avoid the military-political methods of influence in the region. The main task would be the systematic development of the post-socialist countries, a decrease in immigration flows, an increase in the German financial presence. Presumably, over time, the countries of Eastern Europe would become somewhat similar to Germany, the tension in their relations would decrease, and mutual ties become only deeper. In the best possible scenario, both Germany and its eastern neighbors would come to prosperity together (Farrar, 1996, pp. 360-361).

In the mid – second half of the 1990s as the economic and political systems of the post-socialist states were transformed constructively, as well as the procedure for their entry into NATO started, more optimistic assessments of Germany's role in the region began to prevail in British and American publications. The events of the first half of the 1990s on the territory of the Yugoslav republics made a definite impact on the Anglo-American historiography. The crisis phenomena, caused, among other things, by a power vacuum, forced to think about new mechanisms of the European security and a revision of Germany's role and degree of its responsibility in that.

In the second half of the 1990s Germany found itself at an interesting crossroads: its neighbors feared an increase in its military potential and at the same time demanded more active participation in the security area. Taking into account the German history, the processes in that country were analyzed deeply and carefully. Professor Simon Duke, comparing Germany with the liberated Prometheus, rejected the possibility of a pessimistic scenario for a number of reasons. First, Germany did not have colonies and overseas possessions that could take its policies outside the European context. Secondly, the disputes between Germany and its neighbors, which led to world wars, were resolved by that time. Thirdly, Germany in the 1990s was a politically decentralized state, in contrast to the II and III Reichs. Fourthly, the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, in contrast to the Ver-

sailles Treaty, assumed an exclusively peaceful solution to the issue (Duke, 1994, pp. 425-427).

Western experts noted that among Germany's allies there were few supporters of strengthening its military power. At the same time, however, they wanted the German contribution to security in the region to increase. Such a struggle of opposites in the strategic planning of the West led to the fact that Germany began to use actively the methods of indirect presence and influence in the Central European region. In the second half of the 1990s, American and British authors came to the widespread conclusion: Germany's interest in its eastern neighbors was natural, and all subsequent contacts that go beyond economic ties would develop on a multilateral basis (EU, NATO). Germany was assigned the role of the vanguard in stabilizing the political and economic system of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It was assumed that as a result of the successful assurance of that process, Europe would be partly "Germanized" and Germany partly "Europeanized". "Natural superiority" of Germany in the past would be replaced with its "natural importance" in the context of solving new European problems (Duke, 1994, p. 435) (Dorff, 1998, p. 65).

### **East view**

The unification of Germany was soon followed by the USSR collapse. The 1990s became a period of significant revision of the geopolitical role of both Germany and Russia in Europe. It is not surprising that this problem resulted in increased interest among researchers in the post-Soviet space. Speaking about the East view in this chapter we will mean publications of Russian authors: historians, internationalists, geopoliticians. In the 1990s – early 2000s, many articles, monographs and collections of documents on German problems were published in Russia. Lots of scientific conferences and round tables were organized, a number of theses were defended (Solovjov, 1992) (Maksimych, 1993) (Spasskij, 1994) (Zhabin, 1999) (Deviatova, 2003). The main issues related to the role of united Germany in Europe were the following: the position of the FRG in Central and Eastern Europe; Germany's new role in European security; analysis of the geopolitical relations between Germany and Russia (Kolosov, 1990) (Filitov, 1993) (Cherniajev, 2000) (Patrushev, 2004) (Pavlov & Novikov, 2005).

Authors noted that Germany reunification not only significantly strengthened the position of the FRG in Europe and in the international

arena, but also contributed to the collapse of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The disappearance of the GDR greatly weakened the positions of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, contributed to the strengthening of NATO and its expansion to the East. The unification of Germany changed the nature of European politics, indicating a certain geopolitical defeat of the USSR and the weakening of France, Poland, Russia and other European countries. The weakness of Russia's position in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Romania also encouraged Germany to establish political, economic and military control in those territories. The Czech Republic and Poland, historically associated with the West, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century were the leaders in terms of direct investment from Germany. In the second place there were the Baltic countries. In relation to the post-Soviet countries, Germany pursued a flexible policy of creating regional counterbalances to Russia on the principle of "divide and rule" in order to prevent the restoration of Russian influence in the entire post-Soviet space (Gvozdkova, 2003, p. 16) (Vatlin, 2005, p. 285).

Comparing to Western researches, Russian authors did not express so much anxiety and fear about German power and its new geopolitical role in Europe. Both Germany and Russia belong to continental states and share common geopolitical interests. Russian researches pointed out that Germany's natural interest in the Central and Eastern Europe was determined, first of all, by its geographic location, historical roots, economic interests and a cultural factor. The task of spreading economic and financial influence in the region had the top priority in the German foreign policy strategy. In the 1990s, the German stock exchange – *Deutsche Boerse* – was becoming the largest trading platform in Europe. Its behavior in the European markets was assessed by experts as aggressive expansion. Russian experts supposed that political circles in Germany supported *Deutsche Boerse* strategy as were highly interested in establishing Frankfurt as a leading financial center in Europe (Marinchenko, 2009, p. 222) (Samarina, 2005, p. 27).

Security problems in Europe, Balkan crisis and revision of Germany's position in NATO also drew close attention of Russian researchers. Desire to ensure security and stability in the region, to prevent possible conflicts and clashes formed one more official pretext for expanding German influence to the East. Security interests in the Central Europe were among Germany's top priorities in defining national security policy. Germany refrained from actively participating in the 1991 Gulf operation, limiting itself to a financial contribution, but was actively involved in the process of re-

solving the situation in the Balkans. The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany largely predetermined the collapse of the Yugoslav federation. In the spring of 1993, parts of the *Bundeswehr* began to take part in the control of the UN forces over the situation in the Balkans. New position of Germany in NATO at first caused some tension inside organization. After World War II, the United States was able to dictate its terms to a disarmed Europe, as a result of which the sense of national pride of the French and Germans was wounded. However, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century the core of the European Union – France and the Federal Republic of Germany – do not agree to unconditionally obey the interests of the United States. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the Iranian nuclear issue, intensified divisions within NATO (Vatlin, 2005, p. 285).

In 1990s – early 2000s geopolitical relations of Russia and Germany appeared in the center of Russian academic interest. Authors concentrated on analysis of continental nature of both states as opposed to sea nature of the West powers – United States and Great Britain. It was necessary to overcome old feelings of hostility that appeared after two world wars and concentrate on positive episodes from the past. Creation of an axis Moscow–Berlin–Paris would contribute to emergence of new Europe, independent of sea powers (Nartov, 2004, pp. 300-302) (Marinchenko, 2009, pp. 221-225). In that period, a lot of new publications were devoted to research on common features and similarities between Germany and Russia, their philosophy, history, culture, and people. Such ideas could be traced in special issues and collections of papers published by the Institute of World History (Russian Academy of Science), Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO, Russian Academy of Science) (*Ob'edinennaja Germanija v Evrope i mire* (in Russian), 1994) (*Rossija i Germanija* (in Russian), 1998) (*Rossija i Germanija na puti k antitotalitarnomu soglasiju* (in Russian), 2000).

According to Russian researchers, there were a number of factors which narrowed down Germany's room to maneuver in Europe. To their mind, only Russia could help Germany to solve two big problems – integration of eastern lands and fuel resources supply. After unification it still remained at the center of divided continent. However, in order to resolve geopolitical and foreign economic problems successfully, Germany had to cope with its domestic tasks. There was also the problem of the eastern lands, where most of the industrial enterprises were closed, and unemployment in certain sectors of the economy reached 50%. The country also had a difficult demographic situation – there was a decrease in the proportion of children, youth and the work-

ing population with a simultaneous increase in the proportion of pensioners in the country's social structure. Despite the European orientation, the western and eastern lands of the country in the 1990s lived in different worlds generated by the Cold War. The new countries of Eastern European democracies competed with the countries of the EU periphery for capital. Germany played a very important role as an economic bridge to the East. At the same time, high demands were placed on it to be able, if necessary, to resolve all kinds of problems in this field, since that was directly related to the social and economic problems of the former GDR lands.

Another important problem in Germany, was its dependence on raw materials. Russia could help to manage that problem, but European partners saw Russia's function only in the supply of raw materials. Great Britain and the United States pursued a course of delimiting Germany and Russia, since German-Russian cooperation weakens the position of sea powers in Europe and revived the "Rapallo complex". Henry Kissinger wrote: *"It is not in the interests of any of the countries that Germany and Russia concentrate on each other either as the main partner or as the main opponent. If they get too close, they will create fear of the condominium; if they quarrel, they will involve Europe in escalating crises ... Without America, Britain and France will not be able to maintain political equilibrium in Central Europe; Germany will be tempted by nationalism; Russia will miss a global interlocutor. And in isolation from Europe, America can turn not only psychologically, but also geographically and geopolitically into an island off the coast of Eurasia"* (Kissinger, 1997, p. 749). M. Thatcher, being a strong supporter of the Atlantic ideology, considered the American military presence in Europe as a guarantee of its security against threats from Russia and Germany. A united Germany, in her opinion, could not and would not infinitely correlate its national interests with the EU economic and foreign policy. Germany was too big to be just another player in Europe, but not big enough to establish an undeniable dominance over its neighbors. In that case, it was in the interests of Europe to carry out integration according to the confederal scheme, where possible unpredictable actions of Germany would be blocked by a coalition of states that were independent in their foreign policy (Thatcher, 2003, p. 358).

## Conclusion

The reunification of Germany changed the European geopolitical map drastically. It significantly strengthened Germany's position in Europe and at the same time contributed to the collapse of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. After 1990, Germany's aspiration to establish control, primarily economic, over the region of Central and Eastern Europe became noticeable. The FRG's natural interest in those countries had some historical, geopolitical, economic and cultural background. In the 1990s, there was a struggle over the Central and Eastern Europe between two geopolitical forces: on the one hand, these were sea powers, represented by the United States and Great Britain; on the other hand, there was continental Europe (Germany, France) supported by Russia. Germany was viewed by the sea powers as a strategic rival in the spread of economic and political influence over the former socialist countries. At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Germany, despite belonging to the Western bloc, actively developed relations with Russia. That was largely due to Germany's high demand for energy resources. Germany tried to take into account some of Russia's global interests in Europe when pursuing its foreign policy.

Geopolitical competition between the sea and continental powers in the 1990s found reflection in national historiography of involved countries. Powerful Germany and its possible rapprochement with Russia, formation of an exclusive influence area in the Central and Eastern Europe revived "Rapallo complex" and the concept of *Mittleuropa* among Western researchers. Such possibilities obviously threatened the strategic interests of United States and Great Britain in the region. After NATO enlargement eastward in 1999, assessments of Germany's geopolitical role in Europe changed to more positive. It was widely confessed that Germany contributed to the restructuring of the social and economic systems of the post-socialist states and their integration into Western structures. As for Russian researchers, they did not express much concern about the excessive strengthening of the FRG in the 1990s. Germany was seen as a natural assistant associated with post-socialist countries by historical, geographic, economic and cultural factors. Lots of publications on common Russian-German past and new possible areas of cooperation appeared. The expansion of the German trade and financial presence in the region, as well as its involvement in resolving security issues, had been thoroughly analyzed in the Russian academic environment.

However, most researchers came to the conclusion that united Germany had constructive influence on the processes in the Central and Eastern Europe.

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## IMPACT OF DENMARK, SWEDEN, AND FINLAND ON POLAND'S INTEGRATION AND LATER MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

**Abstract:** Nordic cooperation is usually compared to a strong web of informal contacts which are often much stronger than official structures. The Nordic states are generally recognized as small “peace-loving” states with a stable democratic order and effective economic systems, which prefer standing on the sidelines rather than playing important roles in international agreements. In fact, these states are more and more having an impact on the course of events in the international stage, especially when it comes to surrounding them space. An example for that would be their engagement in the 2004 enlargement of the European Union. The aim of this chapter is to critically evaluate the impact of the Nordic states, i.e. Denmark, Sweden, and Finland on the integration of Poland with the European Union in 2004 and their further relations within the European Union, by comparing how these relations looked like before, during and after Poland's accession to the European Union. Thus, the chapter is to answer the following research question: are the Poland-Nordic states' relations still the same as they were before Poland joined the European Union? In order to answer such a research question, the first part of the chapter has been devoted to the phenomenon of Nordic states' cooperation. Then, the road of Denmark, Sweden, and Finland to the united Europe has been presented. In the third part, a short review on how Denmark, Sweden, and Finland were supporting Poland on its way to the European Union has been made. The chapter has been ended with a discussion on a few key breakthrough moments which have a considerable impact on the contemporary relations among these states.

**Keywords:** European Union, European integration, Nordic states, Poland

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<sup>1</sup> Rafał Zajęcki, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland. <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6081-0150>

### **Phenomenon of cooperation in the Nordic Region**

It has been known for a long time that the states of the Nordic Region share a unique community awareness. This is an unprecedented phenomenon on a European and even a global scale, as it is based on an exceptionally well-functioning model of regional cooperation developed over several decades, which does not violate the sovereignty of these states and does not affect their participation in pan-European and global processes (Nowiak, 2001, pp. 7-8). The actual cooperation of the Nordic states in its present shape was initiated in 1952 by Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland; and a few years later, it was joined by Finland (1955), the Faeroe Islands and the Åland Islands (1970), as well as Greenland (1984). At that time, the Nordic Council was established. Another significant factor for the development of cooperation in the Nordic Region was the creation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA, 1960) by Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Finland was its member state in 1986-1994. However, over the time, most of these states left EFTA in order to become a member state of the European Economic Community (ECC) (Piotrowski, 2012; Tomala, 2019).

Undoubtedly, the intensive course of cooperation in the Nordic Region is greatly influenced by factors deeply characterizing its specificity, which, according to Nowiak (2001, p. 33), primarily include: the historical factor (common fate, tradition, historical roots), cultural criteria (a sense of cultural homogeneity, both in material and spiritual terms), economic factors (centuries-old economic ties having been continued up to this day in the conditions of market economy), social conditions (ethnic, linguistic, mental, and religious proximity), as well as natural geographical proximity which, in this case, is not the same as neighborhood. No less important is the intention of further integration of these states on the basis of a previously organized institutional framework, created on the basis of, among others, the Helsinki Treaty (signed in 1962) stating that the principles of cooperation among these states include legal, cultural, social, and economic aspects, as well as transportation, communication, and environmental protection. Article 40 of this Treaty states that the cooperation of the Nordic states should be based on activities carried out within the framework of the Nordic Council (a body for inter-parliamentary cooperation of the Nordic states), the Nordic Council of Ministers (a forum for inter-governmental cooperation),

meetings of prime ministers, foreign ministers and ministers representing different areas (Kościewicz, 2012).

### **Denmark, Sweden and Finland's road to the European Union**

Denmark was the first Nordic state which started negotiations on joining the European Economic Community (1970), positively ended with a positive assessment by the European Commission in 1972. On October 2 of the same year, the Danes participating in the referendum voted in favor of integration with the EEC, and as a result of that, Denmark became part of it (without Greenland and the Faeroe Islands) at the beginning of 1973 (Leśniewski, 2015). In the case of Finland, its geopolitical location had an impact on the limited possibilities of integration with the Western states for a long time. According to Leśniewski (2015), Finland's close proximity to the Soviet Union made this state reject the Marshall Plan, initially refuse to join the Nordic Council, or unable to be a member or associated state of the EEC. Only at a later date did Finland manage to sign an agreement with the EEC to remove customs barriers (1970), but it was still impossible to formally apply for the EEC membership, as it could violate the existing Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Finally, it happened in 1992, shortly after the Soviet Union's collapse, and in connection to the political changes which were then taking place in the Central and Eastern Europe. The accession treaty was signed in 1994. In the same year, a referendum was held in which the Finns decided on the accession of Finland and the Åland Islands (an autonomous territory dependent on Finland) to the European Union (Filipek, 2011). Sweden, unlike Finland, was not under pressure from the Soviet Union. This state had started negotiations as early as 1970, but finally ended them, and started them once again in 1990. The accession treaty was signed in 1994 and the Swedes also made a positive decision during a nationwide referendum on the membership of Sweden in the European Union (Matera, 2001). Finally, Finland and Sweden became full member states of the European Union on January 1, 1995.

The process of integration of the Nordic states with the European Union was based on the principle of social consent. The ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty by these states took place in 1998, i.e. in April in Sweden, in May in Denmark, and in June in Finland (Kuzelewska, 2011, p. 33). The arguments in favor of adopting the new provisions were, first of all, the possibilities of the European Union's enlargement, as the Nordic states

were most interested in deepening the process of European integration in the so-called Baltic, northern and eastern dimensions. In 1995, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland obtained the status of observers of the Schengen Agreement. The delay in signing it was due to the reluctance of societies, proposed accession of Iceland and Norway on special terms, removal of passport controls at the internal borders of the European Union, as well as the tightening of the eastern border between Finland and Russia. Finally, on March 25, 2001, the Nordic states joined the Schengen Agreement (Piotrowski, 2015, p. 138). Then, these states signed the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon which mainly concerned the rules for determining the composition of the European Commission, distribution of seats in the European Parliament, and the method of making decisions in the Council of the European Union. Under both amending treaties, Sweden has ten votes in the Council of the European Union, while Denmark and Finland - seven. So far, Denmark has held the Presidency of the Council seven times, while Finland and Sweden have held it three and two times, respectively. As Leśniewski (2015) points out, the progress in the integration of Denmark, Sweden, and Finland with the European Union should be assessed positively, but not in all areas. An example for that would be monetary policy (Denmark adopted an opt-out clause, i.e. permanent derogation, inclusion of Sweden in a temporary derogation, or full accession of Finland to the Economic and Monetary Union). Nevertheless, it is a fact that the process of European integration for these states has proceeded at a rapid pace thanks to the support of societies and the membership in the previous international organizations.

### **Denmark, Sweden, and Finland against Poland's accession to the European Union**

Although sixteen years have passed since Poland's accession to the European Union, from the very beginning one could see the considerable impact of this event on Polish bilateral relations with Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. They became significantly warmer after 1989, but only from May 1, 2004 one may speak about a real stabilization of relations among these states as full members of the European Union. In the political aspect, this stabilization manifests itself in the fact that the states mentioned above stopped focusing themselves only on strictly bilateral interests and problems. They became equal partners and were concentrating their joint activities

not only on finding solutions for difficult situations on the regional scale, but also on leading cooperation in the wider international context.

The accession of Sweden and Finland to the European Union opened a completely new chapter in the history of these states. This event put an end to the Swedish and Finnish policy of neutrality, which since the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century consisted in constantly being outside the political and military structures (Gryz, 1996, p. 5). Then, the change in geopolitical conditions, resulting from the collapse of the two-block system and the regaining of sovereignty by the Baltic states as well as Central and Eastern European states, influenced the adoption by the Nordic states of new and different than those being implemented up to that time directions of international activity. The accession of subsequent Nordic states to the EU structures deepened their involvement in the process of transformation of the Central and Eastern Europe. In the economic sphere, there was an influx of mainly Swedish and Danish direct investments to this region; while in the political dimension, the strong support of Sweden for integration aspirations of individual states, including those of Poland, was the most noticeable. The opening of Sweden's foreign policy during those times is reflected in the words: "Participation in transformations taking place in Europe enables us [the Swedes] to change the current policy, making it more open to outside initiatives." Moreover, most Swedish politicians hoped that the inclusion of the Central and Eastern European states in the European Union, if it did not lead to any confrontations with Russia, would strengthen the security of their own state and make it easier for Sweden to apply for NATO membership in the longer term.

It is therefore worth analyzing the circumstances for which the Nordic states decided so unequivocally to support the accession of the Central and Eastern European states to the European Union. The first group of premises was chiefly geopolitical, i.e. the position of the Nordic states in this issue resulted from their location. The integration of the Central and Eastern European states with the EU and the simultaneous development of cooperation with Russia were to end the period of divisions in Europe, as well as to guarantee security and stability in this part of the continent (Kołecka, 1998, p. 71). The second group of premises was typically economic. Above all, the importance of absorbing markets belonging to the candidate states, mainly the Polish one, and access to cheap and relatively qualified labor force were being strongly emphasised. Most of the Nordic states needed and still need external human capital in various economic fields. The third group of premises concerning the candidate states' compliance with the EU standards in such

areas as: environmental protection, labor market and social welfare, as well as reducing differences in living standards among different European states, were to eliminate potential sources of tensions in the candidate states, which could have a negative impact on the other states in Europe. Thus, the main reason for the growing interest in Poland was its future membership in the European Union (Noreen, 2001, p. 33).

It is puzzling that neither Sweden, being a net payer to the EU budget, nor Denmark or Finland - states with balanced benefits and contributions, were afraid of competition from the Central European states' side when applying for the EU funds. However, there were differences among them in terms of the order in which the negotiations should be conducted with all the states applying for the EU membership. The states wishing to integrate with the EU were divided into two groups, the so-called *ins*, i.e. the Luxembourg group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, and Slovenia) and pre-*ins*, i.e. the Helsinki group (Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Romania). Sweden and Denmark were opting for starting the pre-accession talks with all candidate states, while Finland was opting for an individual approach enabling the initiation of negotiations, above all, by those states which already received a positive assessment from the European Commission. It should be noted that, according to the Nordic states, the expected benefits (e.g. acceleration of economic development pace, increased trade exchange, inflow of highly qualified employees) resulting from the accession of mostly post-socialist states to the EU, would most likely prevail over possible losses related to agriculture, labor market, and regional aid funds (Czarny, 2002, pp. 170-171). When it comes to security, the states of the Nordic Region wanted to fill the "emptiness" which had arisen in the Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union as soon as possible.

Sweden was the most interested in Poland's accession to the EU among the all aforementioned Nordic states, as evidenced by the transfer of special funds supporting the integration process under the government's development cooperation program for 1996-1998 and 1999-2001. It is worth mentioning here that the strategic goal of Sweden's development aid for Poland was to bring the Polish and Swedish economic contacts to such a level which characterizes the Sweden's relations with other neighboring EU member states. Therefore, Sweden assumed a gradual reduction of financial aid, until its end at the time of Poland's accession to the European Union and achievement of normalization of partnership relations. This financial

support supplemented pre-accession programs (e.g. PHARE) and other initiatives, organized mainly within the framework of Nordic cooperation. A detailed strategy of cooperation was based on the proposals of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), which was guided by the idea that Poland, as a state neighboring with Sweden and a future EU member, is an important partner of both bilateral and regional cooperation, especially within the framework of Swedish Baltic policy. This strategy took into account Poland's priorities presented during bilateral consultations, as well. Sweden offered to share knowledge about the market and help in solving problems in the pre-accession period, especially in the area of negotiations and legal unification: several Swedish experts took part in the "Twinning Project" which was organized under PHARE. According to Czarny (2002, p. 348), its aim was to modernize the Polish taxation administration (e.g. the then Ministry of Finance, taxation chambers and offices, Ministry of Communication and Office of Telecommunication Regulation, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Agency for Development and Modernization of Agriculture, Ministry of Labor and Social Policy). It is also interesting that the attitude of Swedes to the enlargement of the EU was at that time the most positive among all EU member states (as many as 56% of respondents was in favor of the enlargement of the EU and 68% of them was in favor of the accession of Poland to it). There were three reasons for this favour. The first one may be regarded as the selfish one: the Swedes knew perfectly well that EU enlargement would provide them with new markets for their goods and services. The second one resulted from Sweden's sense of solidarity with the states of Central and Eastern Europe, especially with Poland. Mister M. Staffansson, the then Swedish ambassador to Poland, stated: "We are close neighbors and your fate has never been strange for us" (Kuczurba 2001, p. 42). The third one was a consequence of the will to tighten the cooperation of the Baltic states within the EU (Mizerska, 2008, pp. 127-128).

Poland's relations with the Nordic states in comparison of bilateral relations of these states with other European states, were dynamic. This is evidenced, among others, by the implementation of the "Poland in the center of attention" program by the Swedish side in 1999. Its aim was to strengthen all bilateral contacts and popularize the knowledge about Sweden in Poland. As part of the program, for which SEK 10 million was allocated, the "Polish Year" (inaugurated on February 16, 1999 in Stockholm) was organized in Sweden and the "Swedish Days" (inaugurated in December 1999 in Warsaw) were organized in Poland. It may be assumed that the authors

of the motto of the entire event: “Sweden and Poland - neighbors from Baltic Sea in new Europe” already then wanted to draw attention to the benefits of strengthening the Polish-Swedish relations in the context of the integration of both states with the EU. During the event, the highest authorities, ministers and secretaries of state got to know each other, as well as many exchanges of experts and seminars on the integration with the EU and trade policy took place.

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the Nordic states played a key role in the negotiation process for Poland's membership in the European Union. Namely, in connection with taking the Presidency of the Council of the European Union on July 1, 1999, the Finnish government announced an action program under the title of “A strong and open Europe enters a new millennium.” to be implemented by December 31, 1999 (i.e. until the end of its term of office). In that document, Finland somehow undertook to continue the process of EU enlargement, according to the previously adopted principles. One of the most important achievements in the field of enlargement of the European Union by new member states is the modification of the Accession Partnership, which served to support the efforts of the candidate states in meeting the criteria for the membership in the European Union. New forms of pre-accession assistance came into force in 2000, namely the ISPA and SAPARD programs which provided candidate states with additional and invaluable financial support. Exactly one year later, on January 1, 2001, Sweden, just like Finland, took over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the first time in its history, which was given priority by its foreign policy. Sweden wanted to strengthen its image of an active participant on the European and world's stage, as well as to find a new quality in regional cooperation, in which Poland was appearing as an attractive partner. The priorities of the Swedish Presidency were as follows: enlargement, employment and environment, i.e. “3 E”. Enlargement took the first place as Sweden was going to set a detailed calendar for this process. However, taking into account the fact that at that time Sweden had only been part of the EU for six years and did not have an established position in it, it was unlikely that its support in this matter would be enough. The most important matters were then decided by the all “fifteen”. But, the Swedish government made every effort to bring the positions of EU members and candidate states closer to each other. In order to do it, many official conferences and informal meetings of the foreign ministers of these states were organized. The aims of the Swedish Presidency were, among others, to open all negotiation

chapters with the candidate states which started negotiations in 2000 (the so-called Helsinki group) and close as many chapters as possible with the candidate states from the so-called Luxembourg group (including Poland). Sweden was also striving for elimination of the division into the above-mentioned two groups of candidate states and it managed to implement this point of its program. Moreover, Swedish views did not differ too much from Poland's position on the role of the EU in the long term. Both states were against the idea of transforming the European Union into a European superstate. There were, however, some differences in the Polish-Swedish political dialogue on the EU enlargement. The Swedish side urged the Polish side to make a compromise on the free movement of capital and land turnover, rights of Poles to work in the EU, as well as environmental protection issues. Direct payments to Polish farmers and the reform of the EU budget were also a controversial issue, because Sweden, not wanting to delay the EU enlargement to the East, believed that the reform of the budget could not be postponed, as it would be easier for fifteen states to reach a compromise than for twenty-five states. Sweden, on the other hand, supported without any reservations the transition periods proposed by Poland in the field of transportation policy. In the area of justice and domestic affairs, Sweden did not submit any specific postulates or demands, positively assessing the pace of law adjustment in Poland. In the matter of free movement of persons, Sweden did not demand any transitional periods (such as Germany or Austria), but due to its function it had to work out a compromise with the European Commission (Mizerska 2008, pp. 128-131). However, from the Poland's point of view, the most strategic was the Danish Presidency (July 1, 2002 - December 31, 2002), as its primary goal was to complete accession negotiations with a group of up to 10 candidate states. It was in Copenhagen in 1993 that the conditions for the accession of new member states to the European Union were defined. It is also there that the accession negotiations among Poland and other states applying for the EU membership were finally finished ("From Copenhagen to Copenhagen").

### **Relations with Nordic states after Poland's accession to the European Union**

Already less than a year after joining the European Union by Poland, an agreement was signed to start the construction of Nord Stream on the bottom of the Baltic Sea, bypassing such natural transit states as Poland and the

Baltic states. From the very beginning, there were discrepancies in treating the nature of this undertaking between Poland and the Nordic states. Although the investment was completed in 2011 and 2012 (commissioning of the first and second gas pipeline, respectively), until now Poland perceives it as a purely political undertaking, significantly reducing its and the Baltic states' energy security, and fears that Russia may, in the future, use gas supplies as an instrument of political or economic pressure. The Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in 2005 and 2006 was raised as an example of such political and economic pressure. The total length of the pipeline is 1,222 km, of which 1,189 km is offshore. The final sections run through the territorial waters of Russia and Germany, while the remaining ones run through the economic zones of Denmark, Sweden and Finland (Rosicki, Rosicki, 2012, pp. 140-146). Despite clear contradictions to Poland and Baltic states' interests, and that Poland was raising the issue of dependence of Western Europe, or a decisive part of the European Union, on Russian supplies, the Nordic states were treating the construction of Nord Stream as a purely commercial initiative. Denmark was the first to grant permission to open its economic zone, then it was followed by Sweden and Finland (Kubik, 2009).

Finland took the next Presidency of the Council of the European Union from among the Nordic states (July 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006). The Finnish Presidency was well prepared and although this state did not record any particular achievements on its account, as the Finnish ambassador to Poland, Mister J. Store assured, Finland did its best to solve the then problem of the Russian embargo on Polish meat and vegetable products. This is why Poland vetoed the adoption of the EU mandate for negotiations with Moscow, blocking the start of talks on a new EU-Russia partnership agreement. For this reason, Finland did not manage to start negotiations with Russia at the November summit of the European Union. Here, attention should be paid to the difficulties faced by Finland, which resulted primarily from the development of situations on the international arena (Brachowicz, 2009).

Sweden (July 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009), in turn, set itself the main goal of completing the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, which it finally managed to achieve. The Swedish Presidency was also focusing on the implementation of the assumptions of the Eastern Partnership initiated together with Poland in May 2009, by taking specific measures in the field of free trade, facilities for those travelling from the states included in the Eastern Partnership to the EU member states and *vice versa*, as well as in terms of social reforms. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia

were invited to join the Eastern Partnership. At that time, Poland was treating the Eastern Partnership as a great success and hope for further enlargement of the European Union to the East. From the Swedish perspective, the idea of the Eastern Partnership was one of the few, if not the only, successful EU's undertaking at that time inaugurated by this state (Nitszke et al., 2012, p. 208).

Undoubtedly, the further influence on the development of relations among Poland and the Nordic states was its Presidency of the Council of the European Union (July 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011). Pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, the so-called Group Presidency in which the Presidency is exercised by pre-agreed arrangements of three member states (trio) for a period of 18 months. Poland was together with Denmark and Cyprus, and each of these states was leading all the work of the Council of the European Union for a period of six months (July 1, 2011 - December 31, 2012) (Cymbranowicz, 2017). The Polish Presidency was of particular interest to Denmark, as it was Denmark which was next to take over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, and Sweden being the co-initiator of the Eastern Partnership. At that time, Poland was presented in the Swedish media as a state in which radical changes took place in a relatively short time, making it a "model and ambitious European student", although the road to this metamorphosis was full of many difficult moments, such as blocking the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty or sceptical and distrustful policy towards Russia and Germany in connection with the construction of Nord Stream at the bottom of the Baltic Sea (Nitszke et al., 2012, p. 209).

The culminating point of the Polish Presidency, mainly from the Swedish perspective, was the second Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw held on September 30, 2011. Although the Eastern Partnership Summit brought about a significant revival in the Polish-Swedish relations, in the opinion of most Swedish politicians, the effect of this meeting was "worse than expected". Due to the lack of tangible results of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Mister B. O. Lyrvall, representing the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained himself by saying at a meeting with representatives of the European Commission, as well as employees of the Polish and Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that: "Integration consists of time-consuming negotiations and legislative work" (Nitszke et al., 2012, p. 209).

On the other hand, the Eastern Partnership was not a priority during the Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Of course, Denmark attached great importance to the promotion and stabilization of democracy in the Eastern Europe and the transfer of significant funds

to the Eastern Partnership, but in this respect it represented a completely different position from the Polish one. Namely, Denmark was strongly opposing the proposal concerning the future accession of the Eastern Partnership states to the European Union. It was rather supporting the idea of encouraging these states to adopt certain European values and to cooperate more closely with the European Union, mainly of a political and economic nature, while the program of the Polish Presidency pointed directly to the prospects of enlargement of the European Union to the East. Mainly in this respect, as well as with regard to the issues related to energy security and climate matters, there were many inconsistencies between Poland and Denmark within the EU trio (Raczyńska, 2012, p. 141).

Another problematic issue in the Polish-Nordic relations arose between the Danish and Finnish Presidency (July 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019), namely the plans to build Nord Stream 2 which was to run through the economic zones of Denmark, Sweden and Finland, just like in the case of Nord Stream launched in 2012. Initially, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and constantly deteriorating security situation in the Baltic Sea region due to Russia's activities made these states more restrained towards Russian economic projects. As a result of that, the Nordic states' governments found themselves in a difficult position. On the one hand, they did not want to use their national law and the law of the sea to block Nord Stream 2, which was strongly supported by Germany; but on the other one, they were under increasing pressure from the United States and the Central and Eastern European states, including in particular Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Nevertheless, the Nordic states decided not to slow down or block national administrative procedures, additionally obliging the European Commission to assess the compliance of the construction of Nord Stream 2 with the third energy package and proposing to develop a common EU's political position based on the compliance of this project with the objectives of energy and climate policies and the interests of the EU in the field of security (Sawicki, 2017). Ultimately, all of these states agreed to lay the gas pipeline in their exclusive economic zones in the Baltic Sea, arguing that despite their critical attitude towards the project, "they could not have acted otherwise". Before making a decision, all these states were consulting with each other, and Denmark and Sweden (the most sceptical state) were additionally trying to raise this issue on the EU agenda in order to shed light on the project's energy goals, legal aspects, and security issues at the European level, hoping that in this way they would block the investment at the EU level. Finland, in turn, by adopt-

ing a neutral attitude, was treating this project as a typical business initiative from the very beginning, as in the case of the first gas pipeline (Gotkowska, Szymański, 2016).

The next Finnish Presidency of the Council of the European Union made climate protection and the rule of law as key priorities. In line with Finland's assumptions, the European Union should agree to become neutral as far as carbon dioxide until 2050. Initially, 24 states agreed to this goal, while Finland's task was to convince the other 4 states, i.e. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, which was demanding financial compensation for those states being particularly affected by the effects of such a goal, to change their decisions. Ultimately, Poland, as the only EU member state, refused to commit to climate neutrality in 2050, gaining from the EU the possibility to remain using coal as the main energy fuel (Bielecki, 2019). However, bearing in mind the fact that approximately 30% of the future EU budget is to be allocated to activities related to the EU climate goals, the lack of a declaration by Poland as to achieving climate neutrality in 2050 may result in losing half of the funds reserved for Poland for the transformation of its energy sector (Bellon, 2020).

Another issue raised by Finland during its Presidency of the Council of the European Union is the problem of the rule of law in Poland and Hungary. According to Mister A. Rinne, the then Prime Minister of Finland: "The fundamental values in the European Union cannot be ruined as it happens in some states now. For me, it is impossible to tell our citizens in Finland being a net contributor to the European Union, that we intend to transfer funds to states not abiding the rule of law", Finland strongly supported the idea of linking access to EU funds with respect for the rule of law (Bodalska, 2019). Adopting such a solution would harm the interests of both states, i.e. Poland and Hungary, which are currently the largest beneficiaries of the EU funds. The idea of linking the EU budget with the rule of law was supported by most EU member states, but the group of states supporting the most severe version of this mechanism, consisting in freezing or even withdrawing funds, includes, apart from Finland, also Denmark and Sweden (Gadzała, Kucharczyk, 2019). The solution proposed by the European Commission in 2018 is being continued by Germans currently holding the Presidency, and everything indicates that the future EU budget will depend on compliance with the rule of law.

## Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to critically evaluate the impact of the Nordic states, i.e. Denmark, Sweden, and Finland on the integration of Poland with the European Union in 2004 and their further relations within the European Union, by comparing how these relations looked like before, during and after Poland's accession to the European Union. One may say that there is no doubt that in the second half of the 1990s, Poland became a particularly important economic and political partner for the Nordic states because of the fact of being one of the most dynamically developing European states. Therefore, there are many arguments for that the Nordic states were very keen on Poland's fastest integration with the EU. And that was not only limited to their national interest. It is obvious that the Nordic states were firstly looking for new markets for their goods and services. But, it should be remembered that the Nordic states also have a great sense of solidarity with the states of Central and Eastern Europe, especially with Poland. The fact that the Nordic states were looking for a partner with whom they could build a zone of democracy and prosperity in the long term in a region including, apart from the Nordic states, the Baltic republics and Poland, is important as well. This is especially evidenced by the statement made by the Prime Minister of Sweden – Mister G. Persson: "In the future, this region of Europe, which you and we are part of, has a chance for an extremely high development. [...] If the conditions for such development are met here, the future may be really great" (Wojna, 2001, pp. 6-7). Nevertheless, one may see that after a few years from Poland's accession to the European Union, the attitude of Nordic states towards Poland was gradually changing. The most controversial issues concern such areas as climate, energy security and, much recently, the rule of law. All these issues may have a considerable impact on the amount of money that will be transferred to Poland within the future EU budget. And although Poland has obtained a temporary derogation from the obligation to achieve climate neutrality in 2050, the Nordic states seem to be irreconcilable when it comes to linking the future EU budget with the rule of law. At this point, it is worth underlying once again that Denmark, Sweden, and Finland belong to the group of these states which strongly support the most severe version of this mechanism, namely freezing or withdrawing funds for states not abiding the rule of law.

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## BREXIT AND EUROREALISM IN SCOTLAND AND IRELAND

**Abstract:** The chapter is devoted to a topical event for both the European Union member states and for Ukraine, namely, the withdrawal of Great Britain from the EU. The main issues around which analysts are actively discussing are the losses to the economies of the EU and the UK. However, the future of Scotland and Northern Ireland are considered to be of utmost importance.

**Keywords:** Brexit, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Scotland

### Introduction

The idea of European integration divided the societies of some European countries and their scientific and political elites into three conditional groups. The first group included its ardent supporters, the second group involved those who doubted the feasibility and / or success of the European integration, and the third one was formed by staunch opponents of any European unification movement (Tarnavskyi, 2017).


Britain's idea of leaving the EU is not new. There was always Eurosceptic sentiment in the United Kingdom. Partly because of these views, it took Britain a long time to accede to the EU, not only because of France's position

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<sup>1</sup> Lapin Oleh, Lesya Ukrainka Volyn National University, Luck, Ukraine. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2135-7167>

when Charles de Gaulle being the President perceived Britain negatively and considered it a competitor, but also because within Britain itself there was little desire to enter the EU. On the third attempt, after Charles de Gaulle left and there was no blocking voice from France, they entered the EU. For the past thirty years, Europeans have been tackling the problem of their self-identification by joining the EU. In the 1960's when the British Empire ceased to exist, it appeared to be a different state, not like the one that had existed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. They solved this problem by joining the EU. Eurosceptic sentiments did not disperse and part of the population was still dissatisfied. There were politicians who parasitized on the idea that the EU was not profitable to them and that it was worth reforming or even leaving it altogether. However, these ideas were marginal, as Britain received a lot of benefits from the EU membership and free trade as well. After the referendum in 2016, the society split in half – almost 50 to 50 (Fig.1). Actually, in Britain the explosion of consciousness occurred, rather political, than social, because once more the question arose: if we leave the EU, where should we go, what position will we occupy in this world? (The EU is tired ..., 2019).

Figure1. UK votes to leave the EU



The UK has voted to leave the EU by 52% to 48% (UK votes..., 2016).

### **Theoretical basis of the study of Eurorealism from the standpoint of Euroscepticism**

The range of concepts of Euroscepticism, public sentiments and political positions was expanding, and the term “Euroscepticism” became increasingly vague and conventional. In the first studies, Euroscepticism was defined only as insufficient support for the further process of the European integration. Later, this phenomenon was described as full or partial opposition to the integration process. Nowadays, Euroscepticism embraces all political forces (both left and right) that do not support the European idea or its institutional implementation.

The publicity of Euroscepticism directly relates to three tendencies, i.e., populism, moving away from liberal values, and the growing popularity of the left. The crisis of European identity based on liberal values has become an important trend for the recent years. This crisis has been embodied in the rise of Eurosceptic political movements that criticize the principles of a united Europe which doubt the national identity of member states.

Euroscepticism is a multi-layered and multifaceted phenomenon; this applies to both the causes of its nascence and its manifestations. In some sources we find that in the UK the concept of “Euroscepticism” first appeared among opponents of the EU membership around 1971 (Puleykite, 2007). British Eurosceptics feared that the European Union would become a superpower and the United Kingdom would lose its sovereignty. The main arguments of British Eurosceptics were the following: the lack of balance between the tax system and social policy of the EU, the expansion of the European Commission's powers in the field of justice and domestic policy, lack of democracy in the EU structures, a common constitution and currency (Hooghe, 2007, pp. 119-127).

The issue of Euroscepticism has been developed since the mid-1950s and 1980s, mainly in scientific and analytical centers in Europe and the United States, while among Ukrainian researchers, almost no attention is paid to this topic. Thorough research has been conducted and is being implemented by such scientists from different European countries as P. Taggart, A. Szerbiak, C. Flood, P. Kopecky, C. Mudde, S. Riishoj, N. Sitter, K. Zuba and others. Among Ukrainian researchers, it is worth mentioning O. Tarnavskyi whose works are devoted to the concept and institutional dimension of Euroscepticism. E. Andryushchenko, O. Hissa, M. Malek, I. Pavlenko, V. Fisanov, L. Shklyar and others also study the theoretical and methodolog-

ical fundamentals and processes of the European integration and Euroscepticism. Over time, more and more variations of Euroscepticism have emerged, and with the UK's intention to leave the EU, there is a need to revise and supplement the study of the theoretical foundations of Euroscepticism.

One of the recently suggested typologies for the process of the European integration is the combined typology of the Polish scholar K. Zuba who tried to link a limited number of positions in a concise interpretation scheme. Such a scheme is a model of a three-stage division of positions: Euro-enthusiasts (in favour of the integration); Eurorealists (ambivalent position); Eurosceptics (oppose the integration). The concept of Eurorealism is a new key element in K. Zuba's typology; it is characterized by the simultaneous manifestation of opposite qualities (Zuba, 2006). It is from the standpoint of Eurorealism that we consider the determinants of the problem, the current position and prospects of Scotland and Ireland for being part of the United Kingdom.

British think tanks and experts gave completely different forecasts for the UK's exit from the EU, and most of them discussed three possible scenarios: a rapid transition to the growth of the UK economy; a difficult transition period approximately until 2020; protracted crisis until 2030 (Akulenko, Maistruk, Naumenko, 2016). As a result, we have the realized second scenario, i.e., the United Kingdom has left the European Union. After years of political crisis in the UK concerning Brexit, changes of governments, early parliamentary elections, heated debates in the society, on December 20, 2019 the vast majority of members of the lower house of the British Parliament supported the agreement to withdraw from the EU with the amendments of Prime Minister B. Johnson.

### **Brexit: Conflict between Northern Ireland and Great Britain**

Brexit, in addition to the obvious economic challenges, poses very serious political challenges to London. After Britain's withdrawal from the European Union, at least three painful "territorial" issues will be exacerbated, namely, Northern Ireland, Gibraltar and Scotland. Already during the transition period, there is growing political tension in the British regions, where the majority of the population voted against the UK's withdrawal from the EU in the 2016 referendum. Separatist demonstrations in Northern Ireland have become more frequent. This region is called one of the probable problem points after Britain's withdrawal from the European Union.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Northern Ireland was the hottest place in Europe. Clashes between ethnic communities and the police, terrorist attacks, the de facto division of cities into “Protestant” and “Catholic” districts, and armed forces as law enforcement officers were all commonplace. Ethnic British and Scots who advocated the preservation of Northern Ireland as part of Great Britain were called “Protestants”. Ethnic Irish people, most of whom advocated reunification with independent Ireland, were defined as “Catholics”. Confessional markers were used for convenience to avoid long verbal constructions and to clearly mark the line of demarcation (Bakhtieyev, 2019).

In 1973, Great Britain and Ireland joined the European Economic Community (in fact, the European Union). The integration of the EU countries became closer, and the borders between the countries became more conventional. Gradually, the conflict in Northern Ireland subsided, but ethnic Irish still consider their nation divided and Britain's sovereignty over their homeland to be unjust. Ethnic British still see the future of the region only in unity with England. However, ethnic Scots have become a completely unpredictable entity. A majority of Irish and Scots voted against Britain's exit from the EU while most Englishmen were in favor of it.

Since 1998, Northern Ireland has been granted the official right to withdraw from the United Kingdom by the referendum. In many ways, this very act extinguished the passions. However, such a referendum can turn into a reality. Thus, in its election manifesto the Eurosceptic left-wing nationalist party *Shinn Fein* identified the opposition to Brexit, the referendum on the unification of Northern Ireland and neighboring Ireland, the preservation of membership in the European Union as its priorities. Prior to the referendum, the separatists suggest a special status for Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom (Clark, 2020). A total of 18 seats are reserved for Northern Irish MPs in the British Parliament (Election, 2019). According to the poll by Lord Ashcroft, 46% of Northern Ireland residents support leaving the United Kingdom and joining Ireland (45% of respondents are against and the rest have not decided) (Kukhaleishvili, 2019).

One of the key and controversial issues throughout the Brexit project was the status of the land border between British Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as an EU member state. Firstly, one should mention that the “border” between Ulster and the Republic is a very abstract concept. It is long (500 km), winding and sometimes runs in very bizarre places. Often the only indication that a border has been crossed is when road

signs with speed limits in kilometers (Republic of Ireland) are being replaced by road signs with speed limits in miles (United Kingdom). Moreover, it often divides settlements. According to British media reports, it crosses 300 streets (Napalkova, 2019 pp. 70–79).

It is significant that at the summer referendum on Britain's exit from the EU, in Northern Ireland the votes were distributed as follows: the territories belonging to the “Irish” counties (where the majority of the population is Catholic) did not approve of the idea of ‘Brexit’, while the Protestants mostly supported the initiative (Results..., 2016). This distribution of votes makes it possible to judge the transition of the conflict from the ethno-confessional level to a qualitatively new level of collision of socio-economic interests. If the motives of the Northern Irish British are simply explained by national trends, then for the residents of the “Irish” counties of Northern Ireland, which are closer to the border, leaving the EU raises questions of foreign trade (local agricultural products penetration into the European market), tourism and security.

Secondly, for 20 years of relative peace since the Good Friday Agreement, the island of Ireland has become a single economic entity. The Republic of Ireland has become a rapidly developing country, and was one of the first to emerge from the financial crisis. Transnational giants, for instance Apple, which actively sell their products on the British market, have established their European headquarters there.

Thus, the Irish border and its status became a kind of ‘a stumbling block’ in the whole process of Brexit. In relation to it, as well as to Brexit in general, there has been a certain transformation of approaches both in the now leading Conservative Party and in the European community. And its further fate threatens to become either a new “old” problem of Great Britain (revival of nationalism and separatism in the regions), or to become a model of a possible peaceful exit from the European Union.

Unfortunately, the conflict over Northern Ireland has not been finally resolved to date, but Ireland is building a constructive relationship with Britain. The issue of Brexit and further actions of the British government headed by Boris Johnson remains a top topic in the conversations of ordinary Irish people. Despite the difficult history of relations between Britain and Ireland, the countries are largely interconnected: visa issues (you can come to Ireland with a British visa), a common border (there is now complete freedom of movement between Ireland and Northern Ireland), and so on.

### **Conflict of interest between Scotland and Great Britain in the context of Brexit**

Contemporary Scottish nationalist tendencies were highlighted by all world media in 2014, when for the first time in a long period Scottish nationalists openly came up with the idea of secession from the United Kingdom and the restoration of Scots' rights to their homeland. Although the referendum failed, it demonstrated the viability and relevance of the ideas promoted by Scottish nationalists.

As early as the 1970s, when Scotland's oil industry received a powerful boost from new fields and effectively became autonomous from British Petroleum and control of London in general, the question of Scottish independence gradually began to emerge only from historical and cultural narratives. Regional development programs, as well as the openness of European markets, have been a viable source of funding and new buyers for Scottish businesses and producers. Energy is again a separate big issue, as Scottish oil, providing the United Kingdom with energy, has had the potential to enter wider markets, which were cut off from it by Brexit.

Scotland is currently in a strong mood for leaving Britain and for independence. Thus, in the latest referendum, supporters of independence did not reach 50% of the vote, but were very close to it. It should be borne in mind that Scotland is also home to many ethnic British people, and the votes of opponents of independence are their voices (Bakhtieyev, 2019).

In Scotland, events may follow the Catalan scenario. Scotland has been part of Great Britain since 1707. In this British region, the situation is even more difficult for Johnson than in Northern Ireland, as the separatist Scottish National Party dominates the local parliament and in the parliamentary elections it has won 47 of the 59 seats reserved for Scots in the House of Commons. On December 19, 2019, the First Minister of Scotland N. Sturgeon, sent a letter to Johnson demanding that the local parliament be given the right to hold a second referendum on independence. The first referendum took place in 2014, when 55% of Scots voted against leaving the United Kingdom (Scottish independence..., 2014). The Scottish authorities may hold an illegal referendum on independence. Scottish separatists have a solid social base for organizing provocations and protests. According to a YouGov survey, Scottish independence is supported by an active minority – 44% of the region's population (56% of respondents are against) (The EU is tired, 2019).

Such a political move requires the consent of the British government, and B. Johnson flatly refuses to give it: in Scotland the previous referendum took place in 2014, so, according to the Prime Minister, there is no need to hold it again. So the Scottish National Party continues to look for supporters in the EU. Their goal is to persuade the EU leaders to support or not to interfere with such a referendum, and to make it easier for Scotland to join the EU quickly if voters decide to leave the UK (Fig. 2).

In addition to political ambitions, Scottish nationalists have purely pragmatic interests, as after the end of the transitional Brexit period, Scottish exporters lose access to the EU Common Market. Accordingly, it is a chance for the authorities to take control of the production and sale of energy from the shelf in the North Sea. Against this background, populist messages emerge that the way exclusively separate from Britain is the key to Scotland's economic success and prosperity (Turbulent, 2020).

Speaking live on the BBC on Britain's exit from the EU, the former European Council President Donald Tusk said Europe was "sympathetic" to the idea of an independent Scotland and Scotland's accession to the EU would be received "with enthusiasm" while the politician emphasized that Europe did not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of Britain and the nature of relations among the constituent parts of the United Kingdom ('Empathy'..., 2020). In much the same way in the autumn of 2019, Herman Van Rompuy said that after the Brexit referendum, Europeans changed their attitude to Scottish independence: "*I think there are changes, yes, because many people look at what the Scots support. They (Scots) want to stay in the European Union and at the same time they are forbidden to stay in the European Union*" (Herman..., 2019).

A new conflict has been provoked by the internal market law, proposed by the British cabinet of Boris Johnson. Edinburgh has reacted sharply and radically. The rest are critical, but the parties are ready for negotiations, even difficult ones. In Scotland, dissatisfaction with a discriminatory bill that neglects the interests of the regions has provoked the harshest response – a call for a new referendum on independence (Scotland's Case, 2020).

### **Conclusion**

Consequently, the date of January 30, 2020 turned into an unprecedented event for the EU, important for both Eurosceptics and Euro-optimists, i.e., the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from from the European

Union and the European Atomic Energy Community. Since the results of the referendum on Britain's membership in the EU, there has been a clear split in society: just over 50% of Britons voted to leave the EU, and this is not only socially vulnerable, but also prosperous sections of the population. On two vectors - the political arena and the theoretical field - there is a struggle between Eurosceptics and Euro-optimists. We see further prospects for the study on Euroscepticism and Eurorealism in the development of the event after all the Brexit procedures. This event has led to long discussions between supporters and opponents of the EU enlargement and will soon require theoretical and methodological research.

The results of the British referendum are natural in the context of the crisis within the EU and the systemic international crisis in the world. They are not accidental and are not limited to the mistakes of individual politicians. It is worth mentioning that part of the expert community hopes that Brexit will not have catastrophic consequences for Europe. Although Brexit advocates argue that establishing full sovereignty opens up endless new possibilities, in reality it may limit their choices.

The main problem for Britain is the position of Scotland and Ireland. It is unlikely that the British Kingdom will collapse, but political elites have not taken into account that the various relations between the regions have historically existed and have not been divided. There will be some reformatting of structural relations within Britain, between London and the regions, and some compromises will have to be made. Brexit shook Scotland almost more than all parts of Britain, making local autonomy more radical and uncompromising. There have been more supporters of independence in the region than a few years ago, with significantly more Scottish nationalists promoting the idea of independence at all costs. In the last months of 2020, their opinion took the form of a referendum proposal "in Catalan", in absentia, without the consent of London.

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MAGDALENA TOMALA<sup>1</sup>  
TINATIN ZHORZHOLIANI<sup>2</sup>

## EFFECTIVENESS IN THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION DURING THE COV PANDEMIC

**Abstract:** Good governance in the health care system plays an important role to fight viruses back. The aim of the chapter is to compare the health care system in the European Union countries and to show how effective it is during the pandemic. Thinking about the efficiency of health care system, the chapter focuses on the effective usage of resources (independent variables) to improve population health during the pandemic. The result of research allows to illustrate and understand inefficiencies within the health care system, in relation to the health care systems and health outcomes.

**Keywords:** health care system, CoV, pandemic

### Introduction

Spreading the coronavirus (CoV) has shown the importance of the effective health care system in each country all over the world. WHO called the CoV outbreak as a pandemic on March 11, 2020. Pandemic is a term,

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<sup>1</sup> Magdalena Tomala, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland. <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1654-3590>.

<sup>2</sup> Tinatin Zhorzholiani, Grigol Robakidze University, Ivane Javakishvili Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi, Georgia, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8274-9028>.

which is used to explain a large scale of the epidemic that engulfs wide areas at the same time. A pandemic is defined as “an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people (Qiu et al., 2017, p. 3). Although the pandemic has not brought as many victims as earlier health crises, it shows the strengths and weakness of countries' health care systems.

Good governance in this sector of the economy plays an important role to fight viruses back. The aim of the chapter is to compare the health care system in the European Union countries, to draw its effectiveness.

In literature, there are lots of articles, illustrating many aspects of two categories of health care systems: Beveridge and Bismarck (Saltman et al., 2004). Also, there are many comparative works, concerning these two systems and implying which system performs best. For instance, in 1996 Javier Elola, Spain, published his research but it could not be pointed towards the most efficient model (Elola, 1996). What is more, Jouke van der Zee and Kroneman, the Netherlands, published the article ‘Beauty contest between dinosaurs as Bismarck or Beveridge model’s’ (van der Zee & Kroneman, 2007).

Thinking about the efficiency of the health care system, the chapter focuses on the question: how well a health care system uses its resources (independent variables) to improve population health during the pandemic. The result of research allows to illustrate and understand inefficiencies within the health care system. It should be mentioned that the relations between the health care system and health outcomes are complex, therefore they influence several tools. Among them, some are more important than others:

- as for health care costs: health care expenditure.
- as for health outcome: overall mortality rate.

Time series, dated from 2018 and 2020, show the differences between the situation before and during the CoV pandemic.

The chapter consists of three parts. First of all, it explains the differences in health governance in the European Union. Next, it compares the health care system among EU's countries according to the model of health care.

### **Health governance in the European Union countries**

The structure of the health care system in the EU is organized by a national health service system, operating with social insurance, which may be or not, independent of the government. The principal form of the system depends

on the tax-finance which divides countries into two groups: Beveridge-type and Bismarck-type system. The former one has opened up National Health System (NHS) to internal competition to diversify supply and increase purchasing power. The latter one has formed (traditional) Social Security Health System (SSH) where the costs increase on the part of the central government.

The Beveridge Model is named after William Beveridge, the daring social reformer who designed Britain's National Health Service. In this system, health care is provided and financed by the government through tax payments, just like the police force or the public library. Many, but not all, hospitals and clinics are owned by the government; some doctors are government employees, but there are also private doctors who collect their fees from the government. In Britain, you never get a doctor's bill. These systems tend to have low costs per capita, because the government, as the sole payer controls what doctors can do and what they can charge.

The second model is named after the Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck who invented the welfare state as part of the unification of Germany in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Despite its European heritage, this system of providing health care would look fairly familiar to Americans. It uses an insurance system – the insurers are called “sickness funds” – usually financed jointly by employers and employees through payroll deduction. Unlike the U.S. insurance industry, though, Bismarck-type health insurance plans have to cover everybody, and they do not make a profit. Doctors and hospitals tend to be private in Bismarck countries; Japan has more private hospitals than the U.S. Although this is a multi-payer model – Germany has about 240 different funds – tight regulation gives the government much of the cost-control clout that the single-payer Beveridge Model provides.

Countries, using the Beveridge plan or variations on it, include Great Britain, Spain, most of Scandinavia. The Bismarck model is found in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland, and, to some degree, Latin America (see Table 1).

Table 1. Classification of EU's countries according to SSH and NHS systems

<b>Countries with SSH system</b>	<b>Countries with NHS system</b>
Austria	Denmark
Netherlands	Finland
Germany	Sweden
Luxembourg	Italy (from 1978)

Belgium	Portugal (from 1979)
France	Spain (from 1986)
Bulgaria	Greece (from 1983)
Poland	Ireland
Czech Republic	Cyprus
Slovakia	Malta
Slovenia	
Estonia	
Lithuania	
Latvia	
Hungary	
Romania	
Croatia	

Source: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development et al., 2018).

However, it is important to note that different countries have adopted slightly distinct definitions of the health care system and they have organized these in different ways. Both Elola and van der Zee with Kroneman conclude that the health care systems' effectiveness varies, depending on the parameter of performance being assessed. They could not find severe differences in health outcomes between SSH and NHS systems and only find slightly worse results for equity in SSH systems and higher population satisfaction rates in the SSH group. But this situation might be changed in regards to the CoV time.

The first question of the research concerns health care costs between SSH and NHS systems during the pandemic and before it. One of the most important indicators which shows the effectiveness of the system is health care expenditure as a percentage of GDP (see Figure 1). Health care expenditure quantifies the economic resources dedicated to health functions, excluding capital investment. Healthcare expenditure concerns itself primarily with healthcare goods and services that are consumed by resident units, irrespective of where that consumption takes place (it may be in the rest of the world) or who pays for it. As such, exports of healthcare goods and services (to non-resident units) are excluded, whereas imports of healthcare goods and services for final use are included. Health care expenditure data provide information on expenditure in the functionally defined area of health distinct by provider category (e.g. hospitals, general practitioners), function category (e.g. services of curative care, rehabilitative care, clinical laboratory, patient

transport, prescribed medicines) and financing scheme (e.g. social security, private insurance company, household).

Figure 1. Health care expenditure as percentage of GDP in 2018




Source: Eurostat, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9b63fa77-b48c-45d1-8a89-ffb7e871b3c4?lang=en>.

Figure 1 illustrates disproportion between countries' expenditure as percentage of GDP. It is said that the pros and cons depend on expenditures. Consequently, NHS countries take an advantage of SSH countries in 2018. They spent more money, and that is why they made high satisfaction rates available for their societies. Acquiring a high sum of income in the budget, NHS system is able to work more efficiently than SSH. Also, participants of NHS system could improve the quality and organizational restrictions like waiting lists and gate-keeping with consumers preference, investing money

in new technological equipment and innovation tools. Looking at the expenditure date, we can observe that this division between poor and rich countries is connected with the level of development and the economic growth. Therefore, there is an imbalance between the Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe, but not in all cases. For instance, less money from the budget is taken by Luxemburg (5.29%) as a rich country, but on the other hand, Slovenia invests more money (8.3%) than the Old EU like Ireland and Greece. It should be added that the worst result in this category is obtained by Romania (5.56%), Latvia (6.21%), and Poland (6.33%). The best situation is observed in Germany and France (representing SSH system) as well as in Sweden (10.9%) and Denmark (10.1%).

Contrary to appearances, in some countries, health care expenditure fell down during the pandemic. The recovery is expected to start in late 2020 and it will pick up momentum in 2021 (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Healthcare spending in 2020-2021



Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit

Counterintuitively, expenditure on healthcare has been falling in some countries during the coronavirus pandemic, including Europe. The Economist's forecast expects a recovery to begin in late 2020 and to gather its pace in 2021. The battle against the novel coronavirus has led to a sharp drop in expenditure because of other conditions, with non-urgent care cancelled and patients avoiding hospitals and clinics. Many hospitals and clinics were cancelled

in almost all noncritical procedures to clear the way for coronavirus patients. Furthermore, many health-care practices urged patients to stay away from their offices to avoid close contact and to help them free up vital medical supplies for COVID-19 care. Some journalists and bloggers even evidence that desperately sick people avoided medical appointments and hospitals, perhaps due to out of fear that they would contract COVID-19. As a result, expenditure on health care by consumers declined at an estimated annual rate of \$110 billion in the first quarter of the year, knocking 2.3 percentage points off the gross domestic product. However, The Economist expects spending on non-coronavirus care to recover later in the year. The recovery will continue in 2021 when healthcare expenses will rise by 5.4% in Europe in dollar terms. Effective vaccination and coronavirus treatments are likely to become available during the year, necessitating additional expenditure (Covid-19: The Impact on Healthcare Expenditure, 2020).

### **The mortality rate in NHS and SSH systems during the pandemic**

The second research question concerns discrepancy between the mortality rate in NHS and SSH systems during the pandemic and before this time. It should be remembered that the number of deaths increases from year to year in most European countries due to the demographic structure of these countries. This means that using the average number of deaths cases over the past years may increase the estimated mortality rate extensively during the pandemic. In Table 2, one can see the result of the Polish Economic Institute survey from March 9 to May 24. According to their methodology, researchers compared the average mortality rate with extensive death cases during the pandemic.

Table 2. Extensive deaths during the first wave of CoV

<b>Countries with SSH system</b>	Excessive deaths (%)	<b>Countries with NHS system</b>	Excessive deaths (%)
Austria	+5	Denmark	+2
Netherlands	+28	Finland	+4
Germany	+2	Sweden	+27
Luxembourg	+10	Italy (from 1978)	+39
Belgium	+39	Portugal (from 1979)	+10
France	+19	Spain (from 1986)	+56
Bulgaria	-4	Greece (from 1983)	n.d.
Poland	-1	Ireland	n.d.

Czech Republic	-1	Cyprus	n.d.
Slovakia	-1	Malta	n.d.
Slovenia	n.d.		
Estonia	+4		
Lithuania	0		
Latvia	-2		
Hungary	-1		
Romania	n.d.		
Croatia	n.d.		
<b>Average</b>	6.93		23

Source: Excessive death during the first wave of CoV  
Podczas pandemii śmiertelność w Europie wzrosła o 15%. W Polsce jednak spadła, August 11, 2020, <https://300.gospodarka.pl/news/podczas-pandemii-smiertelnosc-w-euro-pie-wzroslo-o-15-w-polsce-jednak-smiertelnosc-spadla>

According to the Polish Economic Institute, the number of deaths during the first wave of the pandemic in the European Union was approximately 15% higher than expected. Comparing the countries which represent SSH system and NHS system, the disproportion between them is visible in favor of the SSH. It should be mentioned that those increasing deaths in all European countries were not the same. The highest excessive mortality was recorded in Spain, Italy and Belgium. High mortality rates were also recorded in Sweden and France.

However, six analyzed countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic) reported fewer deaths than expected. It is worth noting that during the pandemic combined with a lockdown, one can expect an increase not only of factors that can change mortality, but also of those that can negatively affect the number of deaths such as cleaner air, fewer accidents, cancellation of scheduled operations. However, these countries which received positive results during the first wave of the pandemic were in the group of those where the coronavirus appeared last. Thanks to the lockdown and preventive measures which were implemented there at an early stage of the development of the epidemic, the epidemic situation was under control. It was therefore possible that the negative impact of the lockdown on a number of deaths in these countries has outweighed the positive impact of the epidemic. As a result, they have recorded a lower number of deaths than would normally be expected.

The study concentrates not only on the first wave of the pandemic but

it also examines the situation during the second wave. It is essential to underline that countries have changed their policies towards the limitation of spreading the CoV during these two waves. And these countries which coped with CoV in the spring of 2020 were not as preventative as in the second wave (Table 3).

Table 3. Comparison between the first and second wave of CoV

Countries with SSH system	Number of death March 9-May 24	Number of death September 9 November 24	Countries with NHS system	Number of death March 9-May 24	Number of death September 9 -November 24
Austria	4430	9350	Denmark	3883	1057
Netherlands	40209	17928	Finland	2121	280
Germany	56816	31239	Sweden	29163	4510
Luxembourg	759	898	Italy (from 1978)	225399	91016
Belgium	63597	38396	Portugal (from 1979)	8827	13506
France	196559	120001	Spain (from 1986)	197359	93194
Bulgaria	833	14549	Greece (from 1983)	1167	8199
Poland	6718	73096	Ireland	11001	1656
Czech Republic	2132	45835	Cyprus	119	149
Slovakia	196	4086	Malta	42	631
Slovenia	738	3670			
Estonia	441	161			
Lithuania	420	1870			
Latvia	146	782			
Hungary	3316	21439			
Romania	7951	41534			
Croatia	677	7413			

Source: Coronavirus pandemic: daily updated research and data. <https://ourworld-indata.org/grapher/weekly-covid-deaths?tab=table&time=2020-03-16..latest>

As Table 3 shows, during the first and second wave of the pandemic, none of the European Union countries have recorded a similar number of deaths. Comparing these two periods, the worst result was achieved by Poland and the Czech Republic, where one can observe the most dynamic growth during the second wave towards the first one. What is interesting, these countries, which did not cope with the CoV crises during the first wave, improved their health care system, and then were better prepared for the seasonal increase of illnesses and the pandemic in autumn. Therefore, such countries as Spain, Italy, France, or Germany could minimize the consequences of the CoV during the second phase. Even Sweden whose policy was often discussed in the media because of the liberal attitude towards the CoV in spring has recently improved the situation of mortality. However, these countries which were the most effective in crisis management during the first phase, rather did not handle it later on.

### **Conclusion**

Although the crisis is an inherent part of people's lives, no one knows how to cope with it every time it happens. That is why the pandemic reveals the difficulty of management in current, unknown situations all over the world. Each country would like to find the best solution for people's health as well countries business, but there were a lot of unrecognizable aspects which influenced unpredictable governmental effectiveness.

The prospect of the pandemic shows that it has not taken into account all aspects, but only selected elements of the crisis. The heterogeneous information policy of the countries which often does not show the proper scale of the problem, is important in this regard. But apart from research weaknesses, some conclusions could be indicated:

1. According to the chapter, it should be noted that there is only a little link between the country's health care system and the pandemic crisis order.
2. Good governance during the first wave of the pandemic does not help countries to cope with it during the second wave.
3. Problems and difficulties during the first wave of the pandemic allow countries to realize how howling and imminent CoV is.

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ANGELIKA PIENIAS<sup>1</sup>

IMPLEMENTATION OF EMPLOYMENT  
PROTECTION MEASURES  
AS A MANIFESTATION  
OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERVENTION  
IN THE FACE OF THE PANDEMIC CRISIS  
ON THE EXAMPLE  
OF POLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN

**Abstract:** The economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic has significantly affected the functioning of many countries. State crisis support focused on financing the fight against the epidemic and government action packages to counter the socio-economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. This led to an increase in state intervention. The application of interventionist instruments was primarily aimed at ensuring financial liquidity for enterprises (counteracting bankruptcy) and protecting employees against job loss. The aim of the chapter is to examine the effectiveness of interventionist instruments by comparing these activities in two countries - Poland and Great Britain. The study was based on the analysis of reports on bankruptcy of enterprises and unemployment during the pandemic.

**Keywords:** state interventionism, economic crisis, pandemic, anti-crisis shield, furlough, Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme

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<sup>1</sup> Angelika Pienias, Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland. <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2582-4025>.

## Introduction

In the current times, the world is struggling with a new type of economic and health crisis. The economic effects of COVID-19 pandemic have significantly influenced the functioning of many countries. School closure occurred, along with the closure of universities, shops (with the exclusion of grocery shops and pharmacies), and restaurants. The countries' borders were also forced to be closed, which not only affected the inability of human movement, but also highly limited the international trade. The implementation of a 'lockdown' considerably contributed to an increased threat to the economic stability of countries around the world. This is mainly due to the deficiency of employment stability in many sectors of the economy and the threat of ceasing trade in many industries, including tourism, transport, food services, accommodation, and catering industries.

The countries' crisis support for organizations (economic interventionism) in the era of the Coronavirus pandemic seems to be a significant attempt to help those, who were the most impacted by the introduced restrictions. Such attempts have been undertaken by both Poland and Great Britain. The aim of this chapter is to assess the effectiveness of the implemented actions by the mentioned-above countries. It is worth asking whether the measures introduced by Poland and Great Britain, which aimed towards the protection of the most threatened industries were effective and whether they have contributed to the reduction of the negative economic effects? It is also worth remembering that it is not apparent that interventionism is an effective instrument protecting the entrepreneurship. The aim of this chapter is the comparison of the measures undertaken by both countries: Poland and Great Britain and an analysis of the effectiveness of their interventions. A hypothesis can be formed that the introduced measures of securing employment in both countries as an expression of the state interventionism should contribute to a remission of the rise of unemployment rates and a remission of the number of bankruptcies, resulting from the lockdown.

This chapter consists of 3 segments. The theoretical approach to interventionism will be discussed in the first section of the chapter. The views of researchers as John Maynard Keynes, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayes will be presented, as they represent a different approach to the mentioned-above topic. In the next section of the chapter, the measures implemented by both countries to help the most vulnerable industries will be compared. In the last section an analysis was undertaken into the effectiveness

of the measures introduced by the studied countries. In this approach measures such as the bankruptcy rate of enterprises and the unemployment rate were used.

### **State interventionism and economic order**

The presence of the state in the country's economy has been the subject of constant disputes amongst economists, political scientists and sociologists. These disputes continue to rise in intensity especially in the times of deepening economic issues which are manifested by the occurrence of negative social and economic effects. These effects force the active actions of countries, which seem to be essential for the proper functioning of the society. Although theoretically such approach may seem justified, is it so in practice?

Such intervention is called state interventionism. What is in fact state interventionism and how does it affect the economic order? The state interventionism is a country's policy and is based on exerting influence on the economy by the country. Interventionism is deemed as any conscious influence of the country on the course of its economic processes (Nazarko 2015, p. 85). From a historic point of view, state interventionism has always functioned in diverse forms. It should however be noted that its character had a much less repressive approach in the context of a command economy and the existing conceptions did not treat it as a closed regulatory scheme and often attributed it to an ad-hoc nature (Sołdaczuk, 1959, p. 208). It is since the doctrine of J.M. Keynes that changed the radical directions of interest in the traditional economy theories. This doctrine provided the previously missing explanations for economists and provided guidelines for leading economic policy. Keynes had argued the need for state intervention by the fact that the market mechanism was unable to ensure economic equilibrium, allowing for cyclical crises and forced unemployment to occur. In the occurrence of the significant drop of manufacture during the Great Depression, Keynes proposed a solution which was based on delivering additional demand. In accordance with Keynes' proposal, it was possible to raise the levels of manufacturing and in effect, contest the recession. If the government was not able to afford to fill the gaps in the combined demand, it should have taken steps to borrow for this purpose, by paying back the tax money in the period of good times. Based on the above, it may be seen that spending money which one is not in the possession of became justified. In the context of lockdown, it is worth

mentioning the fact that the measures, which were introduced by the government, were not intended for investments, but for meeting the organizational needs associated with its operation (cost approach).

According to Keynes, the monetary and fiscal policies were amongst the indirect measures of effective impact on the economic situation. Keynes first analyzed the dependence between the economic situation and the monetary policy. Aiming for the stimulation and maintenance of the economic situation, the government should provide the remaining economic entities with access to cheap money, as it would seem the only efficient way for the desired levels of both private and public sector investments and consumer spending to occur. As a result of this, the effective global demand would increase and new vacancies were being created, indirectly financially contributed by the government. The precursor of interventionism distinguished four monetary instruments: the rediscount rate, the required reserve policy, the open market policy and money issuance, which had a direct impact on the money supply and the interest rate (Federowicz, 1997, pp. 22-23). It should therefore be noted that in the occurrence of an economic downturn, the government lowers the rediscount rates or reduces the required reserves and in turn buys securities under open market operations or increases the issuance of money. The reduction of the interest rate was intended to stimulate the investment activity of economic entities, which in turn would result in an increase in employment, an increase in the employees' income and an overall increase in the scale of effective global demand. In the occurrence of a crisis, the Central Bank, by lowering the rediscount rates, increased the money supply, which had a high impact on creating additional demand for commercial investment and consumer loans offered by banks. As a result of this assumption, the national income and the wealth of citizens also amplified. The policy of 'cheap money' in the conditions of recession could have had the opposite effect. Borrowers, fearing an increase in interest rates in the near term, would not increase their consumption and investment in spending. Keynes had argued that the monetary policy should be supported by fiscal policy measures (such as budget expenditures and taxes), thus pointing to the close relationship between both policies and the current economic situation.

Another aspect which was significant in the actions of the government's interference in the economy was the technique of financing. Keynes considered the public debt as the basic mean of financing, whilst focusing only on the positives of this technique, thus marginalizing the negative impacts

of inflation. Keynes' view of the government unquestionably differed from the classical view, hence facing much criticism on its way.

It is however worth noting that there is no compromise on the use of interventionism as a mechanism for improving the country's situation in the field of economic sciences. The Austrian economist Ludwik von Mises was one of the mentioned-above critics. He believed that "interventionism means that the government does not limit its activities to keeping order or, as people used to say a hundred years ago", maintaining security. "This means that the government aims to do more. He wants to interfere with the market's phenomena" (Mises, 2011, p. 14). It should however be outlined that not every activity undertaken by the government which results from an attempt to ensure security is aimed at manipulating the financial situation of an individual or the condition of the economy as a whole, or a particular sector of this economy in the principle of hierarchical subordination, when the entity exercising the power of the state imposes on subordinate entities the course of action. Mises was the mentor of Friedrich August von Hayek, whose ideas stood in opposition to the interventionist model advocated by John Maynard Keynes. Hayek opposed the view that the government should steer the demand and regulate the economic phenomena. He also believed that spontaneous order and self-regulation of economic processes were more appropriate for the market equilibrium - it was supposed to be done by the 'invisible hand of the market'. Hayek argued that central banks should be deprived of the monopoly on the money creation system, and governments should support the so-called free banking - a decentralized banking system. Together with the Austrian school, he strongly criticized the solution proposed by Keynes. Mises believed that in accordance with this, politicians obtained permission to increase spending, thus they did not have to look for savings. Based on Mises's theory, Hayek created a model opposite to Keynes' views, the so-called Mises-Hayek model (Piech, 2014, p. 6). It shows that the monetary sphere and the real economy are closely linked. As a result of this, money is not neutral. Hayek believed that it was monetary factors that had a decisive impact on the business cycle. Hayek, along with other representatives of the Austrian school, also adopted the thesis focused on the irrationality of expectations. They also engrossed on the differences concerning the demand for and supply of consumer and investment goods caused by monetary disruptions, resulting in forced savings and then recessions.

### **Instruments of state intervention in the face of the pandemic crisis on the example of Poland and Great Britain**

The pandemic of coronavirus has posed a significant challenge for the European economy and the residents' income sources. In the current epidemiological crisis, it is vital to protect those sectors which have a crucial meaning for the economy, but likewise the assets, technology, and infrastructure and, most importantly, securing occupations and its employees. As part of the introduced programs, the governing parties of many countries could support enterprises affected by the COVID-19 pandemic by granting assistance for maintaining financial liquidity in the forms of secure loans guarantees and by contributing to the loans' interest rates.

Poland's response to the first wave of the COVID19 pandemic in terms of the fiscal policy was substantial, with an estimate of PLN 116 billion (5.2 percent of the national gross domestic product). An estimate of PLN 74 billion (3.3 percent of the national GDP) was endorsed for entrepreneurs and the latest credit guarantees and micro loans. In addition, the Polish Development Fund funded a liquidity plan for enterprises worth PLN 100 billion (4.5 percent of GDP). Another introduced measure was the reduction in social security contributions for contributions for enterprises employing up to 50 employees and self-employed contractors. The mentioned reduction applied for the duration of March to May 2020. Organizations employing less than 10 employees, and in most cases, self-employed contractors were able to benefit from a complete reduction, whereas the organizations employing between 10 to 50 employees – reduction amounting to 50 percent. It must be noted that larger organizations were not eligible for this reduction. Self-employed, high-income earning contractors were also excluded from this scheme as the income was capped at a certain level. To benefit from this scheme, the receivers could not have any amounts outstanding in their social security contribution payments and had to explicitly apply for this funding.

The governments of both countries have opted for wage subsidizing and benefits due to the economic downtime. Poland introduced such a benefit for self-employed individuals and those who work on civil law contracts. As a compensation for the drop in revenue, the government applied the benefit of a lump sum which was paid out to self-employed individuals (50% or 80% of the national minimum wage) and those working on civil law contracts received the sum equalling up to 80% of the national minimum wage. This scheme was primarily introduced for the month of April 2020, however, was

then extended until June. To be entitled for this scheme, the payees needed to demonstrate a drop of a minimum 15% in their revenue on a month by month basis. Organizations, independently of their size were, able to request funding of the salary costs and social security contributions for the duration of a maximum of 3 months. Such organizations had to record the drops in their revenues. Several separate instruments regulated by different legal provisions are concerned. In some cases, enterprises must reduce working time to get subsidies. It must be noted that in some cases, enterprises had to reduce their working time in order to benefit from the funding. In other instances, however, enterprises were not permitted to partake in the STW in order to benefit from the funding (subsiding) as this could result in double financing. Subsidies were also available to self-employed, however, those who were not hiring any employees. The amount received was dependent on the enterprises' reduction in turnover and amounted to approximately 50% to 90% of the minimum wages. Business owners were also obliged to sustain the operation of their enterprises for the duration of the funding. Similarly, Great Britain introduced measures which included the government paying 80% of average earnings to self-employed contractors and to furloughed employees (capped at £2500 per month). This is known as the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme. For employees who were furloughed during the pandemic, the CJRS was extended until the end of October. This scheme was reformed and with effect from July, employers were able to place their employees on furlough leave for a part of their weekly working hours. The government's contribution to the furlough scheme reduced from 80% to 70% in September (maximum of £2,187) and was reduced further to 60% with effect from 1st October (maximum of £1,875). Employers were required to contribute the difference to top up the 80% of the wages. The furlough scheme was likewise extended for the self-employed, however, it was prolonged for a period of 3 months and the government's contribution was reduced to 70% of the individual's earnings (IMF Policy Tracker, 2020).

Poland launched a package of loans for enterprises which amounted up to PLN 100 billion (being 4.5% of GDP). A portion of these loans may be withdrawn under specific circumstances such as the continuity of business operations following the end of the national restrictions and by securing jobs. The operational and technical features of the implemented measures will vary subject to the organization's size (micro enterprises – up to 9 employees, SMEs – from 10 to 250 employees and large enterprises – over 250). The Polish Development Fund is the body responsible for granting such loans and

subsequently issues funds for the enterprises and its operations. Such bonds are warranted by the state and purchased by the National Bank of Poland. Loans of up to a maximum of PLN 5,000 (approximately EUR 1,100) were available for micro-enterprises, non-governmental organizations, and self-employed contractors (European Commission, 2020, pp. 70-73).

The government of Great Britain initiated three distinct loan programs to expedite the organizations' access to credit. Together with the British Business Bank the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme to support SMEs and the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loans Scheme to support bigger enterprises, which carry an 80-percent guarantee for loans up to £5 million for the former and up to £300 million for the latter. Furthermore, the government of Great Britain introduced a Bounce Bank credit program for small and medium-sized enterprises with a 100 percent guarantee for credits amounting to £50,000 (IMF Policy Tracker, 2020).

Many people in Poland have a liberal view of the economy. For years, the scale of tax burdens and the necessity to pay contributions have been questioned. Today, the vast majority of citizens and entrepreneurs expect interventionism. Suddenly, it turns out that we need the state, and we remember what its fundamental role is - to guarantee security for citizens. Such a policy is conducive to the fact that the government does not lose public support during the crisis, which is reflected in election courts.

On November 4, Poland's authorities as a response to the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic announced an implementation of additional fiscal measures assisting the economy. The approximate cost of these measures to date has not been clarified and the approval of the parliament is yet outstanding. The main measures consist of:

- co-funding of the permanent costings for small and medium-sized enterprises in the sectors which were mostly impacted by the national restrictions,
- disregard of subsidies from the PFR Financial Shield for small and medium-sized enterprises. This measure was available for sectors depending on the sanitary restrictions and subject to an increasing drop in revenues (of at least 30%) between March 2020 and March 2021,
- Financial Shield scheme for large organizations was extended until March 31, 2021 for applications and until June 31, 2021 for the payments. The change in regulations for evaluating the losses due to COVID-19 in terms of preferential credits was extended from the current timeframe of March

to August 2020 until March 2020 to March 2021, based on the original structure of the scheme,

- de minimis guarantees were maintained for small and medium-sized enterprises, and, in addition the liquidity guarantee was also upheld for large organizations as this requires the coordination from the European Commission on the likelihood of subsidies to cover the loan payments with the six year maturity for sectors impacted by the restrictions,
- subsidies to jobs were prolonged in the structure of lay off's and a reduction in the working time,
- self-employed contractors profited from the standstill benefit as this was extended in the sectors which were subject to restrictions,
- those sectors which were affected by the national restrictions received exemptions from paying the social security contributions,
- co-financing of a change in the scope of activities under grants for business; increasing the amount of the subsidy from 6 to 8 times the average salary and extending it by co-financing not only new activities, but also changes in the scope of current activities for industries affected by the restrictions,
- second chance policy was proposed, which was based on co-funding the costs associated with restricting of organisations by the ARP,
- transport sector received co-funding in terms of their leasing systems,
- voucher of PLN 500 for all teachers to cover expenses for the IT equipment necessary to provide remote teaching (European Commission, 2020, pp. 70-73).

On September 24, the government of Great Britain introduced a new package of measures. These included:

- Self-Employment Income Support Scheme was extended further for those individuals who were continuing their trade however faced a reduction in their demands due to the pandemic. The initial sum granted to self-employed covered 20% of their profits in the 3-month span from November until the end of January 2021 equalling up to a total of £1,875. A second grant will be accessible from February next year until the end of April,
- the temporary 5% decrease in VAT was extended for the sectors of hospitality and tourism until the end of March 2021,

- VAT payments were postponed until the end of March and are to be paid in 11 instalments. Similarly, self-assessed income tax which was initially due in July has now been deferred until January 2021 and is to be paid in 12 instalments,
- loans taken under the CBILS and BBLs were extended for a period of up to 10 years,
- likewise, the applications periods for the stated above loans were extended until the end of November (IMF Policy Tracker, 2020),
- estimated total value of support under the Polish Anti-Crisis Shield is PLN 212 billion (nearly 10% of GDP),
- government cash component worth approx. 67 billion (2.9% of GDP). It consists of taxes as well as social and health contributions,
- government liquidity component with a value of approx. PLN 75.5 billion (3.3% of GDP). It consists of: credit holidays and deferred tributes, as well as liquidity financing in the form of loans and financing from the use of funds from the Polish Development Group (PFR, BGK, KUKI, ARP),
- NBP liquidity package worth approx. PLN 70 billion, ensuring the necessary liquidity and credit conditions (European Commission, 2020, pp. 70-73).


The state assumed that with increased consumer incomes (benefits), the functioning of the market would not change (the relationship between supply and demand). During the pandemic, consumers changed their purchasing plans. The uncertain time kept these amounts from being spent and thus not driving the market. Consumers in the age of the Covid-19 pandemic tend to hoard cash. Thus, assuming that their financial situation may deteriorate significantly in the near future.

### **Bankruptcy of enterprises and unemployment in Poland and Great Britain**

The emergence of the coronavirus pandemic has led to the emergence of an economic crisis all over the world, including Poland. The freezing of the economy has cut or diminished the sources of income for many enterprises. Outlets have disappeared. Supply chains are disrupted. Some have lost their jobs. The government protection package (the so-called anti-

crisis shields) has not turned out to be sufficient for all enterprises. In such a situation, the salvation from debts may be carrying out bankruptcy proceedings of the enterprises or declaration of consumer bankruptcy of a natural person. The coronavirus has had a huge impact on the health of global economies. We do not know the scale of the economic crisis yet, but its effect is rising unemployment, bankruptcy of enterprises and increasing debt. Figure 1 shows bankruptcies and dismissed bankruptcy petitions in 2020 in Poland.

Figure 1. Bankruptcies and dismissed bankruptcy petitions in Poland in 2020 (January 1 - October 31, 2020)



Source: Own study based on: Central Economic Information Centre, 2020.

In the whole of 2020, 515 bankruptcies were announced. For the first time, we have fewer bankruptcies than restructuring proceedings - 564 throughout 2020. If this trend continued in the long run, it would be beneficial for the entire economy. Such a low monthly number of bankruptcies may be due to several reasons. Entrepreneurs threatened with insolvency try to save their enterprises through an arrangement with creditors as part of restructuring proceedings. In October, we saw a record number of such proceedings - 106. The adoption of measures under the anti-crisis shield obligated entrepreneurs to operate for a certain period, including not declaring bankruptcy. The shield also provided additional liquidity which resulted

in over PLN 50 billion of additional funds on entrepreneurs' bank accounts. In April 2020, 34 bankruptcies were published in the Court and Commercial Gazette, according to analyzes carried out by the Central Economic Information Center. It was the lowest monthly number of bankruptcies in the entire period. Many more enterprises wanted to take advantage of bankruptcy, but 28 bankruptcy petitions were dismissed. An upward trend can be observed in the next three months. During the pandemic, it was in July that most enterprises declared bankruptcy - 62, and all applications were filed - 136. In August and September, a decline in bankruptcy is noticeable. In October 2020, 44 enterprises were declared bankrupt. Many more enterprises wanted to take advantage of bankruptcy, but 57 petitions for bankruptcy were dismissed. Table 1. shows bankruptcy of enterprises by industry in 2020.

Table 1. Bankruptcy of enterprises by industry (January 1 - October 31, 2020)


Type of activity	Quantity	Percent of bankrupt enterprises
Wholesale and retail trade; motor vehicle repair, including motorcycles	129	25.1
Industrial processing	127	24.66
Construction	68	13.20
Transport and warehouse management	35	6.8
Professional, scientific and technical activities	29	5.63
Activities related to accommodation and gastronomic services	26	5.05
Activities related to the real estate market	20	3.88
Activities in the field of administration services and supporting activities	20	3.88
Health care and social welfare	15	2.91
Information and communication	10	1.94
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing	8	1.55
Financial and insurance activities	8	1.55
Activities related to culture, entertainment and recreation	5	0.97
Generation and supply of electricity, gas, water steam, hot water and air for air-conditioning systems	3	0.58
Mining and quarrying	2	0.38

Water supply; sewerage, waste management and reclamation activities	2	0.38
Other service activities	2	0.38
Education	1	0.19
Other service activities	5	0.97
Total:	515	100

Source: Own study based on: Central Economic Information Center, 2020.

As far as sectors of the economy are concerned, most proceedings concern entities dealing with commercial activities 25.1%, industrial processing 24.66% and construction 13.2%. The least threatened by bankruptcy are the following sectors: education, water supply; sewerage, waste management and reclamation activities, mining and quarrying, generation and supply of electricity, gas, water steam, hot water and air for air-conditioning systems. Figure 2. shows bankruptcies in Great Britain from January 1 to August 30, 2020.

Figure 2. Bankruptcies in Great Britain in 2020 (January 1 - August 30, 2020).



Source: Own study based on: The Insolvency Service, 2020.

In 2020, the largest number of British enterprises went bankrupt in January - 1514. We can observe a downward trend until June. It was in June that the fewest enterprises went bankrupt – 762. In July, this value was higher by 199 enterprises. In August 2020 there was a total of 778 enterprise insolvencies in Great Britain. The overall reduction in enterprise insolvencies was likely to be, in part, driven by the range of government measures put in place to financially support enterprises in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Total claims at the end of August were £ 35.4 bn.

The government also announced in late April that it would temporarily prohibit the use of statutory demands and certain winding-up petitions from April 27 to June 30, 2020. This was further extended to September 30 under the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act (The Insolvency Service, 2020).

Business bankruptcies are still being dealt with. However, it should be noted that enterprises maintain a safe level of liquidity, still using government anti-crisis programs and funds obtained from financial institutions, which also supported them with special solutions during the pandemic. To reduce the greater risk of non-payment, some sellers switched to pre-payment and some started using credit insurance. A concept closely related to bankruptcy is unemployment.

Eurostat and Statistics Poland (GUS – Polish Central Statistical Office) provide divergent data on unemployment in Poland. This is due to different research methodologies. The Statistics Poland presents data on unemployment from two sources: registration of the unemployed in district labor offices - on this basis, the registered unemployment rate is calculated with a monthly frequency at the end of the reporting period (end of the month), representative Labor Force Survey - LFS (the equivalent of the Labor Force Survey / LFS in the EU), which is carried out in Poland on a quarterly basis. The results collected in this study allow for the calculation of the unemployment rate according to BAEL, published every quarter. Eurostat presents unemployment data on a quarterly and annual basis based on the labor force survey. These data are obtained from national statistical offices, in Poland - GUS. Moreover, for the purposes of monthly statistics in the European Union, Eurostat produces a harmonized unemployment rate based on the ILO methodology. Due to the lack of possibility to receive monthly indicators from LFS, the data for Poland are estimated by Eurostat based on quarterly results of the labor force survey (LFS / BAEL) and monthly data on registered unemployment, seasonally adjusted and forecast for subsequent periods. The discrepancy between the monthly value of the unemployment

rate on the Eurostat website (calculated on the basis of the ILO methodology) and the data on the registered unemployment rate (calculated monthly) presented on the GUS website results from a different methodology used in collecting and compiling the data, including the definition of an unemployed person (Beszenker, 2020). Table 2. shows unemployment in Poland.

Table 2. Unemployment rate – registered and total unemployment rate in Poland in 2019-2020 (%)

Month	Unemployment rate - total (% of the workforce) EUROSTAT		Registered unemployment rate %(GUS)	
	2019	2020	2019	2020
January	3.8	3.0	6.1	5.5
February	3.8	3.0	6.1	5.5
March	3.6	3.0	5.9	5.4
April	3.4	3.2	5.6	5.8
May	3.3	3.3	5.4	6.0
June	3.3	3.3	5.3	6.1
July	3.2	3.2	5.2	6.1
August	3.1	3.1	5.2	6.1
September	3.1	3.1	5.1	6.1
October	3.0	n.d.	5.0	n.d.
November	2.9	n.d.	5.1	n.d.
December	2.9	n.d.	5.2	n.d.

Source: Own study based on: GUS, 2020c; EUROSTAT, 2020.

The registered unemployment rate estimated by the Polish Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Policy was at the end of September 6.1%, which means that it has remained at the same level for four months. Thanks to the introduction of the anti-crisis shield, changes in the labor market are not as sudden as forecasted in March. Unemployment did not increase dramatically during the pandemic. As part of the three targets - anti-crisis, financial and aid - the government has already allocated over PLN 142 billion to protect jobs and ensure financial liquidity for enterprises. According to the latest Eurostat data, in August 2020 Poland was the second country in the EU after the Czech Republic with the lowest unemployment rate, reaching the rate of 3.1% against 7.4% among all EU countries and 8.1% in the Euro zone. The unemployment rate in the country was down

0.1 percentage point lower than in July this year and remained at the same level as a year ago. Thanks to the remote work introduced under one of the targets during the lockdown, the enterprises could maintain the continuity of operational activities. Table 3. shows unemployment in Great Britain.

Table 3. Unemployment rate - registered and total unemployment rate in Great Britain in 2019-2020 (%)

Unemployment rate - total (% of the workforce)	2019	2020
<b>January</b>	3.8	3.9
<b>February</b>	3.7	3.9
<b>March</b>	3.7	3.8
<b>April</b>	3.7	3.7
<b>May</b>	3.8	3.7
<b>June</b>	3.8	3.9
<b>July</b>	3.8	4.3
<b>August</b>	3.8	4.6
<b>September</b>	3.7	4.8
<b>October</b>	3.7	n.d.
<b>November</b>	3.7	n.d.
<b>December</b>	3.7	n.d.

Source: Own study based on: EUROSTAT, 2020.

The UK unemployment rate tended to decline at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, since July, there has been a noticeable steady increase in the unemployment rate, which in September reached 4.8%.

The government is trying to protect jobs in many ways. The largest is the vacation program, where most of the wages are paid to employees when their employers cannot. As a result, many of these people did not become unemployed. However, the vacation program was closed in September and October, ahead of the scheduled closure on October 31. Many enterprises laid off jobs in preparation for the end of the program, and there were record increases in layoffs from July to September (resulting in an increase in unemployment).

### Conclusion

Keynes' vision of the government highly differed from the classical approach. According to Keynes, the state had to interfere with the economic

sphere, as only in this way could it lead to improving the degree of utilization of its manufacturing capacity, correct the market failures, prevent social unrest and reduce the size of forced unemployment. The passive attitude of the state in economic life led to the deterioration of the condition of the economy, contributed to the non-competitive behavior of monopolists, and also deepened socially unacceptable material and income discrepancies in society. The current economic crisis has brought back the importance of Keynes' anti-crisis theory in the economists' debate on economic stabilization.

The coronavirus pandemic caused the labor market in Poland and Great Britain to experience rapid changes that it was not fully ready for. Many enterprises have cut employment and suspended recruitment in the hope that it will help them through the difficult period. The state played an important role in saving the economy in both countries, which decided to interfere with the instruments of state intervention. All state financial aid contributed to the maintenance of many jobs and prevented many enterprises from bankruptcy. Employment security measures introduced in both countries, as an expression of state intervention, to some extent contributed to the end of unemployment growth and the number of bankruptcies resulting from lockdown. Unfortunately, the assumptions made did not work out in Great Britain's statistics, which took into account the rising unemployment rate. This may indicate that state intervention brings positive results in short periods. Governments have also failed to take into account changes in people's purchasing preferences. In this case, people's rising incomes did not boost the economy as expected. Fearing a worsening financial situation, people focused on saving. State interventionism is necessary in times of crisis, but its instruments do not always bring the intended results.

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(...) The purpose of this monograph was to start a debate on the current state of research in relation to the phenomena, processes and trends referred to as contemporary challenges for the functioning of states and international organizations (in selected aspects). An attempt was made to verify and aggregate theoretical and empirical research on problems and threats to entities on the international arena.

This monograph is a collection of chapters made by researchers representing various academic centers from Poland, Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia, who indicate the multifaceted aspect of challenges in the modern world in terms of social, economic, political, and global threats.

The authors of the monograph are of the opinion that it is impossible to properly understand the specificity of challenges for the modern world, and therefore this monograph, without a critical look at the socio-economic and political systems, both in the national, regional and international dimensions. In view of the above, the authors' task was to embed the aspects of challenges for the functioning of states in the external and internal dimensions, based on the aforementioned dimensions of analysis.

From Introduction